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SUMMARY
The thesis examines the accession of the 
Hellenic Republic to the European Communities 
on January 1st I9 8 I and compares it with the 
accession of the United Kingdom, Denmark and 
Eire on January 1st 1973 to determine the contribution 
of law to the enlargement process and to appraises 
its quality as a Law of accession.
While for reasons of space the thesis had 
to be selective, the whole history of enlargement 
has been considered from the important Association 
"with a view to membership," with Greeces in I9 6 I 
to the present. The proposed accessions of 
Spain and Portugal are mentioned only by way 
of illustration.
We consider the forces that motivate enlargement 
and the impact of enlargement to assess the extent 
to which law can control non-legal factors. We 
look at national law, international law, and 
community law and the underlying assumption that 
the function of law in the communities is to 
promote the goal of European integration or at 
least to advance the wider aims of the Preamble of 
the E.E.C. Treaty.
This thesis reflects the opinion that it is 
impossible, when studying a dynamic system such as 
the Community, to refrain from commenting on the 
successes and failures of the integration process
vii
in the hope of offering possible solutions to 
problems of the accession method by indicating 
how changes could be made in the law and practice 
of accession.
In assessing the impact of the law of accession 
the thesis examines the institutions, to see how 
they have been affected by the exercise both 
directly and consequentially,
A selection of Community policies are looked 
at to see what kind of effect accession may have.
¥e have felt compelled to explore the 
problem of withdrawal from the Communities and 
the related difficulty of re-negotiation; these 
represent an antithesis of enlargement. Such a 
study might lead to a broader understanding of 
accession as a legal process.
Finally, in the conclusions, we apply the 
understanding gained in the main body of the thesis 
of the scope and effect of the law of accession and 
the relative practice, to the problems we have 
identified. We then suggest changes to the 
established accession procedure by taking an 
overall approach trying to avoid the retrograde 
effect that the present method seems to have.
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THE LAW OF ACCESSION OF STATES TO THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES ; THE CASE OF 
THE HELLENIC REPUBLIC.
"... but when states are acquired in a province 
differing in language, in customs, and in 
institutions, then difficulties arise; and to 
hold them one must be very fortunate and very 
assiduous *"
(Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince.)
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
The second enlargement of the European 
Communities as a result of the accession of the 
Hellenic Republic (Greece) as its tenth member 
has been an event of significance for the Com­
munities: not only because of the expected impact in
political,economic and social terms, but also, and 
it is with this that we shall be most concerned, 
as another illustration of the Communities' 
practice in carrying into effect the commitment 
contained in the eighth indent to the Preamble of 
the 1 9 5 7 Treaty of Rome, to preserve and
strengthen peace and liberty, and calling upon the 
other peoples of Europe who share their ideal to 
join in their efforts ..."
Such a statement implies both a process and 
a procedure, a gradual coming together. It is, as 
we shall see, a process that has a number of legal 
components
not all of which are contained or based on the 
three foundation Treaties. The larger part of 
the process is carried out as a matter of practice; 
a practice emerging from the action of officials 
and authorities at the national and at the supra­
national levels.
The purpose of the present dissertation is 
to examine the Communities' practice or method 
of effecting enlargement and to identify and 
evaluate the function of law. We shall look for 
concordant practices which we may consider to be 
part of the law of accession following aspects 
of Hart's approach to Law^*.
By thus having distinguished between the 
legal and the non-legal aspect of the enlarge­
ment method and by having considered the nature 
of the legal components, we shall then indicate 
whether the accession of the Hellenic Republic 
has evidenced the existence of a law of 
accession. We may then discuss the efficacy 
of this body of law.
While inquiring, in this dissertation, 
into the Greek accession we shall contrast and 
compare it with that of the United Kingdom,
Denmark and Ireland ("the first accession").
3Although negotiations with Spain and Portugal 
are well advanced, for reasons of space and clarity 
we have restricted references to these negotiations 
and applications to footnotes and for occasional 
emphasis in the text. Our relative familiarity 
with the effects of accession on the United 
Kingdom is the main reason for selecting the 
British experience as representative of the first 
accession in 1 9 7 3 : the four applications were,
at that time linked with each other, an.d the pace and 
direction of negotiations was dictated by the British 
application. We have not hesitated to consider 
aspects of the Irish accession or Norway's 
"slip twixt cup and lip," It has been, in 
addition, essential to look at the first 
abortive British application in the 1960s 
because it was then that the practice evolved 
which has become the foundation of the law of 
accession.
The European Coal and Steel Community 
(E.C.S.G.) and the European Atomic Energy Community 
(EURATOM) are discussed hardly at all. The E.E.C, 
is by far the most wide-ranging and dynamic of the 
Communities, The saving of space also supports 
such an approach. We have frequently chosen 
to speak of " the Communities "
where speaking generally, of the activities of 
any of the institutions of the three Communities.
We begin our aim of isolating the legal 
contribution in Chapter H  in the form of a 
"screening-out" of (a) geographic and historic 
factors; and, (b) political and economic factors. 
Admittedly this may involve an arbitrary selection: 
one could as easily choose sociological, 
linguistic or even gastronomic factors, all of 
which could possibly be relevant. We have 
chosen these two sets of related factors, firstly, 
because they themselves are the aggregate of a 
number of other factors and, secondly, because 
of the intimate connection they bear to the topic.
We are investigating a European Economic
Community : Europe may be defined,in the first
instance, as a geographic and historical entity;
Art. 2 of the E.E.C, Treaty clearly sets out its
economic purpose, if such a statement were necessary;
and while a community need not always be political,
when the inter-relations of states and their
economic activity are an issue, politics becomes
inevitable: "We are not in business at all: we
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are in politics," said Walter Hallstein , Ernst 
Haas too in the early days of economic integration 
in Europe, considered the E.C.S.C. to be a 
political community^.
Our choice of such an approach is justified in 
the context of Chapter tit » where we go on to 
consider the importance of integration theory. 
Integration theories, as will be seen, concentrate 
to a greater or lesser extent on the economic and 
political factors which usually involve and 
specify a use of law in the integration process.
It is only the application of these theories to 
enlargement that concerns us and not other appli­
cations to integration elsewhere in the Communities 
Ve touch here, for the first time in the thesis, 
on the importance of goal-definition. Integration 
theory assumes that integration is per se 
desirable and we accept this as a criterion of 
efficacy (whJ.ch the reader may treat as a caveat.}. 
Integration theory provides a standard which may 
facilitate the evaluation of the contribution of 
law. It will be noted too that integration theory 
is itself always in a state of flux; we assume 
too that this second accession, with which we 
are concerned, may affect integration theory 
once its significance is fully received*
Chapter PJ , discussing the contribution 
of international and municipal law, is included 
as a necessary preliminary to later discussions. 
This leads us to the core of the topic which is
treated in Part Two of the dissertation.
Part Two begins by scrutinising the law and 
practice- of accession in its application to the 
accession of the Hellenic Republic. Chapter V should 
be of particular interest: it examines the worth of 
a pre-accession association agreement. This is % 
historically and technically,, the single most signif­
icant legal distinction between the first and second 
accessions. We begin to notice, in chapter V, how 
restrictions in any particular stage of the process of 
accession or enlargement in the wider sense of the 
terra can have consequences for the other stages. This 
relationship, which goes to the heart of the inquiry 
dealing with the role of law in accession,becomes 
gradually more evident in Chapters VI & VII where the 
other advanced stages of the accession process arc 
reviewed.
Going beyond the limits of a solely theoretical 
study we enquire about the goal which law might be 
expected to achieve and are consequently compelled to 
look (without being exhaustive) at the practical results 
of enlargement. Chapter VIII studicKs institutional 
changes induced by the accession of a new member state. 
Such changes are expressly contained in the accession 
documents and admit easily of comparison. The implies! 
and consequent changes are sufficiently predictable 
to allow of discussion. Chapter IX
deals with some of the less easily traced conse­
quences of enlargement: those areas where the
direction of Community functioning is affected 
by accession. This is a selective exploration 
which takes into account the dynamic features 
of the Communities,
In Part Three, the concluding section of the 
dissertation, Chapter X , canvasses the emerging 
issue of the possibility of withdrawal from the 
Communities and the other related output - failures 
in the present enlargement method, viz. re­
negotiation and secession. The final Chapter.X I 
integrates conclusions already drawn in the 
course of the thesis and critically appraises 
the function of law in the enlargement method 
and offers practical suggestions for the 
Improvement of the way in which the Communities 
enlarge,
As already indicated, our method involves 
contrast and comparison. The greater part of the 
research for this dissertation was executed 
between September 1979 and September I9 8 I, There 
was, at that time, no systematic survey of the 
Greek accession negotiations. Accordingly, our 
first task was to prepare a narrative account of 
the Greek negotiations from the often scanty 
reports in the Bulletin of the European Communities 
("the Bulletin") and newspaper reports.
8The passage of time has brought with it an 
increasing amount of published work incor­
porating pertinent, though not prédominently 
legally directed, material (most notably, The 
European Community and its Mediterranean Enlarge­
ment by Loukas Tsoukalis, I9 8 I). Such material 
has been included as footnotes, or to the extent 
it supplies crucial information, in the text. We 
have included our narrative account of the Greek 
negotiations referred to above as Appendix A; it 
may be of some interest in its own right; it is, 
at the same time, the factual basis for many of 
our arguments and conclusions. The inclusion of 
the narrative account in the body of the thesis 
would have diverted attention from the thrust 
of our argument,
The source material we have used is that 
available in English, Whilst this facilitated 
our research in relation to the British attempts 
at accession and the two accessions themselves, 
there was a scarcity of material written in English 
about the Athens association agreement, A number 
of apparently cognate articles in Greek, cited in 
English works, remain uninvestigated.
Our principal sources of reference are the 
Community Treaties, the appropria te secondary 
legislation, the jurisprudence of the Court of 
Justice, reports and working papers of the 
Community institutions and organs,
9especially the Association Council under the 
Athens association agreement. Ve have made 
considerable use of the Bulletin and other 
publications of the Information Office of 
the European Communities, All of these have 
been available at Glasgow University library 
as an official depository of community 
documentation. We have in addition relied 
upon related academic writings of the 
European Communities,
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PAI^ T ONE 
CHAPTER 11 
MAJOR NON-LEGAL FACTORS
The enlargement process of the Communities, 
when a state applies for accession, involves a 
number of legal considerations; and while we may 
be able to identify a law of accession, the content 
of that law will vary from time to time. In 
comparing and contrasting the first and second 
enlargements^the attribution to the application 
of legal norms as causing major differences, which 
may actually be the result of unique factual or 
historical circumstances^should be avoided. Ve 
shall in this chapter make reference to these factors.
(a ) Geographic and Historic factors.
Historically, Greece was always likely to 
answer the call in the Treaty Preamble (page 1 above}. 
The earliest Greeks, known to us as a barbaric 
tribe, the Heliens, had drifted down from the 
Danube/Black Sea area around 1400 B.C. and had 
later returned to Europe as a colonial power 
(see Galtung page 59 "below } colonising between 
8 0 0 and 6 0 0 B.C. the area now known as Naples in 
Italy and Marseilles in France, There then 
followed,(4th century B.C.), the Golden Age of 
Pericles when democracy, science, and philosophy 
flourished^. The Macedonian conquest pulled Greece
back towards the east but Roman conquest brought 
her closer to developments in the European area. 
Later, in the 4th century A ,D*, the Goths 
invaded Greece and it was not until the I820*s, 
after the Byzantine era and Ottoman rule, that 
Greece gained independence as a political entity 
and state.
In 1 9 0 9 a military coup took place. In 
1 9 3 6 the Metaxas dictatorship was established.
The aftermath of the Second World War brought 
a civil war between the Royalists and the 
Communists, lasting from 1946-1949. Then the 
British^who had included Greece within their 
sphere of influence,were unable to sustain their 
role in the area and were replaced by the 
United States,
The united States* response in 1947 was to 
shape iirs own foreign policy until the present 
day and have a substantial impact on Greece: "The
very existence of the Greek state is today 
threatened by the terrorist activities of 
several thousand armed men led by communists, 
who defy the governments authority at a number of
points, particularly the northern boundaries....
I believe that it must be the policy of the 
United States to support free peoples who are 
resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities 
or outside pressures. Should we fail to support
la
Greece and Turkey in this fateful hour, the effect 
will be far reaching to the West as well as to 
the East-, We must take immediate, and resolute 
action,"^ This is,, among other things, the 
source of the Greek fear of Turkish aggression 
and distrust, of N,A,T.O, which we shall later 
see was to play a substantial part in the 
accession negotiations (see page 1 5 0 below and 
App. a). The Monarchy was formally abolished 
in 1 9 7 3 after the military coup of April 21st 
1 9 6 7 and shortly before the fall of the military 
government due to its failure to deal with the 
disagreement with Turkey over Cyprus in 1974.
Karamanlis was recalled from exile to begin 
what was to become Greece's eventual progress 
towards membership of the Communities,
This historical background informs us 
of certain aspects of Greek foreign policy 
which we shall see reflected in later developments; 
for example„ accession had to be able to deal 
with the Greek/Turkish relationship. When one 
recalls that this same accession procedure was 
used to resolve the question of New Zealand butter 
imports to the United Kingdom we begin to see how there 
can be a difficulty in formulating a generally 
applicable; law of accession.
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The foregoing brief introduction shows that the 
Greeks are indeed linked with Europe; this is some­
thing they vehemently stated during accession ne­
gotiations.
Greece is a medium-sized European Republic 
stretching across the tip of the Balkan Penninsula 
from the Ionian to the Aegean seas. Europe can be, 
and is primarily, a geographic term. The significance 
of this to the law of accession is that the clearest 
legal source of accession procedure, viz. Art. 237 of 
the E.E.C, Treaty states that an application can be 
made by "any European state.,.", (The reader is referred 
to Appendix D for relevant Treaty articles).
Although this may not be immediately important, 
the sudden economic development of, for example, an 
African, Caribean and Pacific state might make this 
an issue. Haas^quotes Gravier who sees "a Vest 
European economic space", "elongated into Vest Africa". 
Ve submit that the term "European" has to be construed 
narrowly otherwise there is a danger of losing the 
loyalty to an ideal which is an integral part of the 
Communities and which is a focal point of integration 
theories (see Chapter ITT ), We can say that the 
Greek accession has c o m  irmed that a very restrictive- 
view of Europe will not be taken by the Communities; 
indeed this attitude was, already apparent from 
the Athens association agreement of 1p6l which ad­
mitted of the possibility of membership.
14
It would seem that the correct approach is neither
8geographic nor historical but is multifactorial • 
Already we can see that law in the instance 
above has a definite normative function. It 
prohibits certain conduct even if such conduct 
would be otherwise indicated on other grounds: 
for example,* the United States could not apply 
for membership. It has a positive aspect by 
encouraging applications by European states (the 
wider implications of this are discussed in 
Chapter III )• Another indication of the nature of 
the law of accession that we obtain from Art, 237' 
is that it does not specify in detail who may and 
who may not apply.
In addition the position of Greece on the 
Mediterranean coast tends to bring it within the 
quasi-political grouping of "Mediterranean states". 
It is the similarity of topography and climate which 
associates Greece with other littoral states despite 
the lack of formal or economic bonds,^
The country extends to 51,000 sq.ml, in area* 
similar in size to Czechoslavakia, Most of Greece 
is within 40ml, of the sea and 75^ of the land mass 
is mountainous. The climate varies radically from 
one area to the next* but the conditions are quite 
similar to those of the other Mediterranean states*
15
The population is concentrated in and 
continually drifting towards the cities. Over 
half of the population is classified as urban
10and Athens itself accounts for around 3m people
Greece does not share a common boundary 
with any other Community member state. This 
has implications for transport costs and the 
Communities aid funds. On the other hand, the 
Greek merchant fleet is one of the world's 
largest.
10
(b) The Political-economic backgrond.
The Communities were formed with implicit 
political goals. One of these goals was a certain 
economic stability which was sought after World 
War Two, "...with the support of the United 
States, a powerful movement began to take shape 
for the restoration of commercial and economic 
relations in accordance with the theories which 
assert that international competition in a really 
big market will ensure that men and materials
are put to the best use"#^^
It was in this atmosphere that the three 
communities were established. Political co­
operation, or at least a certain degree of 
shared political harmony, was assumed. The 
immediate aim was rather economic, with scope 
left for gradual political progress.
The Communities are not "evangelical": it
is left to non-member states to apply for member­
ship or association. To say this is to take a 
legal approach. In economic terms, the establish­
ment of the Communities has been an act which has
focussed the attention of other states towards it, 
especially on its Common External Tariff, It was 
this more than any other background factor which 
prompted the United Kingdom and the other applicant 
states to seek to join the Communities, There 
was also considerable pressure from the United 
States.
lY
In 1 9 6 1 , Prime Minister Macmillan said to
the British House of Commons, "a Community
comprising as members or in association, the
countries of free Europe coul0 have a very rapidly
expanding economy, supplying as it eventually
would, a single market of approximately 3 0 0 m,
p e o p l e * T h e r e  was for the United Kingdom the
added problem that its traditional source of food
and industrial raw material, the Commonwealth,
was contracting, "In the last few decades the
majority of them (Commonwealth nations) have
sought to enlarge both the variety of their
1 3produce and the range of their markets,"
The pressure from the United States was both 
politically and economically motivated: "Through­
out 1 9 5 0 s andl 1 9 6 0 s there were growing signa that: 
the U,S. now regarded the Six as the most important 
ally in the cold war,..• Britain had lost ,., her 
former position of special access to Washington,
A strong Europe would be able to dispense with
Américain aid  It would not only act as a
bulwark against the spread of Soviet Communism, 
but would help to share the U.S. burden of 
distributing aid to the underdeveloped countries 
of the world.,., after the I9 6O Presidential 
election, Washington began to apply steady 
pressure on London to bridge the gap with the 
Six,. 5^^
It was hoped that a substantial economic
IS
benefit would accrue from membership, "Free 
competition from Europe would give our industry 
the stimulus to efficiency it lacked. wore 
important, access to the mass market of the 
Continent would provide our more efficient in­
dustries with the opportunities to expand,. ,.
which neither the British home market nor the 
Commonwealth could any longer ensure,
Politically the British were not enthus­
iastic about Europe. They believed they had 
rescued Europe from Hitler with the assistance 
of their former colonies and had not themselves
been invaded, Britain had been separated from
« 15mainland Europe since the Norman conquest.
It was to be some? time between 19 6 3  and 19733 
that the United Kingdom would be able to enter. 
President de Gaulle’s press conference of 14th 
January I9 6 3 which effectively vetoed Britain’s 
application came directly after the meeting at 
Nassau on December 1 9th of the previous year 
between John F, Kennedy, then the U.S, President,, 
and Harold Macoiillan, the United Kingdom premier, 
at which the U,K, effectively associated its defence 
policy with that of the U.S., That extraneous 
matters of a political nature were able to affect 
an application based on an attempted economic 
co-ordination is an indication of a problem in the 
accession procedure. It is a problem which we 
shall discuss in the context of the Greek 
negotiations (eee“page 71 and App, A)
1 9
In comparison, the application of Greece was
based on different motives from those involved' in
the British accession, "Enlargement is unquestionably
a political imperative for the Community. To slam
the door on the newly emerged democracies of
southern Europe would be an act of folly as well
1 6as of selfishness".
It has been suggested that from an economic 
point of view Greek accession should not have been 
permitted because it was too expensive or rather that 
the Greek economy was too weak to contribute to the 
progress of the E.E.C.. This is sometimes known 
as the "Rich man's club" argument.^^ It has some 
force.particularly in a time of recession. It need 
not be a capitalist or reactionary attitude. It may 
be that to allow a less developed Country (L.D.C.) 
to join the E.E.C, would put so much pressure on it 
that the general political benefits would be lost.
As might be expected, when applying for member­
ship the Greeks claimed that the economic problems, 
apart from being secondary, were not serious: "It
may therefore be said that economic developments in 
Greece have been characterised in recent years by 
exeptional dynamism, considerably greater than that 
which had been predicted at the negotiations for the 
association of Greece with the E.E.C. in 
However, the Commission of the European Communities 
("the Commission") noted that in the period between 
1961 and 1 9 7 3 » "...agriculture lost little of its 
importance ..." and "...at the same time the 
industrial sector, because of the low starting point
has not yet reached the stage of providing a very
1 8substantial part of the G.D.P.".
A cost-benefit approach, although often 
disavowed, was apparent in the negotiations. This 
may have been as a result of the experience of the 
first accession when economic arguments seemed so 
crucial and in the U.K., "...the political
implications of joining the Common Market were 
constantly played down by the government once it
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had decided to join." The cost-benefit analysis in 
so far as it was relevant was briefly as follows. 
Greece was to obtain an expanded market for her 
industry, aid from the Community regional and 
monetary support funds, aid from the C.A.P, and 
assistance in moving industry to secondary 
production levels from the reclamation and 
mineral mining stages which were predominant. The 
Community in return was to gain access to Greek 
mineral resources, especially bauxite, nickel, 
iron,copper, asbestos, lead and zinc*
The Community was also expected to gain 
from an enlarged market and from the proven oil 
reserves in Thassos of at least eighty thousand 
barrels per day. The value of Greece as a minor 
financial centre for the Middle East and the rest 
of the African littoral states was not under­
estimated •
Finally there was the Greek merchant fleet 
which was equivalent to 6 5^ of the tonnage of thé 
existing members, "Greece also brings with it as a
.n
2 O
dowry, the largest merchant fleet in the world...".
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a statement which suggests that apart from this 
asset, there was very little of short term benefit 
to the community.
There was not then the same weight of obvious 
economic benefit in support of the Greek application 
as there had been when the United Kingdom applied.
We have already referred to a point which will 
arise throughout this thesis; respective motives 
for applying for membership were different in the 
cases of the United Kingdom and the Hellenic Republic# 
In the case of the United Kingdom there was the 
hope of economic benefit; in the case of Greece, 
political stability was thought to be more 
important. The Communities are not supposed to 
consider applications in this way: they are
constrained by the commitment to European unity 
and must allow for accession where the requirements 
of Art, 2 3 7 are met. What the Communities may do 
is to ensure that the accession does not damage the 
Communities' existence whatever the motivation of 
the applicant.
While this can be an economic or a political 
question, we submit that this can only be the case in 
the most exceptional of circumstances: a bankrupt
(economically undesirable) or anarchic (politically 
undesirable) member could bring Community function­
ing to a halt. However, it should only be in extreme 
cases that one of these factors could weigh against 
the primary importance of Treaty obligation to permit 
accession.
This being so, a way has to be found to achieve
2 3
this task. It is at this stage that law assumes a 
function. The Communities are built on a foundation 
of law, not only international law but also its own 
legal order. Its functioning and development are 
governed - and according to the integration theories 
which influenced its creation - predetermined and 
directed by its legal nature. Thus while it could 
have been possible to translate an "economic" 
application into the terms of a "political" 
application and seek to deal with the same 
parameters and concepts, this has not been the 
Communities* experience. In both accessions the 
economic and political issues have been encompassed 
within community legal terms and concepts. It 
would be attractive to ascribe this to an acceptance 
of a "rule of law" by the leading actors but we feel 
(and this is justified by the integration theories 
we discuss and the accession procedure we later 
examine) that the very nature of the Communities 
necessitates such an approach.
Law is closely and intimately connected with both 
politics and economics and it is to some extent 
impossible to "screen-out" the political and 
economic aspects, healing with this inter-relationship 
Walker says of politics, "As studies jurisprudence and 
politics are interdependent and almost indistinguish­
able in origin ,,,,In practice the studies of law 
and politics are inextricably enmeshed and inseparable”; 
and of economics - "Much law springs from the 
necessity of regulating economic relations and exists
33
for ttiat purpose while economic activities , . .
are shaped materially by the legal forms
21recognised in the community,"
We now proceed to consider some aspects of 
integration theory, having shown that the inter­
relation of law, politics and economics is of 
practical significance in accession. We hope to 
clarify the scope within which legal technique 
may be applied in accession allowing us to examine 
the actual practice critically.
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CHAPTER III 
THE INTERRELATION OF LAW, POLITICS AND 
ECONOMICS IN ACCESSION: THE VALUE 
OF INTEGRATION THEORY.
In considering accession as a process which 
alters many aspects of the Community legal and in­
stitutional functions, we are obliged to review some 
of the fundamental Community concepts. This is 
because of the "re-ordering of the stakes of 
integration!*, which is said to take place on 
accession (see page 73 below). There will be 
powerful interests seeking to change the status 
quo. Those promoting these interests might try 
to use accession as a means of effecting changes 
which they could not otherwise execute. If, as we 
have suggested, it will be for law to ensure that 
accession is effected in the best way suitable for 
the Communities* goals, then it is necessary to 
determine the scope of the function that law may 
have to fulfil before proceeding. We must do this 
before going on, as we do in the concluding 
section, to evaluate its efficacy.
The Schuman plan envisaged "a new High
Authority whose decisions will bind France,
22Germany and other member countries"* Remember­
ing also the Schuman statement that, "Europe will 
not be made all at once; or as a single whole;: it 
will be built by concrete achievements which first
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create de facto solidarity,'* ^^here is little doubt 
that law was intended to further the political 
goals of the Communities by making these achieve­
ments more likely by utilising the normative function 
of rules ("binding decisions").
The accession of a new state necessarily 
involves a consideration of this fundamental inter­
relationship between law and Community goals.
It must be remembered that when considering 
integration theory, its recent development is 
largely based on the Communities' own experience.
These theories, deduced from the complex and dynamic 
political and economic status quo, deal with the way 
in which it is thought that law can be used. But, 
because it is a theory which is derived from all 
three disciplines, it is quite amorphous.
Federalism
is perhaps the foremost theory of 
integration of states (themselves legal/political/ 
economic entities). It begins with the United States 
of America. Before this, integration, when it took 
place, did so as a result of conquest or colonisation. 
"Neither the Declaration of Independence of July 4th, 
1 7 7 6 nor the constitution ratified by the thirteen 
states in I7 8 I contain any provision authorising the 
the federal government to regulate trade between the 
states. This lack of economic unity quickly gave 
rise to serious complications in trade and dissatisfied 
several of the less favourably situated States which
26
were suffering economically. Hence the constitution 
of 1 78 7 removed from the individual states the right
23to keep their own tariffs and currencies."
The precedents in Europe were the Zollverein 
and latterly Benelux established between 19^3 and 
1 9 4 5 on a different basis from the united States of 
America. They decided to form a customs union, but 
only after the economic position had been consolidated.
Implicit in the federal model is convergence 
at a high political level. We are concerned only 
with the federal model in which power is transferred 
to a higher authority by surrendering powers of the 
integrating states to the federation. Law is used in 
these situations (and the U.S, constitution is an 
example) to demarcate the areas of competence of 
the states and the federation.
To this extent the legal framework of a 
federation is unlikely to have a dynamic enlargement 
facet. Indeed it is likely to inhibit dynamism. It 
is appropriate in this regard to note that the united 
States has in the past enlarged by first purchasing 
the appropriate territory either by private or 
public treaty. Thereafter the acquired territory 
may aspire to statehood which is given by a
24downward grant as in the cases of Alaska and Texas,
The political future of the Communities in the 
long term was and indeed still is thought of as
27
leading towards a "United States of Europe," The 
more immediate aim in the first fifty years was 
to be the domain of a different political organ­
isation; "Some people may still want to ask whether 
the Community is a 'federation* or a * confederation' 
in the contrasting terminology of nineteenth- 
century constitutional theory. In my view, the 
alternatives are false. For the Community is 
neither. It is not a federation because it is not 
a state. And it is not a confederation because it 
is endowed with the power of exercising authority
directly over every citizen in each of its
2 5member states,"
So the federal model has difficulties in 
truly representing the reality of the European 
Communities. It can be useful in a study of 
enlargement only by way of analogy. Admittedly 
however, insofar as an application is made by a 
state to the Communities, the accession procedure, 
especially the negotiating conference, has an 
external similarity to a federal model and the 
ever increasing influence of the European Council 
adds to the illusion of federalism.
We now turn to a selection of the more 
modern theories concerned with integration in 
the latter part of this century.
oFunctionalism,
as a theory, predates the formation 
of the Communities, having been incubated in the 
nineteen-thirties . It could therefore have^Jiad 
an influence in the formation of the Communities 
themselves. Functionalism is a concept of social 
science rather than any of our three areas of 
enquiry(law, economics and politics) alone; but 
that being so it is applicable to all of them to 
a degree, all being social sciences in their own 
right. We propose to look briefly at its 
contribution to understanding the enlargement 
process and the position of the law therein.
The international community is seen in terms 
of social, economic, and technological forces 
which transcend national boundries. Because of 
the increase in technological achievement it is 
postulated that the political (and legal) reality 
will require to adapt to accommodate this progress. 
This happens unconsciously and, more significantly, 
with a minimum of political intervention; "The
nature of each function tells precisely the' "range 
of jurisdiction and the powers needed for effective 
performance. And for the same reason, unlike rigid 
political arrangements, functional arrangements can 
be adjusted, without political friction when the 
conditions of the function are seen to have changed".
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The first thing we notice is that functionalism 
recognises what we may call an extra-territorial 
dynamism that is obviously relevant to a study of 
enlargement. If we take States A,B, & C , which all 
have functional links one with another, they will 
also have links with states X,Y&Z respectively.
What is it that identifies A ,B&C as a community 
and X,Y,&Z as outsiders?
The functionalist answer is that legal rules
will develop to meet the need. This is what is
suggested by Witrany when he speaks of the "range
of jurisdiction and the powers needed for effective
performance". It is in the nature of law to reduce,
where possible, the normative requirements to as
few rules as possible and provide for these rules, to
27a single source of validity.
This suggests that the legal form which will 
arise from the relationship between A,B&C will be 
generalised and capable of extension because of 
the mutuality of their obligations. On the other 
hand the relationship with X,Y&Z will be particularised 
and limited.
Functionalism indicates two things to us.
Firstly, that there is a potential for membership 
of a community even if mutual legal obligation 
is minimal and political co-operation not evident; 
secondly, that the more numerous these co-operations 
become the easier it will be to give them legal effect.
30
What this theory lacks is specification. We 
are concerned with one particular set of communities 
and the European Communities are far more complex 
than what the postulates of functionalism envisage. 
Neo-functionalism tries to remedy these shortcomings.
Neo-funct ionalism,
Goes on from functionalism and begins
to take account of factors other than technological
change. Foremost among these factors according to
Haas is the central position of the political actors
or as he later describes them "elites". It is the
shifting of their activity towards a centre with
institutions which brings about unity. Moreover
these institutions either possess or demand
28
jurisdiction over the member states.
A theory such as this involves a considerable 
legal contribution. An institution is established by 
law and its activities are likely to includd the 
power to legislate.
The other major theme of neo-functionalism is 
"spillover". This term refers to the way in which 
activity in one field makes activity in another field 
essential. The most obvious example was the drift 
to formation of the E.E.C. and Euratom after the 
success of the E.C.S.C, (see also "spill-back"in 
App. B ) ,
Haas anticipated an extra-territorial spill­
over; "Is there not evidence that countries not
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initially members of the regional grouping find it
desirable to deepen their ties with the integrating
bloc? Is there evidence, in short, that the geo« '
graphical, as well as the functional dimensions of
integration, tend to expand as new sectors are added?
The evolving attitude of Great Britain towards Euratom
and the General Common Market provides some interesting
29speculative material ..." His examination of Britain* s%
then apparently casual ties with the Communities (an
association agreement with the E.C.S.C. being the
only formal manifestation) concluded with the
statement that, **A geographic spill-over is clearly 
30taking place.". While the b,K.*s accession seemed to 
substantiate this analysis, the Greek accession follow­
ing on the Athens Association appears to put the matter 
beyond doubt. Neo-functionalism clearly does offer 
a theoretical basis for enlargement.
Of greater legal interest is the way in which 
the institutions are taken account of in the theory.
This view is taken further by Lindberg and Scheingôld^^ 
who include the ideas of competence and decision 
making within their theoretical community model. Neo­
functional theory as developed by these two writers is 
quite complicated but because it is of great 
analytical value; and because it provides a convenient 
shorthand mode of expression of key terms we have in­
cluded a brief summary which comprises appendix B,
They said that enlargement with the U.K. was,
*not simply geographic expansion with its own special 
considerations, but, more significantly, several
32
distinctive kinds of internal redistributions which
might be expected to flow from British entry". As
integration itself is a process^ then accession
procedure must also be dynamic, Hallsteins analogy
is still a graphic description of this; enlargement
is like a passenger boarding a ship; it cannot go
back to port nor can it change course and both must
32be kept moving. This is recognised by neo-function- 
alism which accepts that the Communities cannot make 
progress without first consolidating achievement and 
moving forward. We shall look to see whether this is 
reflected in our examination of the law and procedure.
In so far as the applicant has to be speeded up 
or the Communities slowed down, it is likely to be law 
which is used for this purpose, having, as it does, 
a central position in the Communities. In our next 
chapter we look at the nature of the law which is or 
can be applicable to accession. However law is not 
just a technique for effecting enlargement* legal 
changes are themselves the reality of enlargement,
This is picked pp by Lindberg and Scheingold in their 
discussion of "systems change" (which they consider 
accession to be). This systems transformation is,
"an extension to specific or general obligations that 
acre beyond the bounds of the original Treaty commit­
ments either geographically or functionally. It 
typically entails a major change in the scope of the 
Community or its institutions, that often requires 
an entirely new constitutive bargaining process among 
the member states, entailing substantial goal
3 3
33redefinition among national political actors,"
Even although Lindberg and Scheingold are espec­
ially concerned with politics, we can see that this 
core concept of systems transformation has a 
considerable legal component. For example they 
speak of "commitments" and "obligations" which in 
the Community are frequently capable of analysis in 
legal terms. The components of their theory will 
be measurable in some instances by considering legal 
instrumentation. They also expressly acknowledge the 
extension of obligations geographically as a systems 
transformation which accords with our earlier consider­
ation of enlargement as a "geographic spill-over",
We shall in the course of the thesis refer back 
to Lindberg and Scheingold’s model both for convenient 
terminology and to provide a theoretical framework 
for understanding the significance of the legal changes 
we shall see take place on the accession of a new 
member state.
We now proceed to look at the different range 
of norms applicable to accession.
CHAPTER IV 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MUNICIPAL 
LAW ; ACCESSION AND THE 
NEW LEGAL ORDER.
"(The Community) has a constitutional law,
which inter alia governs distribution of powers
among its various jurisdictional centres; and yet it
also has a strong element of Treaty law, and relies
on international law techniques for certain types
of legislation and , indeed, for amendment of its
Constitution, the constitutional acts themselves
acquiring their sanctity because they are treaties
and not because they emanate from the people in
34constitutional assembly..."
We do not find the above analysis entirely 
satisfactory (with no criticism intended of the 
learned author who was writing with a different per­
spective ), but it does illustrate the point we wish to 
make: accession is effected by the operation of
multifarious rules. Whether these are rules of the 
same or different legal systems can give a practical 
as well as theoretical result (see Lord O'Hagan's 
question page 164 below).
To those who think in terras of a hierarchy of 
norms, the initial statement has much to recommend 
it. Runnings speaks above of sanctity but this is 
hardly an appropriate term being a hybrid moral/legal/ 
political concept. It does however point to a consider­
able problem in Cbmmunity law in general, and to the
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process of accession in particular.
Article 237 E.E.C., in that it refers to "an 
agreement between the member states and the applicant 
state", is contemplating what in international law is 
a treaty. The rules of international law relating to 
t±?eaties will therefore apply to the accession treaty. 
International law is not yet sufficiently clear on all 
the questions of form and effect of treaties. It has 
been said that, "the intention to be bound is the 
critical point," We submit, that the question of 
intention to be bound in international law may differ 
from the intention to submit to binding rules.
How far then does accession depend upon inter­
national law? We think it sufficient to say that it 
is a source (in a non-technical sense of that term) 
of the law of accession. International law is not 
however a true source of Community law,^^
The principal application of international law 
is the accession treaty. We have already indicated 
that a binding international agreement may not be an 
essential part of Community membership; why then is a 
treaty concluded?
A number of reasons are possible. It may be 
that the content suggests the form: the negotiation
phase of the accession procedure closely resembles 
traditional international relations. The determining 
factor may be thé need for supremacy of Community 
law which is achieved in some states only with 
difficulty. The conclusion of a treaty being thought
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of as a higher source can allow the "external" norm
37to have Internal effect.
We do not have the space to review the whole
supremcy question here and neither is there any need
to do this. We accept that Community law must take
precedence over even inconsistent later national 
37legislation. It is this necessity of being able to 
accept the supremacy of Community law, whatever its 
foundation, that we consider to be part of the law of 
accession. Where does this obligation come from?
Art, 2 3 7 E.E.C, makes no mention of supremacy; neither 
is there any mention of it in the foundation treaties 
themselves. The doctrine was,in fact, developed by the 
Court of Justice of the European Communities ("the 
Court of Justice" or "the Court") in the now well 
known series of decisions in the early 1 9 6 0s: case
2 6/6 2 , Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der 
belastingen, (I9 6 3 ) C.M.L.R. 105» By analysing the 
effects of the treaty referring in particular to the 
possibility of community law directly affecting 
individuals without the need for its conversion or 
adoption by national legal systems, the court found 
that the Community legal system was a new legal order; 
the later case 6/64 Costa v E.N.E.L. (1964) C.M.L.R. 425 
saw the Court going further and by founding on the 
reciprocally binding effect on the state of accepting 
the Community treaties, the need for the treaty to be 
effective and the individual rights conferred, held 
that a subsequent national rule, incompatible with
37
the aims of the E.E.C, treaty could not apply in any 
conflict,
O Q
In subsequent cases, the Court clarified the 
supremacy of Community Law to the point where it can 
no longer be in dispute. The position was already 
clear when the first accession took place, but it is 
fair to say that it was not settled when the U.K. 
applied for membership. Acceding member states must 
accept this jurisprudence as part of the acquis 
communautaire (see page 67 below).
It is curious that in each of the accessions 
we have examined, some attention has been paid to the 
doctrine of supremacy which itself is not mentioned in 
the foundation treaties. The commission Opinions 
forming part of the accession documents both state, 
"Whereas it is an essential feature of the legal 
system set up by the treaties establishing the Communities 
that certain of their provisions and certain acts of 
the community institutions are directly applicable, 
that Community law take prededence over any national 
provision conflicting with it and that procedure exists 
for ensuring the uniform interpretation of this law: 
and whereas accession to the Communities entails 
recognition of the binding force of these rules 
observance of which is indispensible to guarantee the 
effectiveness and unity of Community Law."^^
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We submit that this itself has no binding force. 
Certainly Art. 189 E.E.C, states that opinions shall 
have no binding force. It is probably there to give 
political support to a position which is given its 
legal protection by accession itself, in that Art.
164 E.E.C. gives the Court sole jurisdiction to 
interpret the Treaties,
There is much of interest in looking at how 
the applicant states bring their national legal 
systems into line with the supremacy doctrine* but 
it is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine this. 
The domestic problems of Eire and the Hellenic
4oRepublic are well set out by others ; Both of these 
states enacted constitutional amendments which 
provided for the supremacy of community Law and it 
justifies our saying that some such arrangement is 
an informal but essential requirement before accession 
will be permitted.
We now return to the idea of sanctity of the 
constitutive treaties. An acceptance of this idea 
causes difficulty when accession is contemplated,
Does the alteration of these treaties materially 
affect the new legal order which has been founded on 
them? We would submit that this is not the case. An 
accession will not seriously affect the new legal 
order if it is accepted that its validity rests upon 
à rule of recognition, which Hart, speaks of as 
"providing the criteria by which the validity of the
41other rules of the system is determined," He calls
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this an "ultimate rule". The usefulness of the 
Hartian view is that it does not rely solely upon 
a perusal of the treaties themselves to determine 
the content of the rule. "A rule of recognition 
is unlike other rules of the system. The fact that 
it exists can only be an external.statement of fact.”^^ 
We would apply this to accession to the Communities 
by submitting that for so long as the features which 
led the Court to declare the new legal order and the 
supremacy of Community Law remain in existence the 
communities constitution remains intact.
This sort of reasoning was apparent in the 
E.N.E.L, ^page 36 above)case. The court said, "In 
fact, by creating a community of unlimited duration 
having its own institutions, its own personality... 
real powers...the member states have restricted their 
sovereign rights.^
The corollary of this is that as a new member 
state brings about a new factual status, the rule of 
recognition may change slightly.
The importance of having an understanding of the 
nature of Community Law is seen for example when we 
later see that the negotiation phase of the accession 
procedure raises questions about the difference between 
adjustment (provided for in Art,237 E.E.C.) and 
amendment (provided for in Art. 236 E.E.C.).
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How these articles are interpreted can have 
enormous ramifications for accession procedure. If 
instead of accepting the Hartian analysis one were to 
take a Kelsenian view* considering the treaties to he 
the locus of a "grundnorm" or basic norm* then the 
choice between adjustment and amendment could become 
a technical matter. If one accepts the rule of re­
cognition analysis, the choice between these two 
courses becomes a matter of qualitative appraisal.
A final indication that the rule of recognition line 
is more appropriate is seen in Lindberg and Scheingold 
who in their consideration of systems transformation 
place some weight on the "political economic reality" 
(see also Friedman).
Two final issues need to be mentioned about the
implications of international law. The Court of Justice
ruled in case 11/70* Internationale Handelsgesellschaft
(1 9 7 2 ) C.M.L.R. 2 5 5 that "respect for fundamental
rights has an integral part in the general principles
of law of which the Court of Justice ensures respect.
The protection of such rights,, while inspired by the
constitutional principles common to member states*
must be ensured within the framework of the community
Il 5
structure and objective" . This raises much the 
same question as we looked at above. It also seems to 
be an acceptance of the argument that the Community 
constitution can be altered* albeit imperceptibly, 
without formal amendment of the Treaties,
41
Another aspect of the same motif is the effect 
that accession has on the ability of the Communities 
at some stage to amend the Treaties, This difficulty 
arises because the new member states may be barred 
by their constitutions from allowing such a course 
considering that they might be exceeding the original 
power granted by constitutional amendment to join the
4oCommunities. Lang certainly felt that this might be 
the effect of the Irish constitutional amendment. Art. 
28 para. 3 of the constitution of the Hellenic 
Republic could easily have the same effect. While these 
enabling clauses, being widely drafted, are not 
likely to become obstructions to future amendment, 
this is a contingency which must be provided for.
This concludes our preliminary investigations 
into the motives for enlargement and the general 
political, economic and legal background factors.
We now proceed to inspect the accession procedure 
itself.
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PART TWO
" "And must one have a permit to sleep here ?" asked 
K..."One must have a permit," was the reply..." "Well 
I'll have to go and get one," said K. yawning..."And 
from whom pray?” asked the young man.,."From the Count," 
said K.,"that's the only thing to be done.""A permit 
from the Count in the middle of the night I" cried the 
young man..." "Is that impossible?" inquired K. cooly, 
"Then why did you wake me?" "
(Franz Kafka, The Castle )
SECTION A 
THE PROCEDLKE AND PRACTICE OF 
ACCESSION.
CHAPTER V 
ASSOCIATION WITH A VIEW 
TO MEMBERSHIP.
As we shall see when examining the negotiation 
phase in the next chapter, applicant states must at 
times feel that K., the proverbial camel and rich 
man could not experience as great a difficulty in 
reaching, respectively, the castle, the other side 
of the needle and the kingdom of heaven, as 
applicants have from experience had in trying to 
accede to the European Communities. A procedure has 
developed and we start by looking at what we suggest 
can be thought of as the first legal regime providing 
for the controlled accession of an applicant state to 
the Communities: a Community legal act under Art, 238
E.E.C*. We look first at association agreements 
generally and then at the idea of association with
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a view to membership. Chapter VI which follows examines 
Art, 2 3 7 E.E.C. which is the only Treaty article 
expressly providing for accession. Chapter VII 
looks at the legal regime which applies subsequent 
to accession*
We look at association first because it is 
logically prior and historically it was the 
Communities' first response to application (which 
according to Lindberg and Scheingold can be considered 
as "demand" within their equation) for eventual 
membership,
Association under Art, 2 3 8 is to be distinguished 
from application for membership under Art,,237 and from 
commercial agreements in terms of Arts, IIO-II6 E.E.C., 
The latter are concluded by the Communities alone and 
bind the member states. The Commission makes a 
recommendation to the Council which then gives a 
negotiating mandate to the Commission. The Council 
forms a mandating committee to assist the Commission,
Article 2 3 8 on the other hand is a wide and 
flexible provision; "reciprocal rights and.obligations" 
can be as wide or as restricted as the parties 
themselves desire. A possible restriction one could 
posit is that these rights and obligations should not 
be inconsistent with the Treaties themselves. Another 
restriction would be to apply the rule expressio 
unius alterius exclusat to the relationship between 
Arts . 2 3 7 and 2 3 8 , This would prevent any association 
agreement amending or adjusting the Treaties,
There are three identifiable uses to which the 
association agreement is put.
The first use is to regulate the relationship 
of the Communities with the member states * former 
dependencies and ex-colonies. The principles 
governing these arrangements are found in Art. 132 
E.E.C,. These may be concluded under the so-called 
"mixed procedure" which differentiates them from otheir 
association agreements'^. Examples of these are 
the agreements with Nigeria and Lome Conventions.
Secondly* the Communities have association 
agreements with the Maghreb states* with Malta* 
Austria, Iceland* Portugal* Sweden* Switzerland, 
Turkey* Finland and Norway among others. These 
are themselves broadly divisible into categories.
The Maltese and Maghreb agreements resemble pre­
ferential trade agreements common enough in 
international relations* although they do have 
the hallmark of the Communities; an institutional 
structure viz. the Association Council.
The agreements with Switzerland, Austria 
and Sweden are also distinguishable; these 
agreements exist despite:(a) Switzerland's perman­
ent neutrality first recognised during the 
Congress of Vienna and now internationally accepted; 
(b) Austria's similar neutrality and its obligation 
under the State Treaty for the Re-establishment 
of an Independent and Democratic Austria (1955)» 
preventing Austria entering a political or economic 
union with Genhaiiy;(c) and Sweden's "non-legal"
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neutrality founded on a neutral foreign policy, ^see 
Eek).^7
This shows how flexible association under B.E.C. 
Art* 2 3 8 can be. As Eek said, "It is important*, how­
ever, to note that Art, 238 in the Rome Treaty is 
drafted in wide terms and permits a minimum of 
rights and obligations between the parties to an
association agreement as well as an arrangement
hiwhich comes very close to full membership."
Indeed Sweden's second application was considered 
by the Communities as having been made under
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article 2 3 7 and not 2 3 8 .
.Association was taken to its limits (for the 
present) in the case of Greece, This was the first 
association agreement and as can be seen from our 
chronology (see page 2 1 5 balow) the beginning of 
the Communities’ enlargement policy. The distin­
guishing feature of this, the Athens association 
agreement, and the Ankara agreement with Turkey is 
that they were concluded expressly with a view to 
the eventual full membership of the associate.
This is evident from the preamble of the Athens 
agreement at para. 4, "Recognising that the support 
given by the European Economic Community to the 
efforts of the Greek people to improve their 
standard of living will facilitate the Accession 
of Greece to the Community at a later date."
This is given substance by Art.72 of the Athens 
agreement: "As soon as the operation of this agreement
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has advanced far enough to justify envisaging full 
acceptance by Greece of the obligations arising out of 
the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, 
the contracting parties shall examine the possibility 
of the Accession of Greece to the Community.^ ^Admit­
tedly this is not a very onerous obligation but it is 
more than an expression of hope, for otherwise the 
preamble expression would have been sufficient.
What is noticeable even at this early stage is 
the Communities’ insistence upon "full acceptance".
This inchoate expression was later to blossom into
the doctrine of acquis communautaire (see page 6? below).
There is a similarity between the idea of a 
grant of aid by the Community to Greece and the grant 
by the United States to the original member states 
under the Marshall Aid between 1948 and 1952. The 
form of the agreement also clesely follows that of the 
Community treaties. This suggests that the Communities 
were acting reflexively rather than deliberately: an
ad hoc response.
Not only was this association with Greece the 
first move towards enlargement, but it was not 
intended to be the last. At the signature ceremony 
the then President of the Council said, "We see in 
your country ...the cradle of European culture. How 
then could we possibly conceive a European Community 
without Greece?...it is with your country that we 
make the first step towards the extension of our
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49Community,"
The desire for eventual adhesion was provided 
for in a practical way in the agreement by the atten­
tion to economic detail: "It is certainly true that
the association is no mere commercial agreement. The 
texts quite clearly show that it,.,was in fact 
intended as a preparation more or less advanced 
according to the area - for full membership in
many, if not in most, of the main areas of activity
50mentioned in the Borne Treaty,"
What this suggests is that association with 
a view to membership does not depend on an Article 
such as Art. 72 Athens alone^but upon the scope and 
nature of the substantial provisions contained in 
the agreement. On the other hand the political 
effect of Art, 72 Athens was to be confirmed when 
the association was "frozen", which we discuss 
later in this chapter(see page @1 below).
The definition, if we were to seek one, of 
association with a view to membership would be 
based on integration theory which we looked at in 
Chapter III,(see page 24 et seq above) and would 
reflect the existence of legal political and economic 
motivating forces.
If we accept that the political requirement 
was met by para. 4 of the preamble and Art, 72 
Athens, where should we look for the, economic 
indicator? "The agreement of association went 
beyond the establishment of a customs union. It 
called not only for the complete abolition of all
4»
barriers to trade between Greece and the E.E.C,
over a transitional period of twenty-two years but
also for the harmonisation of Greece's agricultural
financial and transportation policies with those of 
51the community',' Accordingly only the closest possible
economic ties justify the "with a view to membership"
tag. It was the detailed legal obligations binding
upon both parties which actually made the Athens
agreement part of the law of accession. It is
analogous to the motoring rules which ensure that
vehicles are travelling at a sufficiently fast
speed before joining a motorway. The accession
procedure and particularly the association with a
view to membership is analogous to the lane markings
which allow a "filter feed - in lane" where a driver
hoping to join the traffic can pick up speed (Highway
code ch, 149).
We have then an agreement with a long term
political aim and a medium term economic aim, IVhich
was the greater influence? It was said that "The
problems of economic unions between countries that
are in different stages of economic development have
not yet been resolved. Extension of the traditional
customs union theory to problems of economic unions
between developed and developing countries is not
always appropriate for the special conditions of
52such unions," This sentiment was expressed by others 
53suggesting^^ that it must have been largely a 
political decision to associate with Greece at that 
particular time.
The contents of the agreement are well described
by the other writers cited in this chapter but a 
brief summary follows for the sedce, ofT continuity.
The agreement took effect from November 1st, 
1 9 6 2 ; A twelve/twenty - two year transitional 
period was established for the full realisation of 
customs union and Greek exports were given equivalent 
reductions on tariffs to the member states themselves. 
Special attention was given to sensitive products. 
Tobacco and raisins were given preferential treat­
ment but quantitative restrictions were placed on 
some fruit produce. All imports from the E.E.C., 
with the exception of most industrial products 
produced in Greece, were to be subject to complete 
tariff reduction in a staged period within twelve 
years. Art. 18 of the agreement allowed Greek 
derogation ^ "provided this action would help 
stimulate new activity." Industrial products were 
treated similarly but were subject to a 22 year 
transition period; by staged reductions within the 
transition period Greece was to adopt the Common 
External Tariff: An association Council was
formed; free movement of labour, capital and 
services was to be achieved and Greece was promised 
loans of 125m. U.S. dollars in the first five years 
of association.
Clearly this was an agreement differing in 
degree rather than in the essentials from the 
original Treaties.
¥e now ask how this was likely to contribute 
to the enlargement method and how it did contribute
‘O
to the course of enlargement.
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Referring to the theoretical model in 
Appendix B we suggest that association is an 
example of demand in the enlargement process. Of 
course, an application for full membership is 
demand also but both can be distinguished on qual­
itative grounds: Association is a lesser demand.
Among the other factors mentioned by Lindberg and 
Scheingold, systemic support was not high at the 
time of the Athens association because the Comm­
unities themselves were only recently formed. 
Leadership was at a bigh level as the Commission 
was at that time unfettered by the Assembly or by 
Court decisions.
It was therefore likely that a systems 
transformation could be predicted,i.e.,that the 
Athens agreement would result in an increase in the 
functional scope and institutional capacities of 
the Communities.
It is not certain that association with a 
view to membership was intended to be such a 
theoretically sound proposition, but the resort to 
a system of rules indicates a conceptual approach. 
Had, for example,, only economic aid been intended 
this could have been done in other ways.
We now consider how far these theoretical 
expectations were justified in fact.
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We must first mention the freezing of the 
association. This, unfortunately, makes it extremely 
difficult to gauge the practical effectiveness of 
an agreement such as the Athens association in 
the accession process.
The circumstances of the freeze are well-
54known , The Greek army seized control of the
Government on 21st April 1 9 6 7 * The Communities’
answer was then to "freeze" the association. What
they meant by this was not entirely clear. The
Commission said in 19^7 that the freezing would
affect, ."areas requiring further negotiation and
54not bound by specific legal provision," This is 
an indication that there can be a division (although 
it may be only temporary) between politics, economics, 
and law in the accession process (and incidentally 
is a partial justification for the division we 
have made between these three disciplines). In­
deed, if we assume that the legal nature of the 
association was as dynamic as the original 
treaties then a freezing which did not interfere 
with the fundamental rules would have little 
retrograde effect on integration.
The other theme was that the association was 
reduced to current administration. The problem from 
the Communities’ view was that the Greeks were not 
in breach of their agreement. The "view to member­
ship" provisions were then used to try to justify 
what was in fact political disapproval of the 
regime. The President of the Commission said on
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November 28th 1 9 6 7 * "the association agree­
ment with Greece was not only an economic agree­
ment but also an agreement having a political
bearing as it would lead to the ultimate adhesion
54of Greece to the Community,"
This was perhaps unfair because the agree­
ment only "could" lead to membership and not "would"
lead to membership. There was in fact no legal
54basis for such an action, Coufodakis states*
"Art , 2 3 7 on membership set not only the geogra­
phic limits of the Community,i.e.*a European 
Community but also carried the de facto condition 
of Parliamentary democracy..." We look at this in 
more detail as a point raised at the time of 
accession (see page 120 below) but at this stage 
we submit that whatever the interpretation of Art,
2 3 7 E.E.C., to use that article to restrict the 
operation of the association was to take an extreme 
view of the extent of the binding force of Art, 72 
Athens, It is accordingly the case that the reader 
must beware of the distorting effect of the freeze 
in the discussion that follows.
The association did not live up to its economic 
promise. It had been thought likely, on theoretical 
grounds, that the Greek economic position would suffer , 
if the agreement were to be adhered to but that 
economic support would compensate for this, Hitiris 
predicted, "The deficit of the Greek balance of trade 
will expand during the period of association and 
the welfare effect of the changes in trade will not
,n
be very significant. If the deficit in the balance
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of trade means also a deficit in the balance of 
payments, Greece will probably meet additional 
difficulties in her effort for accelerated 
growth and development* However, the E.E.C,'s 
compensation of the detrimental effects of the 
association in the form of economic aid could 
possibly be extended to become the basic instru­
ment in the process of development through 
association,"
In any event, the communities were always 
likely to advance in the space of twelve or 
twenty-two years, making some obligations 
difficult to fulfil. Financial support was not 
forthcoming- under the Athens agreement the Euro­
pean Investment Bank was to allow loans of 125m,
U,S, dollars in the first five years of association.
By 1 97 0 only 6 9m, U.S, dollars had been advanced.
The Communities claimed that this was because of 
the freeze. Part of the failure to obtain the 
appropriate level of funding was in part due to 
the Greek failure to find sufficient capital and 
projects to absorb the loans (a maximum 2 / 3  capital 
could be required). Some 32m, U.S. dollars had been 
repaid before the freeze. It was suggested on the
56other hand that the industrial loan rate was too high. 
The Community's attitude, when considered with 
the two and a half year delay by the Community in 
ratifying the second financial protocol authorising 
loans of 280m, u/a, led Strathos to speak of "a lack 
of any substantial assistance,
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This economic problem in itself need not have
been at all serious , as Hitiris was speaking only
of static effects and it was apparent that there
would be dynamic gains for the less developed country
resulting from the relocation of resources and tariff 
53changes.
These dynamic effects are widespread and can 
explain why, notwithstanding the lack of enthusiasm 
on the communities’ part the creek economy continued 
to grow. Kalamatosakis went so far as to say that, 
"If the economic miracle which associate membership 
has brought continues to benefit Greece the country 
will be in a position to assume its responsibilities 
of full membership in the E.E.C. before 1984."'^^ 
(Incidentally this comment reflects the psychological 
force of Art, 72 Athens which made full membership 
by 1984 seem certain.]
Greece for its part continued to act as if the 
association had not been frozen causing it to suffer 
financial losses. The Greeks thought that this was 
of some value in the later accession application, "In 
fulfilling the obligations of the association for 
fifteen years... Greece has long since begun to 
adapt its economic structure to that of the Comm­
unity and moulded it towards full and complete 
57accession?^ It could have gone further. Had the 
association not been frozen, political initiative 
could have built upon the legal framework which had 
been provided to allow of a more active association, 
preventing a situation arising where it could be 
said that "participation in the Communities'
customs union is very different from being in 
a customs union under the association agreement.
As it was, the resulting position was more 
modest: "the existence of the 1 9 6 2 association
agreement, which makes provision inter alia for 
the gradual establishment of a customs union 
between the Community and Greece, puts the (Economic 
and Social) Committee in a better position to 
assess the results and problems of merging the 
two economies. ^
It should have been possible to make more 
of the association; we shall discuss this in our 
conclusions. Without a doubt, the association left 
much economic integration to be achieved which in 
the context of accession as we shall later see 
means that political issues will be needlessly in­
volved.
The association agreement was a useful 
political lever. Its value in this regard was due 
largely to its legal nature. The Greeks had after 
all continued the agreement against the strongest 
possible political opposition and they did not 
forget this when the time came to apply for 
membership of the Communities.
We shall now look at how the existence of 
this agreement was taken account of in the enlarge­
ment process at the accession stage. This, to some 
extent pre-empts our discussion of negotiations, 
but it seems proper that the association should be 
dealt with in all of its aspects at the same place,
as it is pivotal im this thesis.
The Greeks insisted that progrès» should con­
tinue to be made under the Athens agreement and that 
the timetables contained therein should be followed.
The Association Council on learning of the applica­
tion under Art.237 E.E.C, confirmed that the work 
involved in negotiating entry should not delay the 
development of the Association.^^It was also stated 
at this time that it was thought that progress 
already achieved under the association would help 
some of the problems posed by accession. This 
"separate development" operated satisfactorily but as 
time went by it was suggested that it was. unnecessarily 
formal to insist that negotiations- and the work of thes 
Council should be kept apart.
The fifth report of the Association Council 
reveals that whilst Greece continued to redhce 
its customs duties under the time-table> of the 
Athens agreement* some of its work was affected by 
the negotiations then in progress. Indeed)* as the 
Council's work was now relegated to day to day 
running* it was felt unnecessary to hold Association 
Council meetings at all* leaving the work to an 
Association committee. The Committee* reopening 
talks on the special tariff arrangements for the 
Dodecanese* was informed the Community could not 
proceed with entry negotiations on free movement 
of goods in the industrial sector until the 
special tariff arrangements had been resolved* and 
had deferred consideration until the deputies meet- 
ing on 20th February 1979#
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The Committee itself decided not to discuss the
question of duty free arrangements but to leave this
to be resolved in the accession negotiations.
These were pragmatic solutions. As such they
did detract from the legal obligations contained in
the Athens agreement. They did regrettably divert 
political activity from the association, which in 
the event of the collapse of the accession would 
have left the association weakened.
Greece took action under Art.18 of the Athens 
agreement to re-introduce a customs duty on cathode 
ray tubas for television sets at the substantial 
rate of 12^ for the E.E.C. and 20% for other countries. 
As required, a note was given of the economic grounds 
in support of the derogation. The Community thought 
these inadequate and complained that notice: had been 
given two months after their imposition. They were in 
the end approved.
The significant point for us is that in the 
accession negotiations this re-±ntroduction had been 
requested and rejected by the Commission. And so in 
a real sense the separate development continued in full 
force.
It has been said that, "there can be no doubt that 
the association has been a useful preparation for full 
membership.,.nor can there be any doubt that the pre­
paration would have been even more useful had the 
association agreement been fully carried out'*’^ ^In an 
economic sense it had not been a triumph;"the only area 
where a concrete preparation for full membership (had) 
in fact been achieved (was) that of the Customs Union"
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Neilsen questions the value of a consideration of the 
Athens agreement in discussing accession because "the 
accession negotiations are not based on the association 
agreement and the extent to which its various provisions 
have been carried ouf’.^^The only criterion she correctly 
points out is the ability of the applicant to accept 
the acquis communautaire and not whether either side 
has observed its obligations under the association 
agreement.
We cannot comment on how far we would adapt the 
present enlargement process until we have discussed 
negotiation and the other stages in the procedure* 
However, already we can say that law has had a positive 
and negative effect on the other aspects of enlargement. 
It consolidated past achievement by preventing the 
political act of freezing from terminating the relat­
ionship between the states - a negative function; the 
positive thrust of the provisions encouraged economic 
and political harmonisation. We expect to see these 
functions appear in the other phases of the procedure.
It is however impossible to evaluate fully the 
possible uses of association as part of the accession 
mechanism until we have looked at the other stages. We 
must bear in mind too that the Community itself did not 
know how difficult accession was at the time of form­
ulating the Athens association agreement.
We now turn to look at the procedure and practice 
founded on Art,237 which has already been mentioned 
in passing.
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CHAPTER VI 
ACCESSION PROCEDURE FOUNDED 
ON ARTICLE 237 E.E.C,
The express terms of Art. 237 imply that certain 
procedural steps will take place: An application
by "any European state"; a unanimous Council Act; 
a Commission opinion; an agreement between the 
member states and the applicant state which must 
contain the adjustments to the Treaty necessitated 
by admission. ^
We propose to discuss this procedure but not 
seriatim because the Community response to applic­
ation is not easily allotted to these categories.
We have already discussed the geographic and 
historical implications of an application (page lO 
above). Much has been read into this provision 
other than those aspects we mentioned earlier.
Galtung said of the community, "It is also con­
siderably less than "European": It is only for
those powers in Western Europe that meet certain 
requirements, above all recent loss of Empires and/ 
or N.A.T.O. membership’.'^^This may well reflect the 
Communities’ external appearance, but it is not 
given a legal warrant in Art, 237. However, we 
shall see that acceptance of an application does 
not always proceed upon legal grounds.
A less speculative extension of the term 
European is that mentioned by Bambassei^ among others;
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"One of the instructions of the preamble to the Treaty 
ôf Rome is that only countries which are both European 
and Democratic can become members of the Community
We can certainly see nothing in the English text 
of the Preamble, nor in the U.N, Charter to which it 
refers, to support this proposition. We shall return 
to this question when looking at the Court of Justice 
(page 120 below). What we can say is that neo­
functionalism assumes the existence of a pluralist 
state of some description in order that demand and 
pressure for progress generally can be processed in 
such a way that spill-over results. To this extent 
there would be a utilitarian argument for restricting 
membership to pluralist states. While almost every 
democracy is pluralist (indeed this is part of some 
definitions of democracy) not every pluralist state need 
be a democracy. As we shall later see* the acquis 
communautaire implies that Community initiatives will 
be followed, and the ability of the applicant to fulfil 
the acquis communautaire comprises a consideration of 
its pluralist nature, because we saw in Chapter 111 that 
the Community depends considerably upon elite groupa 
to function and elite group activity can only affect 
government in a pluralist state. The Economic and 
Social Committee is a manifestation at the highest level 
of this pluralist approach.
The law here is clear and we would submit that 
there is no reason why a non-democratic state could 
mot apply. Neither can we properly imply "pluralist" 
into Art.237; it is of course a consideration im 
determining whether the application should be accepted
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in the first place which would throw upon the Communities 
the onus of refusing an application, politically more 
awkward than ruling an application ineligible.
Moving on to the question of application it­
self, E.E.C. Art. 2 3 7 makes no mention at all of 
who should make the application. ‘International law 
provides for the conclusion, ratification and 
authentication of treaties but not for their 
negotiation. As Art. 237 procedure is completed 
by a treaty, then it is appropriate that the agree­
ment should be as a result of the transactions only 
of the party which eventually completes the inter­
national law requirements.
As, "Every state possesses capacity to conclude 
treaties"^^and the practice of international law 
recognises by custom certain designated delegates 
of states to carry out these functions^^, then the 
Community will insist upon dealing only with these 
parties. This is not stated in Art. 237 because 
it is part of the international law context we 
discussed briefly in Chapter IV. Art. 237 by 
referring to "states" accepts this analysis.
States it seems take the precaution of having 
domestic political authority before applying for acc­
ession, This may either be a requirement of national 
constitutional law, but may also be an attempt to add 
political weight to the application and at a later 
stage to avoid political pressure for withdrawal. 
Certainly the Community would have no obvious legal 
grounds for refusing an application because it did 
not follow on a parliamentary mandate.
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Obtaining such authority does seem to be an 
almost universal practice: The Macmillan govern­
ment went to l^arliament on 3rd August I9 6 I after 
having been elected in July 1959; The second 
application in May of I9 6 6 was also made after 
Parliamentary approval had been sought; The 
Commission, commenting on the Spanish application 
noted that, "the unanimous support of all the 
political parties represented in the Spanish 
Parliament and of both sides of Industry" was
69in favour of membership: The Greek application
was made 7 months after an election had given 
the pro-european wew-uemocracy Party 54% of the 
V O  t e .
We submit that obtaining a national domestic
mandate before application should be considered as
being truly part of the law of accession; we shall
in our conclusions consider whether it presently
takes an appropriate form(see page 173 below). It
should be considered whether the community would
be better advised to incorporate a provision
specifying the way in which applications ought to
be made, such as is found in Article 28 of the ,
70Charter of the Organisation of African Unity,
It is also surprising that there is no place 
in Art. 237 for the Assembly, the members of which 
are now directly elected, "Determined to lay found­
ations for an ever closer Union between the peoples
71of Europe" ' must be given more meaning, especially 
in the context of accession. Apart from Art, 237 
itself it is the international law dimension which
6 3
has deprived the peoples of Europe from having a
part to play through the Parliament in the accession
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procedure. The experience of Greenland must emphasise 
how crucial it is to introduce a popular element into 
accession procedure. So far the law and practice 
of accession precludes such an approach.
We now look at the origins of the interpre­
tation of Art, 2 3 7 » an interpretation which was, 
and we feel*significantly used again in the case 
of Greece, This covers three legal acts: the
Commission opinion; the council act; and the 
agreement between the member states. The first 
two of these are acts of Community Law and the 
third of both community law and of international 
law. We look at this mainly because it constitutes 
the basis for the negotiation phase.
One month after the signature of the Athens 
Association Agreement, the British government sent 
a letter addressed to the Council on Aug. 9th 1961,
It stated that the U.K. wished "to open negotiations 
with a view to acceding to the Treaty of Rome under 
Art, 2 3 7 ."^^
It was then not clear whether this was the 
way things were meant to be done, but the U.K. had 
no formal guidance from the Treaties nor practical 
guidance from the Community itself. We can assume 
that extensive informal discussions had taken place 
between the major political actors in the applicant 
and the member states. This was confirmed by 
Macmillan's statement to the House of Commons 
"During the past 9 months we have had discussions
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with the E.E.C. governments. We have now reached 
the stage where we cannot make further progress 
without entering into formal negotiations ..•.
Art, 2 3 7 envisages that the conditions ....should 
be the subject of an agreement. Negotiations must 
therefore be held in order to establish the con- 
ditions on which we might join".
This is the first indication of a procedure 
and a time scale to supplement the skeletal Art,237* 
Macmillan’s course of action would have been formu­
lated in conjunction with the heads of state of the 
member states and perhaps with the Commission, A 
plain reading of Art. 237 would suggest that the 
council Act and the Commission opinion would be 
prior to the Agreement, the council Act confirming 
the political will in principle and the Commission 
commenting on the effect upon the treaty structure.
What we must remember is the significance of 
the British application to the Community and the 
world. It meant a gradual disintegration of the 
Sterling Area and the Commonwealth preference. It 
also involved E.F.T.A, as an organisation;; the U.K.'s 
application was made conditional upon acceptance ofthose 01 
the three other then applicant states: Ireland,
Norway and Denmark,
Barbara Castle, M,E,P,,. has stated, "Enlargement 
is only possible within the context of abandonment of 
the Treaty of Home,, the abandonment of the Parameters 
of the six. There's got to be a fundamental root and 
branch reconsideration and rebuilding. There should 
have been that when Britain, Denmark and Ireland
joined".^^This may well have been what the British 
were originally seeking. The first British application 
came at a time when the Community itself was hardly 
established, the various transitional provisions 
contained in the Rome Treaty being extant. This 
may have resulted in some unnecessary inflexibility 
in the Communities' attitude. We now turn to the 
Communities’ response.
The Council replied to Macmillan that "the 
procedure envisaged by the Treaty had been set in 
motion".^^The Council then wrote to the Commission 
asking for an opinion. This the Commission refused to 
do until the negotiations were completed. If the 
Commission had replied immediately, it would have 
been deprived of further control of the process as 
there would only remain the agreement to be concluded. 
This is concluded by the member states and the applicant 
states alone.
Presumably, this statement by the Commission 
was enough to constitute a definition of its 
position within the terms of Art, 175 so as not to 
constitute a failure to act. In any event the 
Council did not require a positive opinion to act,, 
the only legal requirement being that an opinion 
be taken. Art, 237 did not specify a time scale.
It had then been established that negotiations 
would take place and that they would precede the 
Commission opinion and the Council act; it remained 
to be seen who would conduct the negotiations. The 
Council decided that the member states would 
negotiate at its meetings of the 2 6 th and 27th of
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September I9 6 I, This was contrary to the Commission's 
view that the Commission should negotiate on a bi­
lateral basis. They felt this appropriate because
(a) of their knowledge of the working of the Community,
(b) it would allow separation of ordinary Community 
business from the negotiations,(c} according to their 
reading of Art. 237» it was legally appropriate. The 
Commission was allocated the role of counsellor to 
the parties and a right to be heard, but was not 
even given the chair in the negotiation meetings.
We would submit that,, on legal grounds, the 
Commission's argument was not well founded. Art,
228 gives the Commission a negotiating role in Comm­
unity agreements whereas Art. 237 expressly states 
that the agreement is to be concluded between the 
member states and the applicant. If a negotiating 
role had been intended for the Commission, it would 
have been stated: Expressio unius est exclusio dlterius.
However, the Treaty was not to be imperiled 
even in the absence of the Commission, for the Coun­
cil stated a number of principles which would be 
followed in the negotiation process, "•..any applica­
tion for accession to the Community would mean that 
the country unreservedly accepted the rules and 
objectives of the Treaty of Rome; consequently, 
negotiations could only deal with the conditions of
admission and adaptations of the Treaty which these
7 7would involve", (it was also stated that for 
political and economic reasons, membership of the 
E.E.C, would entail membership of Euratom and 
E.C.S.C,; This was not legally essential especially
before the Merger Treaty.)
These principles were developed into the 
doctrine now known as acquis communautaire as a 
result of the British reply. The U.K. "...re­
served the right to discuss other subjects arising 
from various articles of the Treaty, particularly in 
regard to the regulations, directives, decisions and 
recommendations adopted since the Treaty came into 
force. The British government suggested that the 
examinations of some of these problems could wait 
until after the U.K. had acceded to the Treaty, 
although for the more vital matters the British 
Government considered that it was desirable to
77establish mutual understanding before accession".
The reply to the U.K. was in total opposition to 
the British initiative. "...We start from the 
principle that these protocols must not be allowed 
to modify the tenor and the spirit of the Treaty and 
must essentially concern transitional arrangements 
only... problems.. .need to be settled without ex­
ceptions becoming the rule and vice versa. Exceptions 
must not be of such scope and duration as to call into 
question the rules themselves or impair the possibil­
ities of applying these rules within the Community".
As we shall go on to show, the same approach 
was taken with Greece, and consequently, this initial 
coagulation of policy needs to be properly understood! 
We have already pointed out how in concluding the 
Accession agreement, the Community had indicated that 
accession meant assuming all of the obligations of 
membership.
6 8
The Council statement was wrongly phrased. It 
should have been the other way around. As put, it 
was an example of petitio principi; the reason that 
an applicant must accept the "rules and objectives" 
is that Art, 237 restricts it to this by limiting 
consequent changes to "necessary adjustments".
As we shall now see, this is the received 
interpretation of the Treaty: Art. 237 allows of
only changes which directly and closely result from 
membership and as such may be effected by the sub­
sequent agreement.
The British were, not without some justification, 
to try to go one step further: to accept that they
would be bound by the Treaty as it stood, but then 
to try to undermine the legislation developed there­
after. Even Art, 237 gives no legal basis for pre­
venting this review. It is Community law itself 
which has developed the idea of acquis communautaire, 
not international law. Acquis communautaire has come 
to mean more since the first attempt at enlargement 
(mainly because the Community itself progressed) 
and it now comprises all Community achievements:
This acquis communautaire was given a restatement on 
the opening of the negotiations for the second 
British negotiating conference when the Community 
required, "the acceptance of the Treaties and their 
political objectives, all the decisions of every type 
which have been taken since the Treaties came into 
force, and the choices made in the field of develop­
ment 4
The solution of any problems of adjustment which
may arise must be sought in the establishment of
transitional measures and not in changes of the
existing rules; as a general rule, they must in-
78corporate detailed timetables".
The acquis communautaire in its renewed form
was restated at the first meeting of the Greek 
79negotiations. It was said by the President of the
Commission, Herrr Stoel,that the institutions are
continually evolving and that Greece must accept the
Treaties, their political objectives and decisions
taken subsequently and the options taken for
development. Adjustments were to be solved by
transitional measures and not by changing the rules.
Detailed timetables would of course be provided,
though their respective duration might be variable,
00
The Greeks made nine points in reply; They 
undertook to abide by decisions taken on the political 
development of Europe and others that might be taken 
before accession, with consultation procedures 
provided for in the Association Agreement being 
available; further progress was to continue to be 
made under the Association agreement, particularly 
with respeêt to the coordination of agricultural and 
commercial policies; transitional measures should last 
a maximum of five years; some obligations should be 
postponed until after the transition period; no steps 
were to be allowed which would retard the Association 
agreement. The Association agreement was to be adopted 
in providing the timetable for achieving the customs 
union in the industrial sector,, with fulIL' union, to be
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completed by the end of the transitional period 
provided therein; and finally,Greece stated that it 
would require special treatment in agriculture, 
especially in relation to infrastructure, in steel 
and in entering the "own resources" system.
This means that the content x)f the acquis 
communautaire as it is now understood, is a matter 
of politics and economics: Its existence is legal
and based on a particular interpretation of Art, 237«
This interpretation which allows the acquis commun­
autaire a legal protection is not taken on a consid­
eration of what is most efficacious for the Community, 
but is rather a result of political pressure. Whether 
or not this protection of the acquis communautaire 
is a benefit or not in terms of integration theory, is 
a different question. We shall not begin to answer it 
until we have looked at the results of the Accession 
mechanism,
Before going on to consider the negotiation phase, 
it may be as well to point out that the Council act 
and the Commission opinion have now been relegated 
to the level of formalities. The Commission opinion, 
unfavourable to Greek entry, was virtually ignored.
The Commission has accepted its role as an interested, 
informed observer, A modus operandi has been established,
At this stage the reader is referred to appendix 
A, a chronological summary of the negotiations, inter- 
collated with contemporaneous reports of relevant 
extra-systemic events. Before going on to discuss 
the whole Community approach to negotiation, we shall 
mention briefly some examples of events which are
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worthy of comment.
Negotiations were supposed to be dealing with 
adjustments necessitated by the enlargement of the 
Community. This was not always strictly observed;
The Commissioner responsible for external affairs 
became involved in the Greek application to the 
U.N. and the International Court of Justice over the 
Sismik I dispute in September of 197^» in January 1977 
Greece replaced its negotiators as a result of a 
suggestion that Greek entry would be dependent on 
the merits of the Spanish and Portuguese applications, 
Greece was granted a large loan under the Athens 
Agreement before the fourth deputy level negotiating 
meeting and France demanded a revision of the Community 
wine, fruit and vegetable policy at the sixth 
deputies meeting*
This influence of external matters on the 
negotiations continued; the third ministerial level 
meeting advanced the negotiating timetable shortly 
after Spain applied for membership; Karamanlis 
pursued his hopes of a special relationship with NATO 
after the tenth deputies meeting; a considerable 
amount of negotiation appears to have been taking 
place at a political level between the tenth and 
eleventh deputies meetings and the fifth and sixth 
ministerial meetings. The position of Spain and 
Portugal and NATO were all canvassed; the United 
kingdom suggested that the Greeks hold a referendum 
after the seventh ministerial meeting; and before the 
eighteenth deputy meeting there were rumours about 
the exercise of a veto.
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Enlargement can be seen as a test of Community
functioning as well as a separate exercise. As
Lindberg and Sheingold said, "the point to be made:
is that British entry meant a reordering of the
stakes of European integration for all members across
the whole range of issues posed by Britain's 
„ 81application."
This is what the Community had hoped to avoid 
in the formulation of the acquis communautaire 
doctrine. The inclusion of another state with other 
interests challenges the value of any existing bal­
ance of interests consolidated in the Treaty. The 
Commission said, "for political reasons the only 
adjustments made to the provisions of the Treaties 
by the First Accession Treaty in 1972 were those 
directly reflecting the increase in the numbers of 
member states...More far reaching changes will there­
fore be necessary this time if the enlarged Community
82is to work properly."
This again raises the legal question of whether 
this can be done under Art. 237 or whether Art. 2^6 
would have to be brought into play; adjustment or 
amendment? Certainly there is scope for arguing either 
way. The Commission, in the above statement, by using 
the word "necessary" is referring to Art, 237 adjust­
ment; also by saying "only adjustments" the existence 
of other changes which could be made by adjustment.
What is not clear is how the'acquis communautaire 
would stand after such an e&b#cise. It is submitted 
that if negotiation were to be formally extended to 
cover matters such as were raised in the first and
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second accessions, then little would remain of acquis
communautaire « When Karl Heinz Narjes was asked, "Is
enlargement to blame for everything?"^ he replied,
"Not for everything...it was a serious error to
exclude most matters of substance and concentrate
simply on adapting the texts of the Treaties and
Secondary legislation. This has stored up a wealth
of problems which have become a permanent brake on
the Community, The most recent example being the
81
common fisheries Policy".
This gives us two categories of topics for 
negotiation, changes which are directly consequential 
and the more extensive category of changes which are 
required for the proper functioning of the Community. 
There is a possible third category and that is, put 
simply - everything else; we must remember the legal 
criterion is solely "necessitated".
Our consideration of the Greek negotiations has 
shown us that matters which were not then part of the 
E.E.C. system nor were likely to become so,were 
discussed, albeit not at the formal negotiating 
sessions. We refer here especially to Turkey and 
NATO. The same was true of the British negotiations. 
Lindberg & Scheingold spoke of "two sets of negotiations? 
one explicit and the other tacit." The tacit ones 
included, "penumbral problems" like the Fouchet Plan 
which "strictly speaking.... did not have to be re­
solved in order to incorporate Britain into the
Community system because the Community system did not
84extend to these questions".
We can only return to a consideration of what
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negotiations should cover, and whether they could 
be organised in a different fashion, after we have 
looked at the effect of the negotiated position on 
the Community system, and accordingly we now turn 
to some of the secondary effects of negotiations.
These are effects on the Community enlargement 
mechanism which negotiations are not expressly 
designed to have. They do, however, have to be 
taken account of in a law of accession.
"The enlargement negotiations to some extent 
diverted the Community and so postponed the develop­
ment of a new crisis-test situation..."^^This is to 
say that the Community can become so engrossed in 
the enlargement process that it does not deal with 
development of the Community itself (the reader will 
find examples of this im the chapter (ChapterVI11, 
page 101 below.) on institutional changes). This 
was particularly dangerous when the foundations of 
the Community had not been laid. It is of course 
more likely to be harmful if one enlargement is 
attempted while another is not yet complete.
This is something about which law can do little. 
The Commission has the burden of carrying on daily 
Community functions and should make use of any 
provisions which necessitate action. It is apparent 
that thase are becoming fewer and fewer as the 
Community progresses. What was remarkable about the 
Greek negotiations was their duration; Four years 
passed from application to the^conclusion of an 
accession Treaty. Appendix A shows how negotiations 
were delayed, mainly by the extra systemic questions.
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or as Lindberg and Scheingold would have it "penumbral 
problems", such as Turkey and even French elections.
It appears that the same problem is already occurring 
with Spain.^^In terms of the Lindberg equation this 
is a failure to process demand by the Community 
system and being a reflection of the institutional 
capacity and scope will be reflected in most areas of 
Community endeavour, dependent on demand processing, 
not just enlargement.
We have said that the Community is enlarged by the 
diversion of attention of elite groups. These elite 
groups are then expected to use the domestic political 
mechanisms to enable the legal formalities of Art.237 
to be carried out. Such a move may lack substantial 
popular support, making it all the more important to 
have if at all only one election before accession,
Evans asked of the British Accession, "Were Britain's 
democratic institutions by-passed completely,,..or 
did they merely operate according to customary pro­
cesses which are less democratic than we fondly imagine. 
Clearly with an issue of such magnitude there must 
have been pressure groups at work both in Britain and 
abroad and a great deal of money, imagination and 
effort has been expended".
In making that statement Evans is advancing his 
own conspiracy theory but it corroborates what we 
would expect from our examination of neo-functionalism.
We must ask ourselves whether there is a role 
for law to play in advancing the course of integration.
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There is an obvious answer, A legal timetable could be 
provided - not a political expression of hope as we have 
at present, but a strict timetable either with positive 
(membership confirmed at expiry) sanctions or negative 
(reapplication required at expiry) sanctions. Had 
Greek negotiations dragged on to another election 
Greece would probably not now be in the Community 
taking into account the attitude of the Papandreou 
Government (see page 159 below). We shall discuss 
the legal instrumentation and technique to be used 
later, after having examined the effect of negotia­
tions on the Community,
There are pervasive and serious problems in 
the negotiation phase. The Greeks complained 
bitterly of delays. The Spanish too have found 
themselves in the same position. It was reported 
in 19 8 0 :"The Spanish government which applied for 
membership as long ago as July 1977 has nailed its 
foreign policy colours firmly to the Community mast, 
but it has been seriously embarrassed domestically 
by the slow pace; of entry negotiations". It was
also pointed out that the estimated entry date had
88been put back at least once, A remedy for these 
delays could be subsumed within the law of Accession: 
because there is a whole panoply of legal instru­
mentation available.
The failure of the British application when de 
Gaulle used a veto continues to have a considerable 
effect on negotiations. Although widely condemned at 
the time, its legality was unquestionable. Precedent 
has become a damoclean sword which hovers above
7 7
every applicant seeking accession; especially when 
negotiations have been progressing for some consider­
able time; an applicant is not likely to want to 
lose hard won points and domestic prestige by being 
vetoed.
The negotiations, if successful, result in the 
conclusion of an Accession Treaty with the Agreement 
between the member states and the acceding states 
attached to it. The Treaty must then be ratified 
in terms of Community and international Law and it 
is to that stage we now turn.
The final stages in Community law envisaged 
by Art, 237 E.E.C, are the conclusion of the agree­
ment and ratification of it. Conclusion is marked 
by a formal ceremony where the plenipotentiaries 
sign a treaty according to the form of international 
law which has annexed to it the Agreement between the 
states, expressly mentioned in Art, 237* The Agreement 
requires moreover, ratification according to the 
constitutional requirements of the contracting states. 
This can take some considerable time, on average 
about six months. There is a legal lacuna during 
this time.
The applicant state accedes to a Community
which may have changed since the accession treaty
was negotiated. This was still a problem in the Greek
accession. Shortly before the Athens Treaty came
into force it was reported that "Mr, Kaneopoulos
(Greek Agridulture Minister) accused the E.E.C. of
" • 89'reneging on the terms of the Accession Treaty.,"
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From Athens this was seen in a different way. It 
was reported that the Nine were accusing the Greeks 
of trying to renegotiate by "tough bargaining on 
some key Greek farm products such as olive oil,
74fruits and vegetables,, wine sugar and tobacco".
The then opposition leader Andreus Papandrae#u
said that the Greek Government "panic stricken by the
probable consequences of the Accession agreement it
had negotiated on the country's agricultural economy,
was in fact trying to renegotiate the terms of
accession* This was rejected by our Community
90partners from a position of strength?.
There are provisions which make difficulties
in the interim period prior to ratification less
likely. The Community consults with acceeding
states on any developments in the Community of
concern to them(Declaration 6 attached to the Final
Act of the Athens Treaty)• There is also the
"arrangement regarding tha* procedure for adopting
certain decisions and other measures to be taken
during the period preceding accession which has been
reached within the conference between the European
Communities and the Hellenic Republic; which is
annexed to this Final Act", This arrangement,also
used in the first accession, explicitly recognises
the dynamic aspect of accession by describing the
relationship between the Community institutions and
the applicant states by calling them "acceeding states".
This terminology was not followed in the case of
Greece, but the conceptual position was the same,
*
This is a sensible pragmatic approach for solving a
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practical question. It is effective because the
threat of non-ratification would be sufficient
to prevent abuse by the Community, Even with these
arrangements it seems likely that the Community will
be unlikely to break new ground in the period
between signature and coming into force for fear of
provoking a dispute resulting in non-ratification.
Accordingly the benefits of Enlargement are to some
extent paid for by a loss of dynamism in other areas
of Community activity.
An applicant state may withdraw at this stage
simply by not ratifying the Treaty, There is no
legal obligation on an applicant to accede other
than that created by political embarassment, The
failure of Norway to accede showed that the interim
period was not a mere formality, Norway found itself
bound for internal political reasons to a consultative
referendum on membership. "Powerful economic
organisations wanted to see it ratified,, including
the national trade union organisation, industry,
shipping and the employers federation. Above all
the government was now committed to working for 
91ratification",'^ For a variety of reasons the 
Norwegian people rejected membership (53^ against 
and 46^ for: interestingly a poll showed that
according to 43^ of the electorate, the issue 
should not have been put to them)•
Such a failure to accede means that the executed 
treaty has to _ be adjusted (where there is more 
than one acceding state). In the case of Norway, 
Art.2 of the Brussels Treaty made specific pro­
vision for this contingency by permitting the 
Treaty to be adapted to reflect the non-accèssion 
of an applicant. This certainly corrects the legal 
position, but as we have constantly stressed, the 
contribution of law is limited; While Art, 2 
Brussels regularises the legal position, it does 
nothing to correct the underlying political and 
economic disruption. That is to say, because of the 
wide-ranging nature of the negotiations and the 
essential interdependence of subject matter, many 
of the agreements reached at negotation and appear­
ing in the Treaty, which might have been arrived 
at by the negotiating parties after their having 
considered the effects of the treaty on the result­
ing Community, would not have the same meaning as 
when they were agreed: A hypothetical example would
have been France accepting the risk of the United 
Kingdom attracting foreign investment considering 
itself compensated by gaining access to Norwegian 
markets; a clearer example was the way in which the
mew Member States could not, after Norway left, form
a blocking minority in the Council (see page 105
below ) •
Another aspect of non-ratification is that 
it might turn the formerly acceding state away from 
the Community, thus defeating the Community's goal 
of unity: Norway had to negotiate an agreement from
SI
a position of weakness. While this is a political 
problem, we raise the issue because the Greek 
accession suggests that by using Community law, the 
political damage can be reduced. The Greeks insisted 
upon maintaining their association in full force 
despite the accession procedure. In the event of 
non-ratification the Athens agreement could have 
been fallen back upon to maintain the essential 
links with the Communities.
The Accession Treaty comes into force on the 
date stated in the Treaty, provided the instruments 
of accession are deposited before that date (Art. 2 
Athens Treaty, Art, 2 Brussels Treaty). The 
provisions which bring the acceding state into the 
Community are on the whole self explanatory. We 
summarise them here to make subsequent discussion 
clearer. By Art. 2 of both Acts of Accession "the 
provisions of the original Treaties and the acts 
adopted by the institutions of the Communities shall 
be binding on (the New Member state) under the 
conditions laid down in these Treaties and in this 
Act," (Athens Act.)
Art, 3 Athens binds the new member state to 
the decisions and agreements adopted by the repre­
sentatives of the member states meeting in Council; 
it must also accede to all other agreements concluded 
by the member states related to the functioning of 
the Communities or connected therewith; it under­
takes to accede to Art, 220 E.E.C. Conventions and 
to negotiate the adjustments with the member states; 
it binds itself to observe the principles deriving
8 2
from declaration of the Council and those adopted 
by the common agreement of the member states.
Article 4 binds the Hellenic Republic to agree­
ments of the Communities with the third states and 
international organisations: it must accede to
agreements of the member states and the Community 
acting jointly; and to the so called Internal Agree­
ments between the member states; there follows a 
general obligation upon the new member state to adjust 
its position in relation to international agreements, in 
accordance with its obligations under the Treaty,
Article 5 Athens adopts the provisions of Art.
2 3 4 E.E.C, in respect of international agreements 
concluded before accession. Such agreements are not 
affected but the new member state is obliged to remove 
inconsistencies and must be assisted in this by the 
other member states.
Arts. 14 3 - 1 4 9  Athens provide for the applicability 
of the acts of the institutions: Greece is treated ae 
being an addressee and as having received notification 
of Directives and Decisions in terms of Art. 189 E.E.C,, 
assuming the original member states themselves received 
notification; the Greeks are required to put into effect 
the legislation necessary to comply with the said 
secondary legislation; other acts requiring adaption 
not included in the Act are to be adjusted by the 
Council on a Commission proposal (for Council acts) or 
by the Commission for its own acts. This is, as we 
would expect* an adherence to acquis communautaire by 
carefully drafting the Act so that exceptions must be 
stated no matter how trivial or extensive* thus -
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ensuring the efficiency of omitted or forgotten 
secondary legislation.
It seems clear that the scope for improving the 
Community system during the accession process is 
limited. The cause of this restriction is not clear; 
it could be Art. 237* However it would be possible 
to take wider action during Accession without doing 
violence to Art. 237* Is it then the doctrine of 
acquis communautaire which restricts wider activity 
during accession? We suggest that it is now impossible 
to determine whether the interpretation of Art. 237 
has been derived from adherence to the doctrine of 
acquis communautaire - or whether that doctrine is 
merely a detailed statement of the position which 
Art. 2 3 7 creates. We submit that there is no need to 
make a satisfactory analytical/logical distinction.^^
The problem exists and can be resolved simply by 
change in attitude of the officials and leading actors 
in the Communities.
From the foregoing it is clear that the relevant 
legal provisions have no dynamic aspect. They would, 
if unmitigated, result in the immediate inclusion of 
the applicant in the Community. Such an immediate 
inclusion being economically and politically impossible, 
the legal provision is designed to allow adjustment.
This is what "creates" the transitional Period (see 
Chapter VI1 below)•
CHAPTER VII 
THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD
Ratification formally completes the legal 
integration of the acceding state into the Community 
legal order. The acceding state then participates 
in the institutions and may benefit from Community 
funds. Economically there are greater problems; 
Community membership requires substantial economic 
realignment and restructuring. If done suddenly it 
could detrimentally affect both the economy of the 
Community and of the acceding applicants' economies.
In both cases of accession in 1973 and I9 8 I, 
the applicant states needed time to comply with the 
economic and political consequences of enlargement. 
There have in this respect always been two alter­
natives, The first allows accession but provides 
for leaving some obligations unfulfilled; the 
second delays full membership until the economic 
positions are compatible. The latter course is 
politically unacceptable. If Community membership 
means substantial internal changes, the government 
of the acceding states should be able to point to 
superior obligation to effect these changes, other­
wise there may be considerable internal political 
resistance. The first of the two above indicated 
alternatives has been adopted as a solution.
Transitional provisions have a history as 
long as the Community itself. The Rome Treaty 
established the Community in three stages: The
1961 Athens agreement used a two tier transition anc5
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the 1 9 7 3 Brussels Accession Treaty used a five year 
transitional period.
The transitional periods affecting accession 
are shaped by the other aspects of the accession 
procedure, particularly, by the notion which demands 
that accession of the applicant state should not 
impede the Community’s progress and that the new member 
state should accept all Community obligations in full. 
This implies that the transitional period must be 
finite,
This principle requires further elaboration.
When a new member state accedes immediately it joins 
the Community institutions. Thus it will have the 
political power to influence Community decisions 
from the date of accession. In fairness to existing, 
member states a situation where a state would have 
no immediate responsibility for its activities 
cannot last too long. The transitional period must 
thus be short enough not to allow such distortions 
and be long enough to permit economic adjustment.
As accession is by way of a legal instrument, the 
transitional period will have a legal Character, In 
addition the desiderata of Limilred time^ and specific 
exemption are especially easily effected by legal 
tecniques and norms. The acceptance of the acquis 
communautaire also demands that the transitional 
framework must be rigid,, another quality which law 
provides,
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The negotiations must accommodate the negotiated 
position within the transitional framework. This 
intimate connection between the transitional period, 
which has a legal nature, and the negotiations, which 
do not, was noticed by Inciante, "These (formulas of 
transitional periods) have been tested on the occasion 
of the setting up of the Common Market and tried again 
during the extension of the Community, There should
9 3not therefore be great surprises in the negotiations,',!" 
The systemic negotiations are, as a corollary, limited 
to adjusting matters that can competently be included 
in the transitional period, A consideration of the 
transitional period is therefore of value not only 
in itself, but it will enable us to properly evaluate 
the other stages in the process. We are fortunate in 
having the benefit of the experience of the U,K, 
accession. As this accession involves a legal regime 
it is subject to the jurisprudence of the Court of 
Justice of the European Communities (hereinafter "the 
Court of Justice). This judicial competence augments 
and develops the legal dimensions of the transitional 
period. To this extent the transitional period 
applicable to Greece differs from that applied to the 
first being* as we shall see, more accurately defined 
in scope and content,
L,J, Brinkhorst and M,J, Kuiper have examined the 
transitional measures used in the first round, discuss­
ing the general principles governing the transitional
period and have considered the transitional regime 
94itself,^ They discovered that the problem had been
treated "pakehily and unsystematically"• One hundred 
articles of the Brussels Act,, five annexes and 
most of thirty protocols relate to the transitional 
period. They have also pointed out that most of chapter 
five of the Brussels Act contained a number of trans­
itional rules. The place of insertion in the accession 
documents viz. act, protocol or annex, appeared arbi­
trary or dictated by political pressure especially 
evident with respect to the protocols. The transitional 
measures have however the legal character of treaty 
law and cannot be altered by the institutions acting 
on their own.
To prevent stagnation Art,7 of the Brussels Act 
attached.legal force to articles and acts to which 
the transitional regime related and did not remove the 
competence of the institutions to change the acts in 
such a way that the transitional measures would not 
apply. This position is obtained by reading Article 7 
along with Article 2 and Article 9 of the Brussels 
Act, The possibility remained then that because of 
a change in legislation the transitional regime 
could be distorted.
Brinkhorst and Kuiper noted that Art,135 Brussels
allows the adoption of protective measures by either
the Community or a new member state* and that Article
5 of the Act allows derogation from Article 234 of the
Act which otherwise would have had the effect of depriving
new member states of rights and obligations incurred
between signature and entry into force. There are
some deviations from the general principle that trans-
itional measures may not be suspended* amended or re­
pealed other than
by the means of the procedures by which the original 
Treaties can be revised; and although we speak of 
a transitional period, a number of different time 
limits may apply: fishing till 1 9 8 2 ; finance; to
a special regime was established for New Zealand 
butter. As the transitional measures may not 
always be specific as to their content, as in the 
case of the common Agricultural Policy,, it is left
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to the institutions to take implementing measures. 
Implementing measures can only be taken after the 
entry into force of the Treaty and so Article 151 
Brussels delayed application of the particular 
sections until February 1973* A Council resolution 
of July 20th 1973 was made on the basis of discussions 
in the Interim Committee (see p. 78 above) introducing 
a procedure whereby the Council acts on Commission 
proposals after consulting the acceding states^. These' 
drafts are published and on entry into force the 
Council accepts that they will be confirmed.
The principles applied to the first enlargement 
have been followed in the case of Greece, There have 
however been a number of additions and innovations 
and attempts at improvement. The Athehs Accession 
Act is rather more precise in its positioning of 
some provisions, differentiating between adaptions 
and transitionary measures: for example Part Two,
3Fxtle 1, ^hapt-er 1, Art, 10, deals with the assembly under 
the heading Adjustments to the Treaties: provisions
covering the Institutions, However there follows 
in Part Four* Titlel* Art,23, a provision under the 
heading of "Transitional measures; provisions govern­
ing the Institutions", which delays the holding of
direct elections until the rest of the Community is 
ready and in the interim allows the members to be 
delegated by the national legislature. This 
provision was not of course necessary in the first 
round but it does evince a clarity of approach, which 
Brinkhorst and Kuiper,, by citing Art, 49 (2), suggest 
was lacking in the first Accession,
In comparing the two Accession Acts, we notice 
there is a change in the wording of Article 9 which 
is approximately the same in both Acts and lays down the 
fundamental principle of the transition period. This 
redrafting was no doubt due to the ambiguity which 
had been experienced in the original(clause 9 «)
This point was considered in Cases 231/78 
Commission V United Kingdom(197902 C.M.b.R. 42? 
involving the British potato marketing board which 
was in terms of Art, 6o(2) Brussels a national 
organisation of the potato market. Art* 42 of the Brussels 
Act provided for the abolition of quotas,.or measures having equi­
valent effect'by 1st, Jan', 1975 • The United Kingdom 
refused to allow imports of potatoes. The Commission 
raised an action alleging failure to observe the 
obligation created by Art, 30 E.E.C. and the relevant 
provisions of the Brussels Act, The French government 
intervened. The U.K. government based its defence 
on Art, 6 0 (2 ) of the Brussels Act (see appendix d),
This Article exempts products not covered by a 
common organisation if a national organisation exists,. 
The case then rested on Article 9,in particular on 
paragraph 2 , in which three exemptions from the 
application of the transitional regime are included:
9 0
They relate to dates, time-limits and special 
provisions. The United Kingdom considered 60(2) 
of the Brussels Act to be a special provision and 
that the general termination rule. Art, 9 Brussels, 
should not apply. The Court held however that the 
Accession Treaty is to be interpreted according to 
a principle of equality between member states and 
having regard to the foundations and the systems of 
the Community, However,the Court said that the Act 
cannot be interpreted as having established, for 
an indefitite period, a legal position different 
from that of the original members, The Court 
decided that the responsibility for the market 
became that of the Community; special measures could 
still be envisaged under Art 63 Brussels, They 
could not be adopted unilaterally by the member 
state but only by the Community generally.
This decision is valuable from the point of 
view of fostering integration, but does not seem to 
be a proper interpretation of the precise words of 
the Treaty: it is submitted that it was a policy
decision more than an interpretation, ' The Court is 
not bound by its previous decisions; therefore when 
drafting the Athens Act,, it was evidently thought 
prudent to rephrase Article 9r leaving no doubt that with 
the transitional period, unless a specific time eccem— 
tion is made, the transitional period ends as stated 
and that anything which is encompassed within the 
Treaty and the transitional regime will then become 
a matter of Community competence.
There are other differences in the Brussels and
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Athens Treaties, New sections reflect the additional 
Community activity sine© the Brussels Act, one was 
relating to direct elections and another is in relation 
to the Lome convention. Moreover it should be noticed 
that in the first round the African, Carribean and 
Pacific framework was treated merely in a protocol, 
Similarily the Common Commercial Policy finds a 
place in the Athens Act under the title on external 
relations..
Other differences reflect the idea or improve­
ment of loose or inappropriate provisions. The 
safeguard clause. Article 135^Brussels turns up in 
a slightly altered form. It is necessarily extended 
to cover the long transitional period as well as the 
general five year period. However, where under Art,
135 Brussels the Commission had to 'work without delay';; 
the Athens Act 130(2) para, 2 demands that the 
Commission 'act within five working days' and further 
makes the measures immediately applicable instead of 
allowing the Commission to 'specify the circumstances 
and manner in which they are to be put into effect *•
In the same way,, in agricultural matters the Commission 
is to act within twenty four hours and again the meas­
ures come into effect immediately. These changes are 
tacitly a criticism of Commission unresponsiveness, 
and illustrate how accession can provide an oppor­
tunity to make improvements to the Community system 
generally.
Article h^ of the Athens Act differs from the 
equivalent Art, 43 Brussels in that the former refers 
to the Commission taking action from the date of
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Accession, whereas the latter demands that the 
Commission should do this before a fixed date. This 
shows a more flexible approach without sacrificing 
security.
Despite these differences we have mentioned and 
others that we have not, there has* been no fundamental 
change in the Community's approach to the transitional 
period•
Admittedly the Commission had given some atten­
tion to the possibility of altering the transitional 
period . It was suggested that the transitional
period would have to reflect the economic incompata- 
bility of the new member states, which was not the 
cose in the first accession, lest some new members 
be unable to maintain their obligations. The Comm­
ission starts first by stating that "Given the extent 
of the adjustment problems it would seem advisable
Q g
to tackle them during the negotiating period,., "
The sentiment prompting such a suggestion was mo . 
doubt laudatory but the suggestion involves consider— 
able problems. One inconvenience would be the 
competence of the Community to take steps towards, 
for example, harmonisation of structural redevelop­
ment policies in the absence of any legal relation­
ship between the parties. On the other hand, assoc­
iation is a foundation upon which such measures could 
be attempted. Another is that the negotiating period' 
is already fraught with sufficient danger of delay, 
without the addition of anticipatory organisational 
measures.
One particular danger which was highlighted in
9 3
the debates on the Pintat Report, was that for the 
Communities to insist upon pre-accession measures 
might imply a certain degree of committment on the 
Communities' part to accept an application^^(or 
depending on the stage of the process, to surrender 
points on debate).
The resolution of some transitional problems 
outside of the Treaty would add to the patchwork 
framework making it difficult to identify transitional 
measures. There would remain a legal problem concern­
ing the status of measures taken in anticipation; 
presumably they would require to be adopted later* 
i.e.,within the Act of accession thus giving them 
the necessary status of Community law.
We remain of the opinion that anticipatory 
measures should be kept to a minimum and, if 
appropriate, should be unilateral and should pre­
ferably operate in spheres where the applicant state 
has no existing regime. An example of such a measure 
found in the case of the Second Enlargement is the 
Greek Anti-Trust Law "on the control of the mono­
polies and oligarchies and on the protection of free
competition" (which is described in an article by 
97Andreopoulos upon which the following comments are 
based). The existing law dated back to 19133; this in 
itself does not suggest that there existed a legal 
lacuna. However, in its; terms the former law appears 
to have had little of the scope necessarily involved 
in modern anti-trust legislation. Andreopolis points 
out that the new law is virtually a Greek translation 
of the competition provision of the Rome Treaty,Arts,S5&86.
Although there is a similarity of wording, it 
is not certain that the Greek courts would interpret 
the words in the same way or even that officials 
would take the same attitude, creating a possible 
source of conflict. The added danger is that the 
formal similarity would disguise this divergent 
activity. On the other hand, the Court of Justice's 
interpretation of the Treaty would stand, and so any 
damage would be subjiect to correction( assuming of 
course that the matter were litigated).
We submit that if anticipatory measures are 
taken, they should only be carried out under am 
association agreement which provides both the 
political background and the legal framework. The 
negotiations for Greek entry have indicated that it 
is possible to have a separate development of the 
negotiations and the association^a separation which 
would allow useful anticipatory measures to be imple­
mented without prejucice to the application or 
negotiations,
98The Commission correctly noted that a major 
difficulty of the transitional period is that because 
it is decided in advance the economic and political 
climate cannot always be predicted, emphasising the 
inter-relation of factors analysed! in Chapter III 
(page 24 above). They therefore looked for a tran­
sitional formula consisting of definite and flexible 
measures, A two phase enlargement was envisaged; a 
first stage including definite timetables and targets 
with progress to ^the second stage being subject to 
suspension, if necessary,, by the Council on a
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Commission proposal voting by majority, a second
extension of the first stage by unanimous vote of the
Council. The operation of the delay automatically
reduces the second stage. This type of measure is
admittedly modelled on Article 8 of the Rome Treaty.
However the Commission conceded that this cannot be
directly transposed by saying that (when making a
different point) "the provisions in question were 
99e x p e r i m ental".They chose to accept the technique 
without the time limit. We would suggest that this 
is not an option, for both the technique and time 
limit are closely related. The "success and move on" 
method is only appropriate if there is some time to 
spare. In the case of enlargement this is not so, 
because of economic imperatives and because new 
member states enjoy full rights under the institution­
al system. In certain cases the proposed system 
might be useful where there is little prospect of 
extension to the stages being likely; but to say 
this is in a way to deny the reason for having the 
measure in the first place; to be able to respond 
swiftly to unexpected developments.
The Athens and Brussels Acts should not be 
considered solely on their express terms: the
Brussels Act and to a lesser extent the Athens Act, 
have been interpreted by the Court of Justice, 
Accordingly a body of more general principles about 
the Accession Acts and especially the transitional 
period will develop. Because of this developing 
jurisprudence it cannot always be said that any? 
accession act will have the same effect as its
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and language. To emphasise this we now look at 
some of the cases in which the Accession Act has 
been considered by the Court,, both to contribute to 
our understanding of accession and to see to what 
extent the Athens Act must be thought of as being 
more certain than the Brussels Act,^^^
The first case worthy of mention is Hauptzrollant 
Bielefield v Konig* where the Court held that the 
Acts of Accession have as their essential purpose 
the extension to the new member states of Community 
law in force at the time of Accession. Even Article 
3 of the Brussels Accession Act cannot be construed 
as validating measures* whatever their form if they 
are incompatible with the Treaties establishing the 
C ommuni ties.
This decision appears to support the narrow 
interpretation of Art, 237 E.E.C. which we discussed 
( page 68 above ) but the Court was.* we suggest* only 
concerned with establishing the minimum effect of the 
Brussels Act and was not prohibiting the use of the 
Accession Act for other purposes other than "essential 
purposes",
In a later decision the Court further defined 
the scope of the Accession Act, In Case 15/74 CENTRA- 
FARM V  STERLING DRUG( 1 974) 2 (c.m . L  ,R, 48o) it was held that 
the Act of Accession is to be read with the Treaty, 
and where a given transitional measure is related to 
a principal Treaty Article* then it is to be construed 
with that term. In the instant case, para,2 of 
Article 4 Brussels allowed measures having equivalent, 
effeet to quantative restrictions on imports and
exports to be abolished by 1st January 1975* This 
was to be considered as referring to the same type of 
measures which had been abolished by the original 
member states under E.E.C, Articles 30 and 32-35*
The meaning of the system of compensatory amounts 
contained in Article 65 and 66 of the Brussels Act was 
considered? in Case 61/77 IRELAND v THE COMMISSION(1978)
(2C*M,L.R.466), The Court took a restrictive view of 
the Act of Accession by disallowing conversion factors.
The Court held that such measures would have to be 
expressly laid down in the Act to b® effective. The flexi­
bility crucial to transition was not lost, however, 
because the Court emphasised that action of the kind 
it had prohibited could be taken if it were clearly 
necessary for fixing the correct application of the 
compensatory amounts. And in the case, of Compagnie
Continentale France v Council, case 169/73(1975)^C.M.L.R.
♦ * 
578)^ he Community was held not to be contractually liable
with respect to the effects of the Act of Accession and,,
the wider principle was stated that the Act of Accession
is an integral part of the Accession Treaty, Case 6 / 7 6
Kramer v Othersf1976^2 C.M.L.R,448) provided the Court
with a problem of how to deal with an apparent serious
lacunae in the transitional provisions. Article 102
Brussels was inaccurately framed leaving doubt as to
how member states should behave. First* the Article
was ambiguous about its commencement date; it was not
clear whether the beginning or the end of the six
year period was intended. (This issue was resolved
in the later Case Van Dam en Zonen discussed below.)
y»
Secondly* it was not clear what the transitional 
position should be. The Court decided that the 
Community had rule-making authority in matters of 
high seas fisheries on the basis of the Accession Act 
Article and Regulation 2l4l/?0 and, curiously, "the 
very nature of things". It then went on to explain 
that as the Community had not exercieied its power in 
this field* the new member states had the ability to 
regulate these matters themselves. The Court added 
that under Art. 5 E.E.C. and Art, 1l6 of the Brussels 
Act the member states would still have the obligation 
to avoid taking action prejudicial to th© Community 
interest,
It appears that the Court of Justice is capable
of filling out an Accession Act if necessary. However,
the Court is not sufficiently informed on economic 
matters to be able to take the correct decision in 
every instance. Neither is it appropriate for the 
Court to decide upon matters which may have political 
importance and where the member states would have had 
the opportunity for discussion and agreement in 
advance. Thus again we note how the Act is inter­
preted with the Treaty in sight and not in isolation,
A Dutch national court, in a prosecution against
sea fishermen for contravention of applicable Dutch
fishing rules, made a request for a preliminary ruling 
requesting an interpretation of Art.5 E.E.C, and Art, 
102 Brussels of the Act, VAN DAM EN ZONDEN ET AL 185- 
20V78(1979)(E,C.R, 2 3 4 5 ). The Court of Justice 
disposed of the question concerning the time limits 
which had been inaccurately set, by referring to
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Article 9 of the Brussels Act and saying that Art.102 ^  
Brussels would have no practical effect if the term 
were not read as meaning the end of the year in 
question. The Court also adopted its decision in 
the case Commission v Ireland(page97 above). This 
decision was in fact a clarification of the position 
set out in the Ireland case. It was held that it 
was permissible for one member state to have stricter 
rules than other member states, so long as they were 
applied equally to all within that member state's 
jurisdiction, thus upholding the principle of non­
discrimination.
The first finding that a member state had failed! 
to fulfil its obligations under the Rome Treaty 
resulted from the accession of the United Kingdom in 
the case l4l/?8 THE FRENCH REPUBLIC v GREAT BRITAIN 
AND NORTHERN IRELAND (I98O) 1 C.M.L.R, 6 , The U.K. 
adopted the Fishing Nets (N,E, Atlantic) Order19'77 
which restricted the taking of certain unprotected 
species where the catch included more than 20^ of a 
protected species, A French trawler which was found 
to be in breach of this regulation was fined. The 
Community had* awaiting the creation of a Common 
Fisheries Policy^come to an interim agreement: the
resolution by the Council at the Hague of 30th October 
and 3rd November 1976 which stated "pending the imple­
mentation of the Community members (to ensure the 
protection of the resources situated in the fishing 
zones along their coastlines), the member states will 
not take any unilateral measures in respect of the
-  w
101conservation of the resources," (Quoted in the
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This was however in addition to the existing 
duties under Art. 5 of the Rome Treaty, The U.K.'s 
defence* after admitting that the Hague resolution 
was binding,, was that the measure had not been uni­
lateral in terms of the resolution* because it was 
adopted in pursuance of the North East Atlantic 
Fisheries Convention. This argument was not upheld 
because it was found that the U.K. should have 
adopted the procedure laid down and would have 
consequently received a sympathetic hearing from the 
Commission,
Looking at the Treaty of Rome alone, from 
preamble indent 8 and Art. 237 r it might be 
thought that accession was only a matter of political 
will, ¥e hope we have shown that* although political 
will is important* it need not be overwhelmingly 
strong and that there is a body of law and practice 
which now regulates accession, ¥e have seen too that 
although accession can be broken into stages* these 
stages are mutually interdependent and would overlap 
within certain parameters.
One of the most perplexing parts of the procedure 
is the acquis communautaire doctrine and its relation­
ship with Art, 237 E.E.C,. We have seen how the acquis 
communautaire affects the accession process. The 
difficulties involved in Art, 237 E.E.C, will be seen 
more clearly in our next section dealing with some of 
the effects of accession. This is an important exercise * 
because although it is not a part of the accession 
itself* it comprises the outer parameter of the 
accession process.
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SECTION B:
THE EFFECTS OF ACCESSION 
CHARTER VIII ; THE INSTITUTIONS
We have already mentioned how the new member 
states immediately obtain membership of the Instit­
utions, This is essential if a strict interpretation 
of E.E.C, Article 237 is taken and is permitted with­
out amendment because it is a necessary adaptation. We
shall however see that ©vGLn simple numerical "a#;^ustment" 
can have important effects which may not be intended.
We now propose to examine the changes effected 
on the institutions of the Communities by accession* 
trying where possible to look for implied changes in
addition to examining those explicitly in the Act
of Accession. These almost imperceptible shifts of 
emphasis deserve some special notice. We shall 
examine each institution in turn in the order in 
which they appear in Part 5 of the Rome Treaty* and 
shall finally consider whether the European Council 
has a particular place in enlargement. We have 
chosen not to consider the lesser institutions for 
reasons of brevity,
(a) THE PARLIAMENT
In considering this institution, numerical 
adjustment is leas-t relevant. The first enlarge­
ment itself had little effect upon the Parliament, 
Admittedly the acquision of budgetary powers and the 
holding of direct elections came after accession but 
the first steps to budgetary adjustment were taken 
well before even the signature of the Luxemburg, 
budgetary Treaty on 22nd April 1970* thus predating
the accession. Likewise the Parliament submitted 
proposals under Article 138-3 on a regular basis* 
commencing in May of 19 6 O^requesting direct elections 
which were persistently refused the support of the 
Council, It required the heads of Government to 
provide the impetus (some evidence of the decline in 
the systemic dynamism), This was done in December 
1 9 7 4 after British accession. These are two inter­
esting points as they prove the acceptence by the 
acceding states of the acquis communautaire at least 
to a considerable degree* in accordance with the 
assumption that they gave the necessary consent to 
the Second Budgetary Treaty of 22nd July 1975 and 
gave approval,, in Council, to direct elections on 
20th September 1976.
1 02The Commission opinion had little to say about
the Parliamemt as it felt that only amendment under Art,23 
6 could be used to make any important changes although 
it did urge an extension of the conciliation procedure. 
This procedure allows the Council and the Parliament 
to speak together directly, the Commission having 
observer status.
It is possible that the increase in membership 
inspired the most recent moves towards establishing a 
single seat for the Parliament, Certainly the addition 
of every new member to a three seat rather than a single 
seat body can mean two extra return Journsys between 
the seats, Parliamentis resolution of Thursday 20th 
November I9 8 O, stated that the Parliament approved 
the initiative towards establishing a single seat 
by the French President , and demanded that the
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Governments of the member states should make a 
decision on the matter by June 1981 after consult­
ation with Parliament and finally set the ultimatum 
that failing satisfactory action the Parliament itself 
would take the necessary action to improve its 
effectiveness.
Numerical adjustments vary in significance 
with the importance of the institution. The 
Parliament as an institution is still trying to 
assert itself politically, rather than concerning 
itself with internal power struggles. Consequently, 
a slight imbalance between member states or 
political factions is not likely to cause any great 
upset or difficulty either from the point of view 
of member states or the Community as a whole. In 
the future the question of parliamentary seats may be­
come an issue. The political complexion of the 
applicant state could easily become part of the 
negotiating process with the member states ensuring 
that a comfortable political status quo is not dis­
rupted.
The Parliament began life with France* Germany 
and Italy having 36 seats each, Belgium and the 
Netherlands 14 and Luxemburg 6 , The proposed Act 
of Accession figures gave Britain 36 members and 
Ireland* Norway and Denmark 10* the original member 
states retaining their former allocation.
When Norway failed to accede its seats were 
simply disregarded* and the membership of each state 
remained the same. Direct elections provided for a 
4lO seat Parliament to sit for the July 1979 session
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allocating France* Germany* Italy and United Kingdom
81 seats; Belgium* 24; Netherlands, 25; Ireland, 15;
Denmark* l6 and Luxemburg 6 .
As Luxemburg’s seats were not increased as were
those of the other member states, it would seem that
103a "minimum level of representation" has been fixed 
at six. It seems that any state acceding can expect 
six seats regardless of G.N.P. or population.
The Parliament cannot enlarge by a redistri­
bution of the existing seats. There is a practical 
reason for this with a directly elected Parliament; 
to do so would require a redrawing of the national 
constituences which would cause problems at the 
national level with allegations of Gerrymandering 
being made at every future enlargement. Therefore 
the fact that this adjustment by addition was taken 
in the first round shows that the commitment to direct 
elections was clearly maintained. Consequently this 
method of adjustment made a consideration of direct 
elections essential and this may have assisted im 
increasing the pace towards this aim,
Greek membership added 24 members (Art,10 Athens 
Act) and the accession of Spain and Portugal will 
add, on the Commission’s figures, 58 and 24 members 
respectively. The political groupings within Parlia­
ment changed to some extent. New Democracy, the 
Democratic Centre Union* and the Democratic Socialists 
in favour of community membership and on the other 
hand PASOK and the Greek Communists in opposition 
to continued membership formed alliances with other 
groups but until real political power is at issue
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these are of little real consequence. The democratic 
emphasis of the Greek Accession must have given the 
Parliament some encouragement to push for an ever
1 o4gteater role in community affairs.
(b) THE. COUNCIL
"The community is the first -serious attempt in
the world to evolve a method whereby the relation
between states can be effectively regulated by mutual
consent and the rule of law. It should be judged as 
105such," It is majority voting which provides the 
basis for consensus government and makes the existence 
of a vote of law most apparent. Anything which 
affects this principle is worth the most serious 
consideration. As we shall later find the attitude 
of the members on this subject were made the subjiect 
of a "pre-condition" of Greek Accession which partic­
ularly makes this question pertinent to enlargement.
In addition the numerical adjustments in weighting 
under the majority voting system resulting from 
enlargement have themselves serious implications.
We shall consider these adjustments before considering 
the wider implications.
Under Art, 148 of the Treaty of Rome, Franc©* 
Germany and Italy had 4 votes each* Belgium and the 
Netherlands 2 each, and Luxemburg had 1 vote. The 
treaty required a qualified majority of 12 from a 
total of 17 making 6 votes a minority capable of 
blocking a measure requiring a qualified majority.
From thffise figures no single state could block a 
proposal although as few as two could. Consequently,
10 6
the "big three" could pass anything on which they were 
agreed and the relatively homogeneous Benelux group» 
were not given a blocking power.
The Act of Accession initially allocated France* 
Germany* Italy and U,K, 10 votes; Belgium and 
Netherlands 5 votes; Ireland* Netherlands;* Norway and 
Denmark 3 votes and Luxemburg 2 votes* making a qual­
ified majority 43 out of 61 and a blocking majority 
19» Two big states could still block a proposal but 
now a single large state required at least two or 
even three members voting with it to block,, The 
Benelux member states could block if voting with a 
larg© state but this was not possible even if voting 
with two of the smaller new members. The "Big Four" 
were not a majority on their own and Luxemburg was 
of no value as an ally to them.
Significantly* the new member states voting 
together could block a proposal. The practical 
result of this was an institutionalisation for the 
future of the enlargement exercise creating a possible 
distinction between old and new members. This is 
something which cannot happen within the formal 
enlargement process and cannot be incorporated in 
any provision because of the terms of E,E,C, Art,237 and the 
doctrine of acquis communautaire, This would have 
been a dangerous position which could have undermined 
the acquis communautaire. This is a clear example of 
how numerical adjustment cannot properly maintain 
even the status quo ante.
lO 7
As it transpired the actual weighting esta­
blished by Art. 14 was to give France * Germany* Italy
and the U.K. 10 votes; Belgium and Netherlands 5 
votes; Ireland* Denmark* Netherlands 3 votes and 
Luxemburg 2* producing a qualified piajority of 4l 
from 58 and establishing a block of 18. Two large 
states could still block. The new members thus' lost 
their ability to block* an unexpected benefit for the. 
Community. For the U.K., which could have been fairly 
confident of carrying all the new members with it 
should the occasion have arisen, this change must 
have made majority voting seem suddenly less attrac­
tive to those opposed to entry. (This is reflected 
in P.M. Wilson’s statement quoted below* page 125)• 
However* Luxemburg gained in status as becoming able 
to support a Big Four proposal.
After the latest accession Germany* France* Italy 
and U.K. received 10 votes* Belgium and Netherlands 
joined Greece in having 5 votes* Denmark and Ireland 
held 3 and Luxemburg 2. Thus Demiiark* Ireland and 
Luxemburg all lost their "Big Four ally" status and 
Benelux as a group became insignificant (45 out of 63  
being a qualified majority and 19 a block).
The original six members of the Community hav© 
passed control to the new members. The possibility of 
continuous realignment becoming more likely (assuming 
of course that majority voting had any real meaning), 
Zolotas was correct in a wide sense when he said 
that ; "Greece is merely going to become the tenth 
member of the E.E.C. by taking the place of Norway,., 
..the accession of Greece will give rise to no more
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problems than would have been faced as a result of the 
accession of Norway,"^^^The operation of the Luxem­
burg accords has the effect of making every increase 
in the number of Council members all the more likely 
to bring decision making to a halt (as unanimity is 
required where a member state considers its vital 
interests to be at stake).
Encouragement is evident in the Report of the 
1 07three wise men. So many other causes are given for 
the difficulties in decision making other than the 
Luxemburg Accords that the consequences directly 
following from the increase in membership of the 
Community similarly diminish in importance; "there 
is no doubt that the Luxemburg compromise has became 
a fact of life in the Community, In the reality of 
the Community today voting cannot be used to over­
ride individual states on matters which they regard
107as involving very important interests," This was 
an affirmation of the Commission's view when it an­
nounced that, lit had no intention of reviving an old
quarrel on a particularly delicate point on which
1 0 8the member states had agreed to disagree.
This is typical of the pragmatism in Community
life* but it is an unfortunate disregard for the rule
of law. The rule of law* if infringed* can have
wider implications than merely the practical diff-
1 OQiculties of the infringement. Esch ^said that "the 
issue of majority voting is not a matter of effective­
ness even although it is true that a system of 
unanimous decision making between nine member state© 
is bound to lead to paralysis. Beyond questions of
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efficiency the agreed system of majority decision 
forms such an essential element of the rule of law 
within the Community that it may safely be conaddered 
a precondition for its continuation."
Esch then begins to speak in terms of enforcing 
the rule of law and despite the Council’s practice to 
the contrary the method may be summarised as follows: 
(i) the Commission asks officially for a vote to be 
taken. (ii) the Commission though not obliged to 
call a vote find it difficult torefuse to do so.
(iii) the members may then have a duty to vote as 
it is suggested that failure to do so would be in 
breach of Art, 5* However, he accepts that abstention 
would be an avoidance of such a breach.
A return to the scheme envisaged by the Treaty 
is unlikely for the present. On the other hand 
régularisation of the position should be possible.
So long as there is some acceptable code which is 
close to the Treaty provisions then we need Have no 
fea# for the rule of law* as had Esch. We in the U.K. 
with our constitutions of conventions have no diff­
iculty in finding the rule of law even where there may 
be no rule or no law.
We feel that the situation may resolve itself 
in the same way in which it was created. There may 
arise an issue about which all but one or two members 
feel very strongly and which is met with ©"Luxemburg" 
veto. The majority would vote and the other party 
or parties would, having no legal remedy* be faeed 
with the option of withdrawal. It would be then that 
they will realise that they are practically committed
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as well as legally.^^^The Community of today is not 
the Community de Gaulle was able to disrupt.
The Commission as we have noted accepted the 
decline of the majority vote but did come up with a 
most ingenious alternative strategy; "Consider­
ing this development and the implications of enlarge­
ment, it may legitimately be asked whether the 
Community would not gain valuable room for manoeuvre
111if the areas in which this code applies were extended.
IllThis is very much the idea put forward by Olmi also.
This refers back to the question which we 
previously introduced relating to what scope is offer­
ed for adjustment under Art. 237 E.E.C.* because 
both the Commission and Olmi offer detailed proposals 
for changes to the voting structure which they 
consider could have been carried out in an enlargement 
round without the necessity of amendment under 2 3 6 .
This proposal did not appear in the Athens Treaty either 
because a strict interpretation was taken of Art, 237 
E.E.C, or because the necessary political commitment 
was not there. (It is remarkable to note how much im 
agreement were the Commission's proposals and those of 
Olmi* the only significant difference being that the 
Commission cites articles 75(3), 76* 93(2) as being 
unacceptable for any extension of the majority prim-' 
ciple although Olmi does not. Both comment on the 
mixed nature of Art. 100 which can apply to the most 
trivial or important matters equally)•
Perhaps we should close with Fitzgerald's 
prophetic words, "Only the issue of enlargement offers 
a chance to bring this matter (decision making in the
Ill
Council) to a successful conclusion, and if this
chance is missed the opportunities of making progresss
with improvements in decision making thereafter may
112be few* and remote in time.".
(c) THE COMMISSION
The Commission of the European Communities
consisted originally of nine members (Art. 157 E.E.C.)
one from each state and no more than two from any
one. This was altered by Art, 10 of the Merger Treaty
and Council decision of January 1st* 1973 to 13
members* each member to have one Commissioner but none
more than two. Before the withdrawal of Norway 14
had been fixed as the number of members. The reduction
provided for in the Merger Treaty to 9 never took place,
showing how enlargement can adversely divert the
course of Community activity. Membership was not
retained at 14 as this would have resulted in one of
113the small states being given two Commissioners.
Hallstein (the first President of the Commission) 
had said before the first enlargement* "The number of 
Commissioners should be kept as small as possible. The 
governments have agreed on nine as the optimum 
number; an increase to 14 members is expressly limit­
ed to a short transitional period after the merger 
of the executives. This means that when the Commun­
ity is enlarged it will probably not be possible to 
maintain the principle that nationals from every 
member state must sit on the Commission as the 
driving force of the Community would be unwieldy to
11 4the point of inability to act,". It was not to be.
I ï 2
The Commission ended up having 13 members which not 
surprisingly did result in a degree of paralysis.
This time more caution and prudence was in
evidence. The Commission itself instructed D. Spieren—
115burg to report on the Commission's operations. It is
outwith the ambit of this study to review the whole
scope of Commission reform. The review body echoed the
call for a small Commission and considered that the work
justified only eight portfolios with perhaps a maximum
on enlargement to 12 and an overall membership of one
member per state. Even this is a considerable regression
11 4from the position Hallstein held which would have had 
some states unrepresented on the Commission, A view we> 
feel is supported by the oath taken by Commissioners 
and their individual characters which ensures that theres 
should be no national bias on the Commission's part.
The Report on the European institutions (known as 
the "Three wise men" Report) attributes th© difficulties 
of Commission decision making to the merger ratheir than 
merely the first accession: "Since the enlargement of
the Commission in 19^7 there has been a loss of eoll— 
egiality in its members' method of working combined 
with inadequate internal coordination,^^^This left 
the Commission in a weakened position. Certainly 
size alone is not the Commission's only problem. The 
remedies put forward by Spierenburg and adopted by 
the "Three Wise Men" are to some extent size dependent: 
for example* the strengthened presidency to which both 
reports refer becomes more difficult to operate in 
practice with a large rather than small Commission 
and the rationalisation of directorates-
lia
general is dependent upon a structured Commission 
arranged in a logical manner of dossiers rather 
than in national terms.
The Spierenburg solution had already been fore­
seen by the Commission, "As for the future composition 
of the Commission the guiding principle, as for the 
other institutions of the Community should be to 
ensure its efficient functioning. Various formulas 
would be possible; one possibility* already suggest­
ed by the ministers of foreign affairs (informal meet­
ing at Leeds Castle) is that the College would be 
composed of one national of each member state. How­
ever that would result in a marginal reduction in the 
number of members of the Commission from the existing 
level of thirteen which would pose certain practicral 
problems in view of the increased’ burden of work in 
a wider community, particularly during the transitional 
period".^
A first comment is to ask why the Commission 
did not consider a reduction to 9 or 10 if as they 
say the guiding principle was efficient functioning.
A second is that the "practical problems" excuse does 
not seem valid considering that the Merger Treaty had 
foreseen a substantial and sudden drop in the number 
of members. (In the same way the first accession 
despite the extra workload resulted in one Commiss­
ioner being dropped). Finally,, even speaking in 
terras of a marginal reduction, the consideration in 
terms of a Community of twelve,. is unrealistic, for 
Spain and Portugal certainly were unlikely to become 
members for several years and in that interim period
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the Commission will be overinflated. This was a 
case where the Commission should have proposed in­
terim measures while maintaining a "global contexit".
In endorsing the Spierenburg proposals the "three
wise men" said that "....the switch to the new
principle must be made at the next reappointment of
the Commission which usefully coincides with Greek
Accession (January 1981). If the will cannot be
found to act at this stage,, it will certainly not
1 1 6be found at any later date’.'. This was written 
after sight and in knowledge that the Athens Act 
signed on May 1979 by Art. 15 amended the first sub- 
para, of Art. 10(l) of the Merger Treaty to read 
that the Commission should consist of fourteen mem­
bers* and in fact a Commission of 14 took offic# 
from January 6th I9 8 I until 5th January 1985»^^^
This is despite Commission President Jenkins speech 
to the Parliament on February I9 8O that the 
Spierenburg report would be acted upon without delay 
especially relating to staff matters and coordination. 
He said,, "....decisions will soon be necessary on the 
composition of the next Commission, Our experience 
does not lend itself to think that it should nece­
ssarily. be smaller than the present one, but nor do 
we think it should be significantly larger .
What this means is of course beyond logical compre­
hension but the result we know.
Criticism of the new Commission was soon forth­
coming over the allocation of new portfolios. Michael 
O'Kennedy was allocated the post of President's 
delegate* personnel and administration*, statistical .
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office and publications office* a post lacking in 
much political influence. It was thought that The 
Irish Commissioner was likely to have too little to 
do whereas other Commissioners would have a suff­
iciency. This must have impressed upon the member 
states that a formal requirement that they be allowed 
one Commissioner offers them no guarantee of influence 
in Community affairs.
Apart from the membership question, accession 
causes concern, because of increased routine work, 
namely translation and interpretation. The "three 
wise men" stated that they believed that "people from 
all member states who engage in Community activities 
have a presumptive right to use their national 
language to express themselves". This is a problem 
which can only increase in alarming logarithmic 
proportions with increased membership. However, 
because of the division of labour in a modern plur­
alist state,f political information and activity is 
channelled through experts, and so, there is no reason 
why one or two working languages could not be adopted. 
Parliament may be a special exception because of the 
residual influence of the plenary democractic tradition. 
The benefits of this reform would not only be to save 
resources but would also create a bond of common 
language between the Europeans as they slowly realised 
that to take part in the ever expanding European 
competence they would require skill in the working
language„ much the same way as Latin and English were
1 20learned in their respective imperial times. This 
would best be done before European integration drowns
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in a sea of multilingual paper. The Spanish and 
Portuguese accessions provide the opportunity,
(d) THE COURT OF JUSTICE
There have been no serious criticisms of the
Courts functioning: it copes effectively with its
work load and as an instrument of integration hasB
filled its role well. The only adjustment to be
considered is the numerical alteration, which raises
no significant problems but nevertheless does raise
a few interesting questions.
Art, 1 6 5 of the Treaty of Rome established a-
court of seven judges one from each states and an ad-
dittionalItalian. Such is the oath taken by the
members of the Court and the calibre of the men
swearing it that the question of nationality should
be irrelevant. Certainly in a small Community it is
reasonable that every state should have at least one
member. For example the European nourt of Human
Rights cannot have two judges who are nationals of
the same state and has a membership equal to the
121number of members of the Council of Europe.
On the other hand,, the International court of
Justice consists of fifteen, no two of whom may be
122nationals of the same state. The United States
1 23;
Supreme Court at present has nine members ""^ and there 
is no mandatory allocation of seats. It can be saidi 
then that it can be expected that the "one state one 
member" rule should remain until membership exceeds 
say fifteen to twenty whereupon it might be considered 
possible for some states to be unrepresented. It has
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been said that for the present "the rule should be
upheld that all member states must be represented
1 24in every Community institution and organ",
Art. 17 of the Act of Accession for a 10 member 
community anticipated an eleven member court. On 
Norway’s non-ratifieation it was said* "The non­
appointment of a judge of Norwegian nationality would 
reduce the court to the even number of 10 which is
clearly unacceptable for a judicial organ, A red-
12 5'uction to nine members seems logical” and indeed
Art, 9 of the Adaptation decision stated that the
Court should consist of nine judges. The Commission
has accepted by implication the even number argument*
"it may be stated that application of the existing
criteria (16 3  E.E.C.) would mean that the court should
consist of thirteen judges (an odd number to avoid 
12 5tied votes.)". This view reflected the original
»
composition of seven judges when there were only 
6 members. Art. 16 of the Athens Treaty increased
the courts membership to 10,
This seems to be a strange decision in the light 
of the precedent established in the first accession 
and the Commission's approach. Looking again at the 
comparative examples previously mentioned we see that 
the International Court of Justice has taken a firm 
"unequal" stance with a fixed odd number of judges.
The European Court of human rights can have an odd 
or even number of members but Article 43 of the
1 26Convention restricts the Court to a chamber of 
seven members when it is exercising its judicial fun­
ction which may have awkward political implications
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if member states lose actions when their judge is 
not on the bench.
The Community’s solution appears to be similar. 
Art. 20 of the Brussels Act declares that the Court’s 
decisions shall only be valid when an uneven number 
of judges have entered the deliberations. This again 
causes the political problem we have mentioned: which
judge should not sit.
We would suggest that the type of scheme and 
indeed the attitudes that havs been taken in the 
question of the size of the Court of Justice have 
been uninspired. There are three points to be made; 
first, there is no rule which requires that the Court 
of Justice should have one member from each state; 
secondly* there in no need for members to be nationals 
of member states; and thirdly* there is no reason why/ 
a court should not function in plenary session with 
an even number of judges. The first point has been 
considered generally above. The second point has 
potential for the development of the Enlargement 
Policy. Whereas Art. 10 of the Merger Treaty states 
that "Only nationals of Member States may be members 
of the Commission,", there is no comparable provision 
for the Court of Justice (see Article? 16"? E.E,C.).
This leads us to assume that* providing the require­
ments of 1 67 are met* a national of a non-member 
state might be appointed. This, might be done where 
there is a long-term association such as the Athens 
Agreement, It should have no effect on the Court’s 
decision as such but would be of political and pract- 
ical significance. It would also have avoided the
problems of giving a member state? am extra member,
as in the case of the "extra" Italian.
The United Stakes Supreme Court was created
by Art, 3 ^ee, one of the U.S. constitution which
simply stated that "the judicial power of the United
1 27States shall be vested im one Supreme Court.,,."
Twelve States were signatories to that constitution
yet its initial membership was set at five by
congressional act of 1789* Thus here we have a siæe
comparable?with that of the Community which was
content to allow the judicial function to be exercised
by a Court upon which every state was not represented’.
Even after the Supreme Court established perhaps a
wider jurisdiction than may have been intended in the?
case? of Marbury v Madison in 1803 (like the Court
of Justice itself in Costa v Enel)* the States*
when later increasing the number of justices* did
not alter the position.
The Supreme Court has consisted of an even
number of members on a number of occasions; 17 9 0 -
1807 - 6; 1863-1866 - 10; 1866-1869 - 8, The Courts
practice is that in the event of a tie the decision
128of the highest court below is sustained. Certainly 
the European Court of Justice’s role differs from that 
of the Supreme Court particularly in; the Art. 177 E.E.C. 
reference which is largely advisory and there would them
in the event of a tie be no opportunity to adopt a rule
similar to the U.S. rule. The Treaty demands that in 
such Art.177 E.E.C. rulings that the Court sit in plenary 
session. A possible solution would be to give to the" 
President of the Court the right to produce the
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Court’s opinion in the light of the deliberations of 
the judges;, other solutions could be devised.
Another question was raised* by Brown and Jacobs 
who said that "...the prospects of further enlarge­
ment of the Communities to include Greece....would
have an immediate impact on the working of the 
1 29institutions’’. They appreciated that this would
involve the Court of Justice and continued* asking
"...whether the court should continue to sit
normally in plenary session or whether more frequent
use might be made of chambers or divisions with a
quorum of say five or seven judges. Thus it would
be possible to envisage that the court sit regularly
in two divisions* When a plenary session was still
necessary it might be desirable to introduce to the
enlarged Court a proportionally lower quorum than
129the present,, of seven out of nine judges.’’, ^ The 
addition of one judge to the Court of itself does 
not raise too many problems but if consideration is 
not given to these questions the situation can get out 
of hand. The Commission has projected an increasing 
court,, but will the workload always justify this?
Beyond the question of composition of the Court 
suggestions were made at the time of this enlargement 
to extend the Jtiris diet ion of the Court to include 
some way of dealing with non-democratic states. The? 
inspiration for this was the realisation that the' 
applicant countries had all recently thrown off the 
yolk of dictatorship coupled with a cynical acknowled­
gement that they might slip back again (we recall the 
storming of the Cortez in 1981). Perhaps the some-
12 1
what hasty ill-considered and ad hoc response of 
"freezing" to the Colonels Coup during the Athens 
Agreement had shown the need for a considered 
response. Again we can see that the political 
reality exercises an influence upon the legal 
structure: to ensure an accession that would not
disturb equilibrium it was thought to be clear that 
the law would have to provide extra stability* some­
thing which it would not be able to do simply by 
adjusting the applicant state into the Community 
system.
Christopher Soames said,. "If any member 
country of the Community ever got itself a govern­
ment thcit ceased to follow the precepts of a 
pluralist democracy and the freedoms that they
involve, then that country could no longer remain
1 30a member of the Community". This is a commendable
sentiment evincing as it does a concern for pluralism
which we have said is crucial to integration theory
but we must ask; how is it to be achieved? It was
suggested in the Pintat report that on the model of
the mechanisms for imposing legal sanctions in the
case of infringement of the Treaties the Court of
Justice should be able to establish the failure of
a member state to respect the principles of freedom 
131and democracy, Since 1974 all three applicants have 
fulfilled the most important unwritten qualification 
for membership - that they should establish democratic; 
Institutions, But whether any would be expelled im 
the event of a return to authoritarianism is less 
certain. This does not take us far enough! To be
12 2
of real practical value a sanction would have to be 
provided. If it is to be expulsion we have entered 
a difficult area for there is no withdrawal mechanism 
let alone expulsion mechanism in the Treaties; they 
are concluded for an unlimited period.
The mere declaration of an infringement would 
have little effect on a dictatorship^and expulsion 
is a radical and irrevocable step. The dictatorship 
might only be temporary and shortly overthrown; the 
Community would then have to jconsider something not 
unlike the Freeze, Another alternative would be 
suspension which would be analogous both to de 
Gaulle's withdrawal of 19^5 and the freezing of the 
Athens Association. The Community could not^ we 
suggest^ cope as well with the absence of a member 
state as it could in 19^5 # There is now a far greater 
range of Community activity which is not specific?ally 
laid down by the Treaties, and a failure to make 
progress in perhaps crucial areas might result; for 
the same reasons a freeze would be dangerous. How­
ever* once full Community membership is achieved it 
is unlikely that problems will occur because of the 
inevitable support for pluralist democracy which comes 
from Community membership. We shall for the present
k;-
put this question aside and look at the Court of 
Justice position.
There was no "democracy" clause included im the
Athens Act. However* the Preamble of the Treaty
(Athens) states that it was concluded* "Considering
that the Council of the European Communities after
»
having obtained the opinion of the Commission has;
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declared itself in favour of the admission of this 
state". The said Commission opinion of 23rd May 
differed from the otherwise similar opinion of 1 9th 
January 1972 for the first enlargement in. that it had 
a clause which runs as follows; "Whereas the principles 
of pluralist democracy and respect for human rights 
form part of the common heritage of the peoples of 
the states brought together in the European Commun­
ities and are therefore essential elements of member­
ship of the said Communities", This is not as 
extensive as was sought and its legal effect* we 
would submit, is negligible.
There is some doubt as to the Court of Justice 
attitude to the legal effect of the Preamble.generally. 
Scherpers said,"The problem of the force of the 
preamble is different when not only the motives but
also the aims of the Treaty are mentioned in more
1 32specific terms". In saying this, Scherpers is look­
ing essentially at the Regional policy and concludes 
that part of its legal foundation lies in the Preamble, 
He cites the International Court of Justice decision 
in the Asylum erase and the Vienna convention Art *31 
as general authority. We agree with much of what is 
said* but our problem is not answered by such analysis. 
This particular Preamble provision is too general to 
be actually used either as a guide to interpretation 
or as a foundation for some action. The Court of 
Justice, we would submit* would be unable to take any 
action in terms of it.
We suggest that the purpose of this clause is 
altogether different. It anticipates a situation
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where the breakdown in democracy would be so serious 
that the Treaty would have to be dissolved. As there 
is no provision in Community Law for this it would 
have to be done in terms of the General International 
Law, The clause then takes on a more obvious purpose.
If we look at Art, 62 of the Vienna Convention (see 
Appendix D) the clause is such that it would be a 
valuable indication of a circumstance which "constit­
uted an essential basis of the consent of the parties 
to be bound by the Treaty".
So the new clause in the Commission opinion 
is not the extension of jurisdiction of the Court 
which some had proposed. None the less it is a 
significant addition to the law of accession,
(e) THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL
Although not an institution, specifically 
recognised by the Treaty and not mentioned in the 
Accession Acts, the European Council has a two-fold 
significance for a study of enlargement; it came into 
existence at the end of the U.K. enlargement - it has 
played a part in the Greek enlargement,
We have shown that there was no thorough reform 
of the institutions at the time of the U.K. enlargement. 
Indeed this was not even thought necessary. It was 
appreciated that decision making would be more 
difficult. The reasons for the creation of the 
European Council are obscure* "The European Council 
was created to meet the demands of a period in which 
the detailed guidance in the Treaties was running out,, 
external circumstances had grown hostile, and the 
capacity to tackle these problems both of the (Council
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1 33of ministers and of the Commission had declined". 
Enlargement probably had as much of a part in its 
genesis, Hallstein said* "It is not correct to claim 
that the enlargement of the Community to seven or more 
members will necessarily entail a change in its 
character* a watering down of its aims* a reduction 
of its dynamism. This would be true only if enlarge­
ment were not taken as an occasion to streamline the?
1 34Communities’ o r g a n i s a t i o n . A s  the Accession 
documents made no provision, for institutional reform 
then it is a safe assumption that the European 
Council was thought of as the solution to a number 
of problems including the decision making difficulties 
consequent upon enlargement.
It must also be more than coincidental that 
the Council was formed in late 1974 following the 
U.K.’s expressed intent to renegotiate made to the Cou­
ncil of Ministers in Luxemburg on April 1st 1974.^^^
The British Prime Minister Wilson felt able to say 
that the heads of government had* "already de' facto 
asserted a degree of political power at the top level* 
not only for the month by month decisions but over the 
general method of operation of the market. This does 
not mean that the market has become a Europe des patries. 
It is a Community but* as compared with even a year 
ago * vital interests of individual nations are now 
getting much more of a fair h e a r i n g ^ ^ ^ S o  yet 
another possibility arises. The European Council 
could have been an attempt to pacify the U.K. in the 
face of renegotiation demands. If this is so it 
again suggests that the European Council was a
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by-product of enlargement. The existence of the 
European Council is a justification of the argument 
which says that enlargement should include a review 
of the existing position rather than merely increasing 
the numbers.
The value of the European Council is derived
1 37from its position outside the Community system.
It could however constitute the Council of the 
European Communities and take decisions if it saw 
fit. It is an institution which is difficult to 
place into the Lindberg formula (see App. b ): it
could be considered within the category of systemic: 
support or leadership or even as part of the 
General Error Term. Certainly its role has been 
one of leadership and this would appear to be the 
appropriate category in which to place it.
We might expect that this latest accession will 
put more pressure on the European Council*. Many of 
the same difficulties(which were experienced after 
the first accession are still present which is an 
indictment of the functioning of the European Council), 
If neither the European Council nor subsequent reform 
is able to remedy the difficulties of the second 
accession,, some other ad hoc measures may be taken 
to relieve the pressure on the Community institutions. 
Because the European Council is not governed by any 
rules* its future actings cannot be anticipated. 
Neither the content nor the scope of its behaviour 
is predictable. Nor is its own jurisdiction and 
competence at stake in the enlargement other than
137
its membership being enlarged. It does not have 
to consider as carefully the effect of accession on 
itself as did the other institutions.
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CHAPTER IX 
COMMUNITY POLICIES
We have seen how the aecession affects the 
institutions in a way more extensive than the 
numerical changes alone would suggest.. Next, we must 
obtain an indication of how the method used affects 
Community functioning. Here we have to place some 
limitation on the scope of our enquiry. We propose 
only to look at some areas where substantial progress 
could have been achieved and where it was not in the 
first enlargement. We then comment on how far if at 
all a different approach has been taken in the Greek 
enlargement. Accordingly we do not look at the 
Four freedoms. These were virtually complete at the 
time of the first enlargement and were further
advanced at the time of the Greek accession, Im any
event their final state is determined by the Treaties
as they are measures of negative integration and are
less illustrative of the point we are examining; how 
is the development of the Community affected by the 
enlargement method. This is a narrower question than 
asking how enlargement as a whole affects the Communi­
ties * functioning but logically comes after a consider­
ation of the first.
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We thus turn to look at some of the Communities' 
policies. We do not follow the Treaties' distinction 
between Foundations (part 2) and Policies (part 3) as 
we are looking at development. For example competition 
Policy (part 3) is less a matter of concern from the 
point of view of progress than is transport policy 
or common agricultural policy (part 2). The develop­
ment of the Communities * Mediterranean Policy is a 
particularly interesting matter and we would propose? 
to leave that to a separate section and to include 
in that discussion other observations on the Greece/ 
E.E.C./Turkey relationship.
(a) ECONOMIC POLICY
We begin by looking at Economic Policy, partic­
ularly important in an economic Community. Encompassed 
within this we intend to make mention of economic and
monetary union and a common currency which are related
^  138 tppics.
1 39Economic Policy has a Treaty base, There wae 
no substantial progress made in this field before the 
first enlargement., The desire to move to full Economic 
and Monetary Union became an excuse for putting off 
the less far-sighted proposals. The customs Union 
itself, a prerequisite for E,M,U. was not complete 
until 1 9 6 8 , The six's initiative was the Werner commit­
tee following upon the Hague Summit of 2nd 
December 19^9»
1 30
By the time a Council resolution was promulgated 
based on a Commission proposal following on the 
Werner recommendations* the British Accession Treaty 
was almost ready for signature, "What the British 
found in the way of Community patrimony on joining 
the Community* besides the .......'articles of the Trea­
ty was a medium term economic policy programme* 
decisions to coordinate the economic and monetary 
policies of the member states and two resolutions 
dated March 1971 and March 1972 on the achievement 
by stages of economic and monetary union in the 
Community",^^^Not only did the U,K, accept these 
measures but allowed the agreement and coming into
1 41force of the various measures of 18th February 1974.
It is clear that economic and monetary union 
was supposed to have been achieved by I9 8 O. This 
was declared as an objective at the Hague Conference, 
This has manifestly not been achieved. Can this 
failure be attributed to a failure to include a 
specific obligation upon the new member state?» in 
the accession treaty? It has been said, "L'élarg­
issement de 1 9 7 3 n'a pas modifie cette orientation 
(towards e.m.u.) meme si* sous la pression des 
événements monétaires internationaux et des chocs 
impartis aux structures économiques du monde 
occidental, l'optimisme témoigné' par le rapport 
Werner quant a la durée de 1'enterprise à du faire 
place à des attitudes plus reaTistes".^^^
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1 43This is an acceptable analysis. It is diff­
icult to ascribe any particular mishap in Community 
affairs to an individual cause. The most we may be 
able to say is that enlargement did not contribute 
to the development of E.M.U.. Indeed the U.K, fail­
ure to join the European Monetary System is still
1 44considered a problem.
The Greek enlargement is different from the 
first in that* in itself,, it makes the substance of eco­
nomic union much more difficult to achieve. This 
is to say that even although the legal means of 
bringing about E.M.U. need not be changed* the 
actual economic adjustment it: must bring about is 
greater as we saw in the introductory section (see 
page 16 above). This may result in auxilliary 
legislation to deal with these additional difficulties. 
The Commission said, "In view of this whole range of 
difficulties enlargement could well place a serious 
handicap on the Communities’ momentum; on its 
internal momentum* particularly the consolidation 
and development of the internal market and the 
achievment of E.M.U,.
We can ask whether, if the economic conditions 
of the Greek enlargement were expected to be more 
difficult, there should not have been some specific 
short term economic regime established. This may
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have made a Treaty amendment essential or it could 
have been achieved by making decisions before the 
Accession of Greece in terms of the existing powers 
which are adequate for the purposes. What is danger­
ous is to ignore the problem and to leave regulation 
of the Greek economy until Greece is a member^ for 
then she will be able to resist from within the 
Community System measures which might be politically 
unacceptable in Greece,
(b) FISHERIES
This is perhaps the clearest example of a 
distortion of Community functioning. The Community 
Regulation 2l4l/70 and 2142/70 (O.J. 1970, L 2 3 6/I-5 ) 
had established the Community character of fishing 
grounds up to 12 nautical miles from member states 
territories, Norway and the IT,K, opposed the existence 
of this regime on the basis that the measures were 
not acquis communautaire when negotiations started.
This was accepted by the Community,
The Community will in future be reluctant to 
advance policies while negotiations are in progress 
as a result of this experience lest they be left
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with the problem of having to allow substantial 
derogations. In the case of fisheries what resulted 
was not so much derogation but a roll-back of the 
Community regime. All of the nine* not just the 
acceding states were permitted to limit fishing 
within a six mile limit. Another interesting 
point about fisheries was that this was an area 
where the U.K. and Norway had their own mutual 
and inconsistent differences.
The post enlargement Community did manage 
however, to play a substantial part in fisheries 
policy even if not in the scene of developing it,
A brief examination of the Norwegian demands for 
a 200 mile limit not only enables us see the state 
of Community fishery policy, but it also shows how 
the Community copes with disputes between members 
and associates, (particularly relevant in the 
context of the Greece/Turkey situation - see page 
150 below), This fisheries dispute is complex and 
is well documented elsewhere,^
The E.E.C,/Norway agreement allowed considerable 
tariff concessions on fish. This.agreement being 
concluded with the E.E.C. gave the Community some 
bargaining power. Norway had to look to the Community 
as a whole even although the Community did not 
have a developed fisheries policy.
1 3 4
Norway’s ultimate aim was a 200 mile economic 
zone much, the same as that declared by Iceland in 
1975* The consequences for Iceland had involved 
the suspension of the association agreement. The 
O.K. later had to take its case to the International 
Court of Justice where it was successful. The U.K.* 
Eire, and France were all in favour of an eventual 
200 mile E.E.C. economic zone. The Commission also 
was broadly in favour of this. Norway’s demand» were 
not, therefore, so extreme. The law of the sea is 
a matter of public international law and that was 
undergoing an overhaul at the time at the UNCLOS 
negotiations. The Norwegians for domestic political 
reasons were unable to wait for the mechanics of 
the Convention to be concluded. Instead they 
proposed a no trading zone of a non-discriminatory 
nature with an extent of 5 0 miles.
In negotiating these zones the Norwegians, 
wished to hold bi-lateral talks with the affected’ 
states (France* Eire, U.K. and West Germany) merely 
keeping the Commission informed of progress. The 
reason for this was that Norway intended only to 
offer limited access to the U.K. and eventually to 
phase out access for Franc:e and West Germany, The 
U.K. wanted to preserve its position for the future
13
in relation to exclusive territory. These were 
long term issues. France and Germany were looking 
to the division of Community fishing rights as were 
the smaller E.E.C. states. The three E.E.C, states 
managed to maintain a common front for the negotiat­
ions on the "no trawling zones", *The smaller E.E.C, 
states were able to insist upon Norway negotiating 
with the uommission by using the Association Agree­
ment as a bargaining devise.
This Community reaction to a major economic 
event such as no trawling zones shows how disabled 
the Community was in its post-accession period. 
There was no common position which could have 
obtained better terms from Norway, The Commission 
was not as closely involved as perhaps it should 
have been consequently weakening the influence of 
the smaller member states. As matters progressed 
it was to be seen just how serious these problems 
were to become.
In October 1975 Norway proposed bi-lateral 
negotiations towards the establishment of a 200 
mile exclusive limit; the major concessions were 
to be offered to the U.K., the other E.E.C, members 
being given only transitional exemptions. However 
the Commission then proposed that the eventual 
Community Policy should include a coastal belt 
within the 200 mile economic zone. On this basis
1 36
the U.K* accepted that the Commission could be
given responsibility for negotiating with the
other countries involved. Regrettably the Council
was unable to formulate a negotiating mandate for
the Commission and the negotiations came to a halt.
The U.K. pressed for action and the Community agreed
that a 200 mile limit would be accepted by January
1st 1 9 7 7 . Norway declined this as a target date
for its own limit to be concluded. The difficulty
was the size of the U.K. zone; until this was
resolved the E.E.C. had little to offer the
Norwegians. Eventually the E.E.C. established this
area leaving the problem of the U.K.’s exclusive
area open. The fisheries policy itself has taken
1 hilonger to resolve.
How far can the lack of success be attributed 
to Accession. The reservation of the fisheries 
question was in our submission inexcusable. 
Admittedly accession negotiations should not be 
prejudiced by a single issue but neither should 
a significant issue" be left unresolved. More use 
could be made of the pressure which accession 
negotiations provide to bring both sides towards 
agreement, for we see from this example that it is 
difficult to negotiate a common position when the 
implications of it in the short term are obvious
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to a member state. It was not just a divergence of 
opinion that produced Community intransigence but the 
pervasive problem of the Commission's negotiating 
position. The Commission should insist upon 
receiving a sufficient mandate before undertaking 
any negotiations, certainly in circumstances 
similar to the fishing dispute.
We have seen a general Community problem 
not exclusively caused by enlargement but in which 
it is a major contributing factor. It is one which 
should be solved before the range of matters of 
Community competence increases beyond the ability of 
the presently inadequate Community decision making 
process to handle it. It is this increased diver­
gence of interests which is the hidden impact of 
enlargement not reflected in the legal acts (except 
perhaps incidentally in the protocols attached to 
the Accession acts). One solution is to improve 
decision making. The other is to rule out the 
need for decisions to be taken. This second is the 
method used in the four freedoms. It is not an 
option, except to a limited degree where developing 
policies are concerned. This follows naturally 
as the situations the policies must accommodate, 
are not known at the time of Accession.
(c) REGIONAL POLICY
In contrast, the regional policy appears 
to be a successful consequence of accession.
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The Treaty of Rome made no particular
provision for regional policy although in places
1 4 8mention was made of regional considerations.
The Court of Justice even declared that the 
Community was not empowered to operate a general 
regional policy under E.C.S.C. powers. Until 
1 9 7 2 little progress was made although the 
Commission continued to submit plans. There were 
existing measures available with which some relief 
from the centralising effects the Common Market 
was having could be obtained* 75^ of E.I.B. 
loans went to regional projects ; finance was also 
available under tire coal and steel treaty which 
could be diverted on a regional basis founded on 
the word "rational" in- Art. 2.; the social fund 
made available funds for retraining and re-allocation, 
which would tend only to be necessary in depressed 
areas which can be defined in regional terms. The 
Agricultural Guarantee Fund was able to be used 
within its terms for regional purposes, in matters 
of infrastructure.
This was not adequate to offset the problems 
of expanding connurbations and particularly within 
the context of trying to achieve E.M.U. by I9 8 O 
because of the pressures which members having large 
regional problems would face. An indication of the 
interconnection of regional policy and economic 
and monetary union can be seen in the requests by 
the Italians and Irish that additional regional
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assistance be given to their underdeveloped or 
declining regions before they would consent to 
join the E.M.U. and consequently losing some of 
their freedom to adjust exchange rates.
The question which must concern us is whether 
enlargement itself makes a regional policy more 
vital. The answer has to be affirmative although 
in a case such as Luxemburg or Ireland neither of 
which is regionalised this is less so. But the idea 
of a regional policy in its redistributive function 
means that whether a new member is rich or poor it 
will have something to contribute to a regional 
policy and something to gain: the giving or
receiving of finance or the opening up or availa­
bility of a new market. Economically the implica­
tions can be just as great as E.M.U.. In any event 
an advanced regional policy will be conducive to the 
conclusion of E.M.U. in that the transfer of large 
sums from national economies will make a united money 
market almost vital. The original six were 
geographically highly centralised (excepting the 
French departments) and the addition of new members
introduced a new periphery making transport and
1 4 9communications all the more important.
Another more likely reason for the emergence 
of the Regional Policy was that the U.K. in 
particular? finding that it would be a net contributor 
and being unable to alter the acquis communautaire 
was looking for a means of recovering funds within
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the Community scheme (later of course the pretence; 
was given up and special financial mechanism 
adopted). Regional policy was being actively con­
sidered and indeed acted upon prior to enlargement.
The U.K. at the 1972 Paris Summit we are to helieve; 
argued quite vehemently in favour of such a policy. 
This summit took place? interestingly enough bearing 
in mind much of what we haves stated in the first 
section (see page 70 above) after signature but 
before coming into force of the Treaty and so the 
possibility must have existed even at this very lates 
stage for a breakdown in the enlargement process •
The communique noted the intimate connection 
between E.M.S. and regional policy rather than conn­
ecting it with enlargement, "a high priority should 
be given to the aim of correcting in the Community? 
the structural and regional imbalances which might 
affect the realisation of economic and monetary 
union". The heads of government however do refer to, 
"the correction of the main regional imbalances in the 
enlarged Community"•
The effect of regional policy thereafter on 
enlargement is a different question because there is 
now a financial disincentive to the admission of 
new poor members. This of course is only a short 
term loss and is compensated by the benefits of 
alleviation of over-centralisation. Most states
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operate some form of regional policy and so Accession 
to the Communities will mean a realignment of these 
policies so that no distortion is created.
The ratio of highest to lowest G,D,P, within 
the nine at the time of enlargement was one to five. 
The regional policy developed was based on the idea 
of a regional development fund which was suggested 
by the 1972 Paris Summit and reiterated at the 
1 9 7 4 Paris Summit which stated that the Regional 
Development Fund would be put into operation by 
the Community institutions by 1st January 1975.
The distribution or allocation of these funds 
according to need saw the U,K, receiving the 
second highest grants and in effect four times as 
much as Germany and twice as much as France, Foll­
owing the Communities institutional method a comm­
ittee for regional policy was established consisting 
of member states and of the Commission, The policy 
does not prevent national action but is designed 
rather to be complementary. Perhaps the most 
disappointing feature of the fund was the amount at 
its disposal? some£125 million. This did not? at 
current prices, pay for a general hospital or two 
schools, (&54l available in first three years).
The Regional Development Fund was established 
by regulation and the Commission was obliged to re­
examine the principles of the fund, and make re­
commendations to the Council before the end of 
Nineteen Eighty, The Commission recommended a 15^
14 2
share for the Greeks but to compensate the states 
like the U.K. who would lose substantially because 
of this it was recommended that overall funding be 
increased. The Council cut this but the parliament re­
established it in the budget.
Obviously enlargement would be imperiled by 
such a reduction in funding and although enlargement 
implied an increase, the regulation should be 
amended to make such increases automatic. Even if 
circumstances made a fixed rule somehow inflexible 
there would at least be the benefit that there would, 
in the absence of agreement exist a positive rule 
of law preventing stagnation. Part of the reason 
was that no method of calculating the amount of 
adjustment had been created because there might be 
political overtones to the inclusion of a measure 
specifically recognising a future enlargement. This 
has now been worked out and it is calculated on the 
relative deviation from the Community mean of per 
capita G.D.P, in member countries.
The sisse of the regional fund prevents regional 
policy being a crucial issue in enlargement, The 
Council's attempt to devalue the Regional Development 
Fund shows how easily an extra-treaty obligation can 
be diluted. Its protection can now perhaps be entrust­
ed to the parliament with its new democratic authority; 
although there is still a case for trying to take 
matters such as this outside the scope of general debate.
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The admission of Greece has made the G.D.P, 
ratio closer to one to fifteen which if anything 
makes a case for the more generous endowment of the 
fund. The Accession of Greece also meant that the 
number of regions with a per capita G.D.P, below
fo of the Community average increases from 9 to 17*
The Commission's report on the policy on June 1st 
1 9 7 9 found it to be defective in many ways and it 
remains to be seen how far enlargement will interfere 
with the taking of measures necessary for the improve­
ment of the policy. The Accession of Greece and the 
potential Accession of the other applicants will make 
its perfection all the more necessary; it is fair to 
state that it is particularly the U,K, which has and 
will have most to gain, in the short term financial 
sense, being such a high contributor in other respects,, 
whereas poor agricultural countries should be making 
gains under the C,A.P.. The Commission is still 
dependent upon the national projects and it finds that 
these are not designed sufficiently well to take into 
account the effects of other Community policies and 
indeed other national policies.
Is the Regional Policy the success it seems to 
be? The Commission had certainly felt it to be 
important before the first Accession and its value 
cannot be disputed as a tool of integration. On the
14 4
other hand it came about without a clear treaty 
base,^^^There is an argument to which we would 
adhere that if Regional Policy were felt to be 
essential to E.M.U, it should have featured as a 
treaty amendment. If essential to the proper 
functioning of the enlarged Community it could 
have appeared as an adjustment under a wide defin­
ition of 2 3 7 or as an amendment. Not to do this 
leaves, what might easily become a major feature of 
Community life with no foundation.
Again the support the Regional Development
Fund had during its genesis came from a desire by
some members to effect a financial re-adjustment to
compensate for the cost of enlargement. This is a
misuse of a Community policy and leaves it open to
distortion. In any event because of the need for
member state participation it*is an unreliable means
of adjusting the financial consequences of enlargement
A better solution to that problem is that suggested 
151by Bergehman, He suggested a special reserve to
deal with the economic problems of enlargement from 
which funds could be allocated as need be. He coun­
selled against resorting to non-Community or extra- 
budgetary means to cover the real cost of accession. 
When the scheme is considered with the idea of giving 
aid to an acceding state where necessary we have an 
alternative view of how the R.D.F. could be used.
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It would also prevent the use of the argument that 
the R.D.F, was an "on cost" in any accession nego­
tiation; it would be entered in the "enlargement ac­
count". The obvious danger of this accounting is 
that it might be substituted for a complete analysis 
by short-sighted politicians, '
Accepting our foregoing remarks and reser­
vations, the Regional Policy is an indication of the 
innovation and progress that a new member can bring to 
the Community without deliberate conscious planning.
This enlargement has affected functioning in a 
number of ways. The method of obtaining commitment 
to the acquis communautaire from the acceding states 
seems to give political support to maintaining develop­
ment. It does not and cannot offer real protection in 
the same way that the transitional period does for 
the functioning of the Common Market. There must 
surely be an argument for codifying the acquis 
communautaire before enlargement even with the danger 
that such an exercise could be used to subtly alter 
the substance of the acquis communautaire and might 
result in the loss of practical arrangements which
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member states would not wish to have codified but 
which are nonetheless valuable,
(d) MEDITERRANEAN POLICY
It would be difficult to imagine a more directly 
affected area of activity than the Mediterranean 
Policy and in this respect we are fortunate because 
we can see more easily these non-explicit implied 
changes which we have been discussing.
The Community before Greek Accession had a 
partially completed policy towards the littoral 
Mediterranean states. With the inclusion of Greece 
within the Community a complete restructuring of this 
policy was essential. This was an aspect of Community 
functioning where the acquis communautaire had to 
be abandoned. The delicate relationship between the 
E.E.C., Turkey and Greece also requires to be 
included within some workable framework.
The policy before Accession:
From the Athens Agreement the Community began 
its close association with the Mediterranean states.
It is fair to say that the Community was not quick 
to develop a policy as such, "....the importance of 
the problems was almost matched by the incoherence
of the policies ....  lacking an agreed overall
conception of its own, the Community simply reacted 
to the requests of its neighbours by taking little
14 7
steps of scanty economic and political significance...
and the end product was a mosaic of agreements that
1 52have little relation to one another.
1
Lambert spoke of 1? littoral states and 
pointed out that of these the Community had agree­
ments with all but three. He noticed that the 
Communities’ relationships with these states were in 
terms of the association agreements under Art. 238 
E.E.C., He pointed out that in principle, all 
countries along the northern shores of the Mediterr­
anean being European countries, qualify for full 
membership .... under Art. 237 E.E.C., but that in 
practise, this would remain a dead letter for a long 
time to come since the general level of development 
and in most cases also the political regimes ruled 
out that solution , We have already seen (page 
above) how exstensive and flexible the Association 
can be. The problem with Mediterranean policy was 
its ad hoc nature as Lambert also pointed out the 
Commuaities’ relations with the Mediterranean countries 
were almost "unnoticed in the debate on the enlarge­
ment of the Community". This is despite the fact
that enlargement makes re-negotiation of these
1 54-agreements compulsory.
Attempts were made at various stages; the 
Italians proposed the creation of a general free 
trade area with the Moro memorandum of 19^4. The 
Council in 1972 asked the Commission to report upon 
the Communities’ relations with the Mediterranean 
States. The Paris Summit of 1973 also proposed 
progress in the form of a global policy to take
1 4 8
effect by 1974 (App. E) but little was achieved.
It was only with the Greek application that the
Community realised that it would, "...have to seek
with those countries parallel to the process of
enlargement, a new equilibrium based on active
operation- to permit orderly trade 'and to enable them
to pursue their development with the support of
1 55the Community".
Greek Accession and after;
It was again an economic problem rather than 
one of legal form which faced the Community when 
Greece applied for membership. Most states in the 
Mediterranean produce substantially the same goods. 
The Community cannot grant unlimited preference.
The problem of surplus would also arise with Italy 
and Greece (and eventually Spain and Portugal) 
producing broadly similar goods. The danger which 
the Community must avoid is not just an economic 
one. The strategic importance of the Mediterranean 
is such that it can be dangerous to operate even an 
economic influence, Cyprus being a poignant example.
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The long term view of European Union demands 
that the possibility of membership of these states 
be considered. There are difficulties because once 
both trade and problems relating to security are con­
sidered it becomes difficult to isolate a Mediterranean 
area. In addition to the geographical problem the other 
difficulty is the way in which political and economic 
matters are not easily combined in the framework of 
association agreements.
Accession brings with it the problem of Turkey 
and projected enlargement with Spain and Portugal and 
similar problems (Spain and Morroco and the non- 
recognition of Israel-(see generally? De la Serre),
There can be little doubt that the future of the 
policies will be to move towards alignment of the 
agreements. How far positive steps can be taken to 
achieve a "global" approach is debateable. The 
substantial new southern group in the Community will 
not be keen to see their newly acquired large home 
market invaded by other Mediterranean states. The 
Mediterranean problem is now internalised but progrès# 
is continually being made in so far as this is possible 
with Spain and Portugal's applications pending,
150
The Community, Greece and Turkey
This problem comes only partly within the scope 
of Mediterranean policy but it raises a number of 
problems relating to accession which we also look 
at here. As soon as the Community began looking for 
a policy it became apparent that special treatment 
would be necessary for Turkey. The Ankarra Agree­
ment had already set Turkey apart giving it a "with 
a view to membership" status. After the Truman 
doctrine Greece's new western ally was not as pro- 
hellenic as had been the British, The interest of the 
Western Military powers has been primarily military, 
Greece and Turkey effectively monitoring and control­
ling the movement of the Russian fleet if required; 
it is not important to the U.S. whether it is Greece 
or Turkey which carries out this task. In fact the 
Greeks themselves perceive the most likely threat to 
their security as coming from Turkey.
The territorial claims of each over Cyprus is
the principal manifestation of the issue between
these states, N.A.T.O. and the E.E.C,' both tried to
resolve the dispute as did the United States and to
a degree the United Kingdom. The E.E.C. demanded an
ending of hostilities and talks with Britain acting
as "honest-broker" but this had little effect. More
likely it was the intervention of Dr, Kissinger
158which brought the hostilities to a close.
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Perhaps the Greeks have felt that membership 
of the E.E.C, will give them an edge in the event of 
similar or more serious outbreaks of aggression:
"Turkey would think twice before attacking a member 
of the E.E.C.".^^^The relationship featured quite 
significantly in the Accession negotiations. Indeed 
the Sismik incident took place right at the start of 
negotiations (App. A). Zolotas^^^said in 197^ that 
"...it is unthinkable for Greece to tolerate black­
mail attacks or humiliations and like any other 
country she will firmly defend her integrity,, dignity? 
and prestige. But the argument that our country 
must not be accepted into the E.E.C. because after 
fifteen or twenty years we might obstruct the 
Accession of another country is untenable". He went 
on to point out that the U.K./Iceland dispute over 
cod fishing had not been treated as a significant 
obstacle in the first round. He also pointed out 
that Turkey was protected by the Ankarra Agreement,
(of the U.K./Norway dispute page 132 above). However, 
in Athens, Greek parliamentarians offered a number of 
permutations to resolve the problem rànging from 
withdrawal from N.A.T.O, and non-entry to the E.E.C, 
to full membership of both and even the middle 
position of the Centre Union seeking a European 
defence policy. Apart from real or imagined military 
support Greece as a Community member has a consider­
able say over the Communities' attitude towards Turkey.
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It is not out of the question that the Turks 
could apply for membership under 237»^^^The Ankarra 
Agreement was designed with this in view and when 
the agreement was resuscitated in 1980 it was said 
to be with a view to facilitating the accession of 
Turkey to the Community,^^^The Greeks have given 
assurances that they will not unfairly prejudice 
any Turkish application but this can be of little 
comfort to the Turks, Once Greece is a Community 
member there is nothing that can legally be done to 
enforce such a pre-Accession promise. Even the 
future development of the Ankarra Agreement will 
depend upon Greece, There can be little doubt that 
the position of the Hellenic Republic is strengthened 
against Turkey,^^^A partial solution is the "Troika" 
formula whereby the President, his successor and 
predecessor in office of the Council undertake to 
keep Turkey informed of all pertinent developments 
but this is obviously dependent upon a considerable 
degree of bona fides.
The military coup of September I9 8 O and the 
politically unacceptable regime in Turkey makes it 
unlikely that the Community would have any difficulty 
in supporting Greece in the event of a dispute or 
renewed hostilities. Although a return to democracy 
in Turkey might again provide a political imperative 
making membership an issue again.
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The Greek application created a need for action 
where none had been contemplated but the enlargement 
procedure did not make a positive contribution by- 
utilising the desire to rationalise, prior to 
accession. The legal necessity of re-negotiation 
of existing association agreements, afforded a 
considerable incentive for creative thinking on the 
part of the Community.
What an examination of Mediterranean policy 
does make apparent is the necessity for fundamental 
change where accession will have a considerable 
factual impact. While attempts have been made in 
the Mediterranean policy we can question why the same 
approach has not been taken in other areas where the 
impact has been as great as upon Mediterranean policy. 
The answer appears to lie in the legal nature of 
the Community regime: if the acquis communautaire
formual applies then negotiation leading to improve­
ment is precluded, only transitional adjustment being 
permitted. This position did not apply to Mediterranean 
policy because the "Community patrimony" was unable 
to cope with the problems raised.
Incidentally, we also notice the U,S. involve­
ment in Accession, Although the U,S,/E,E,C, relation­
ship was at first philanthropic (in the shape of 
Marshall Aid) it has now become a matter of self- 
interest, The U.S. had in the past complained of the 
Community breaking G,A,T,T, Agreements in its pre­
ferential agreements. Hillenbrand^^^said that the
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U.S. might begin to exclude E.E.C, associates from 
the scope of its generalised preference scheme. He 
also went on to say "apart from the end result of 
enlargement? the U.S. obviously will have an interest 
in the process itself by which new member states 
enter the Community, American policy will presumably 
continue to be not to interfere with that process, but 
the U.S. clearly has no interest in any weakening 
of the Community by following a destructive route to 
enlargement", This is yet another example of the 
General Error term category of Lindberg,
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PART THREE
"On the day before the first General Election the 
P.P.U* hired five hundred cars and toured the island. 
It was the P.P.U,’s finest moment. The Party had 
been founded two months before the parade, it died 
two days after it .... But Trinidad had been 
impressed by the parade and after ‘that no election 
was complete without a parade". (V,S. Naipaul, The 
Suffrage of Elvira.)
CHAPTER X
RENEGOTIATION, SECESSION, THREATENED WITHDRAWAL
In this concluding section we do not wish solely 
to draw together all the results of earlier discuss­
ions while recapitulating some of our findings. The 
remainder of the results of our investigation shall 
be included in the final Chapter XI when criticising 
the use of law in the Enlargement process.
Before such a peroration we intend to look at 
the key questions of re-negotiation and threatened 
withdrawal. Although we admit that it would appear 
not to be within logical sequence to include new 
matter in the concluding section, there are equally 
good reasons for discussing these questions here.
The first is that neither re-negotiation nor 
withdrawal are properly part of the law and
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practice of Accession (if anything they are opposing 
related processes) and have no place in the largely 
comparative study in Part II. Secondly, it would 
have been improper to include these topics in the 
introductory section, for without the narrative con­
tent of Part II re-negotiation and withdrawal could 
not be understood. Thirdly, whereas we had to 
establish, in the introductory section, what was
beneficial in Accession by examining integration
theory before examining the process, no such
consideration is needed when looking at re­
negotiation and withdrawal as they are both ex-facie 
retrograde steps,
"We shall submit to the British people the 
reason why we find the terms unacceptable and consult 
them on the advisability of negotiating the withdrawal 
of the United Kingdom from the Community^^^This 
was the attitude taken by the British Labour Govern­
ment when it assumed office after the election in 
February 1974, This statement was made to the 
Council of Ministers in Luxemburg on April 1st, 1974,
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No legal warrant was proposed for tirie statement 
and none exists. What is interesting is that the 
end result was said to be negotiation leading to 
withdrawal.
The expressed aim of the re-negotiation# were 
broadly: (a) changes in financing one Community
budget as the existing scheme was oh ought dangerous, 
transferring resources promoting economic divergence; 
(b) a change in direction of the Connnon Agricultural 
Policy away from protectionism; (c) improved terms 
for the Commonwealth and the third world and finally 
(d) to prevent the implementation of the social and 
regional policies restricting national efforts in 
that direction. This is a return tc the expressed 
position of Britain at the time of the first U.K. 
application (see page 6? above). This was rejected 
at that time by the E.E.C,; it is an acceptance of the 
principles of the Treaties but not of what has 
followed upon them; a rejection, in part, of the 
acquis communautaire.
The British expressed the desire of negotiating 
within the scope of the Treaty of Rome and the 
Brussels Treaties, In substance their true aims 
were incompatible with the Brussels Treaty. The 
Community properly treated the matter realistically.
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It chose to introduce new measures; this rather 
than repeal existing ones, or to allow further 
derogation or extension of transitional periods.
Thus the U.K.’s external relations demands were in­
cluded in the eventual form of the Rome Convention; 
the C.A.P. was subjected to stocktaking at Germany’s 
request which gave the U.K. an opportunity to draw 
attention to alleged inequalities. The re-negotiation 
took almost a year to complete during which time the 
U.K. Labour Party members did not fill their alloc­
ation of seats in the Assembly which at the time was 
not directly elected.
There seems little justification for allowing 
a new member state to obtain terms different from 
those prior to Accession. Legally, as we have seen? 
apart from express derogations, and transitional 
measures the U.K. was legally bound to the Community. 
The threat of withdrawal and the commitment to a 
referendum must have put political pressure upon the 
Community not to take a legalistic approach even if 
one were available.
Once the immediate crisis of the’ U.K. re­
negotiation was over the danger of re-negotiation 
was its use as a precedent in subsequent Accessions, 
This is precisely what happened when Papandreou’s 
PASOK won the Greek general election of October 1981,
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Before the election, PASOK had taken a strong anti- 
E.E.C, line. PASOK’s attitude to the E.E.C, and 
N.A.T.O. before the 1974 election was to oppose 
completely membership of either, favouring instead a 
non-aligned status with close third-world links.
By the time of the 1977 elections "a subtle change was 
observable. The opposition to E.E.C. membership was 
still apparent, but now there were suggestions that 
an association on the Norwegian model might be suitable. 
PASOK did remain opposed to N.A.T.O..
Just as the U.K. Labour Party's October 1974 
manifesto had commited a Labour government to refer 
the issue of continued membership to the people, PASOK 
was pledged to hold a referendum on the issue. Un­
like the Labour manifesto, no time was set within 
which the referendum had to be held. The realities 
of office have mellowed this extreme position, 
Papandreou's position is that "in view of the re­
consideration of all of the policies of the E.E.C., 
what is opening up as a possibility is the definition 
of a special status for Greece which will make it 
possible for Greece to survive within the E.E.C.".
Two possibilities have been projected as falling 
within this brief. The first is full membership of a 
new Community where the poorer members obtain, within 
the Community rules, a better financial deal, allowing 
more scope for the adoption of domestic development 
policies by Greece. The other alternative is to 
allow the Greeks substantial derogation from their 
treaty obligations. It was suggested that the "Greek 
government aims to achieve a series of improvements
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which it will be able to present to the Greeks in an
1 67eventual and increasingly distant referendum".
What the Greeks are doing is in effect re­
negotiation but carried out in a more subtle way.
The principal tactics remain the same. The Greeks 
are using the existing mechanism as a means of in­
creasing financial transfers. They then try to have 
the detrimental effect upon the acquis communautaire 
reduced by proposing new developments. This is 
becoming a pervasive enlargement problem: "Si le
peuple donne sa preference a un parti ayant fait 
campagne contre 1 'adhesion ce parti, appelé a former 
le Gouvernment, se trouve dans l'embarras. D'une 
part, il ne peut pas, du jour au lendemain, faire une 
volte-face et accepter sans discussion le statut d ' 
adhesion qu'il contestait avant les élections. D ' 
autre parh, il ne peut pas prendre sur lui la respon­
sabilité d'isoler le pays de L 'Europe...Il est donc 
obligé de trouver une formule de compromis avec la 
Communauté^^^It is one which must be solved.
We have seen how difficult negotiations are,
(page 71 above), and we have seen how the Communities 
surrendered important points in negotiation in order 
to conclude an accession agreement. If renegotiation 
is to become a regular feature then the enlargement 
method has failed. It has failed politically in that 
it allows a new government to have scope to renegotiate; 
it also fails as a legal exercise because the legal 
structure has not given effect to the agreement be­
tween the parties. A solution to the problem would 
of course require only one of the restraints to he
1 61
effective, the political or the legal.
As the damaging position of the renegotiating 
new member state comes from the threat of withdrawal? 
we are forced to look at this hopefully hypothetical 
and unlikely possibility. The attitude to this so far 
has been what we might describe asr the "ostrich" 
approach. This does not imply that the Commission 
has been stupid in doing this. On the contrary, it is 
a technique, conscious or unconscious, which by the 
use of language tries to eliminate the concept re­
presented by the words from discussion: "In our time,
political speech and writings are largely the defence 
of the indefensible... thus political language has 
come to consist largely of euphemismquestion beg­
ging and sheer cloudy vagueness 7^
If re-negotiation were frankly discussed as 
comprising the threat of withdrawal then perhaps 
the political and legal frameworks could be over­
hauled, Withdrawal then becomes an issue in this 
study and in any event needs to be considered because 
it would have to be effected legally itself.
The first serious mention of withdrawal was in 
the aftermath of the failure to agree the C.A.P. 
proposals by June 30th. I9 6 5 . The French withdrew 
from the Council of Ministers and did not participate 
fully in the daily life of the Community. At this time 
the idea of withdrawal was canvassed in France but it 
faced great resistance from French farmers.
It was not a realistic position to take. The 
Community had been designed to meet the needs partic­
ularly of France and Germany, The solution to that
16 8
crisis was to be a preview of renegotiation. General 
de Gaulle submitted his "decalogue" which sought 
changes not requiring treaty amendment.
Nevertheless, the reference to majority voting 
in the Luxemburg accords can only be construed as an 
attempt to rewrite the Treaties,
It was perhaps British entry which raised with­
drawal as a possibility. As already indicated, the 
United Kingdom Labour Party was hostile to the terms 
of entry negotiated by the Conservative government.
The matter was raised by the party at the 1972
1 70Labour annual conference, A resolution was passed 
(but not with the 2/3 majority needed to make it party 
policy) which decided inter alia; "This conference 
declares its opposition to entry to the Common Market 
on. the terms negotiated by the Tories (British Conser­
vative Party) and calls on a future labour government
to reverse any decision to join unless new terms have
1 70been negotiated,,.". This reversal is obviously a 
euphemism for withdrawal.
This attitude remained. The National Executive 
Committee of the Labour Party stated on March 26th, 1975 
that, "a majority of the N.E,C, believe that the terms 
even as re-negotiated do not satisfy Britain's require­
ments and therefore opposes Britain's continuing member­
ship of the common market and so advises the special 
1 70conference". More recently at the I9 7 8 conference a 
wrecking resolution was carried convincingly which if 
effected as government policy would reduce the E.E.C, 
to an intergovernmental discussion group (assuming, of 
course it were in the power of the U.K. to achieve
16 3
such).
Ve feel secure in saying that a trend has been 
established whereby withdrawal is becoming less of a
veiled threat and more of a political possibility.
171The experience of Greenland must offer support for 
this proposition. Greenland is withdrawing from the 
Community in that some of the peoples of Europe are 
leaving. It is an event which is legally distinguish­
able from the departure of a member state. Inter­
national law has had to recognise state succession 
and the idea of a territory achieving some measure 
of home-rule as a corollary of state theory. Diff­
erent problems are posed when a state which joined 
an organisation wishes to leave? a situation diff­
erent from that of Greenland which didn't itself 
join the Community but was taken in by Denmark,
Withdrawal would we think be treated as a matter 
of international law. An indication of what the 
international law might be on this point is given
by Articles S4 & $6 of the Vienna convention on the
1 72Law of Treaties. Under Art. 54 the termination of 
a treaty or the withdrawal of a party may take place? 
"in conformity with the provisions of the Treaty; or 
(b) at any time by the consent of all the parties 
after consultation with the other contracting states". 
The first of these alternatives is not in this case 
possible and it seems likely that the second could 
not be achieved.
Article 56 states that?"1. A treaty which 
contains no provision regarding its termination and 
which does not provide for denunciation
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or withdrawal is not subject to denunciation or 
withdrawal unless:- (a) it is established that the 
parties intended to admit the possibility of denun­
ciation or withdrawal; or (b) a right to denunciation 
or withdrawal may be implied by the nature of the 
Treaty. 2. A party shall give not less than twelve 
months notice of its intention to denounce or with­
draw from a treaty under para.1".
This particular provision may have provoked or 
been the foundation for some of the more extravagant 
claims in the increasing dialogue about withdrawal.
Lord O ’Hagan asked the Commission, ’’The Labour Party’s 
National Executive Committee document asserts:- We 
do not accept that we shall be in breach of Inter­
national Law by seeking to withdraw from the E.E.C. 
having given due notice;-does the Commission accept 
this to be a true statement of the position?”
President Thorn replied for the Commission, ’’The 
Commission does not share the views expressed in the 
statement referred to by the Honourable gentleman.” ' 
This is essentially a question of international 
law and we do not intend to discuss it further having 
established that this issue is one which produces 
arguments for and against its legality.
However, it is true to say that the legal bonds 
that exist between member states are not the only 
forces that hold the Communities together. The gradual 
harmonisation that takes place even during the 
accession transitional period provides a disincentive 
to withdrawal. This is what brought Commissioner 
Narjes to accept the description of the Communities
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existence as "an irreversible fact". He said* "The 
Community member states are now so heavily interde­
pendent that in normal political circumstances - that 
is to say in peace time the social, economic and 
political costs of leaving the community would be 
so high that any government which tries it would 
sooner or later pay with its political life". When 
asked, "So the Communities* existence is an irrever­
sible fact because the economic imperative becomes
the political indicative", he replied, "I can't rule
1 74out fits of political lunacy".
Political lunacy is not a disease of epidemic 
proportions but one outbreak would be sufficient to 
disable the Communities. Indeed the N.E.C, of the 
Labour Party appears to be making its decisions on 
some political grounds. Regrettably the " irrever­
sible fact" analysis does not provide a complete 
answer. In the first few years of membership the 
economic and social ties between the acceding state 
and the member states have not coalleseed.
Our examination of the enlargement method and 
the detailed accession procedure has revealed it to 
be a pragmatic and ad hoc method in which consider­
ations for the rule of law and indeed for economic 
realism seem to have been placed behind political 
considerations. This has had some unfortunate 
results in the effecting of enlargement. The political 
dimension and its powerful influence is seen at its 
most destructive in the continuing demands for 
renegotiation which are without any apparent legal 
foundation.
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CHAPTER XI
CONCLUSIONS
Considering the contribution of law to the 
Community, enlargement and accession processes* we 
may submit that the quality of this contribution is 
not very high. The law has not prevented the emer­
gence of post-accession problems. Taking a more 
radical approach it could be said that it haa con­
tributed to the emergence of these problems.
On the other hand* taking a broader view and 
taking into consideration the other factors influen­
cing the process, no exaggerated' expectations of 
what might be accomplished by legal means should 
be formed. Chapter II (page 10 above) tried to 
identify at an early stage how, for example* geo­
graphic and historical factors inhibit legal solu­
tions. Ve also looked at the considerable force 
that political and economic factors have.
It was in Chapter III however that we saw how 
enlargement is* in fact* a phenomenon which can be 
described from the point of view of any discipline 
and how division between legal* political andi economic 
fields of activity is quite arbitrary. Chapter IV 
looked at integration theories which we treated as 
being attempts to cope with the difficult inter­
relationship between these disciplines. An examin­
ation of some of these theories* particularly where 
they were found to be applicable to enlargement* 
provided us with both a model for discussion and 
a potential source of assistance in goal definition. 
The analytical work of Lindberg and Scheingold was
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adopted for this purpose as indeed was much of their 
terminology which while being useful as a shorthand 
method of description was not in any sense divorced 
from reality.
In examining the legal contribution the final 
preliminary task was to clarify precisely what law 
was applicable and once we had found that there was 
a range of potentially applicable norms,, to indicate 
how these can co-exist.
Our examination of the results of Accession.
(in Part 11 sec.B and Chapter X in Part 111) and 
our examination in some detail of the procedure and 
pracrtice of accession (in section A of Part 11) leads 
us to express concern at the present position.
We dealt in Chapter V with an attempt to make, 
enlargement a gradual process, by means of association 
agreement,, which ended in failure for political 
reasons. Association with a view to membership was 
not adopted in the 1973 accession but we considered 
the surrounding political/economic circumstances of 
the two accessions were such that it was impossible 
to discount association because of the experience; 
with it to date.
Chapter VI reviewed the procedure and the 
practice of the enlargement method which,, with the 
benefit of comparison and contrast between the U.K. 
and Greek accessions* can be seen to be (i) illogical 
and ill-prepared, arrived at as a result of the ex­
igencies of the time* (ii) intimately connected with 
Art. 237 E.E.C.,. a legal provision lacking in detail
n
or guidance* (iii) too cumbersome to meet political
168
demand and finally (iv) now so "received" so as to 
be difficult to alter.
Having already drawn conclusions on some matters 
in the course of the thesis* we do not intend to 
rehearse these here but to proceed to consider the 
wider possibilities of our findings.
The results of accession make a critictal 
appraisal necessary: (i) although looking at only
a few policies, it was apparent both that enlargement 
can have adverse effects and that the mode of accession 
does not assist greatly in reducing these,, economic 
policy being perhaps the clearest example (see page 
139 above). (ii) The institutions were seen in 
(chapter VII page 101 above) to be suffering from 
problems irrespective of enlargement. Accession was 
seen to add to those problems by being both detri­
mental in its own right, for example in the case of 
Council majority voting (see page 105 above) and* as 
having been a missed opportunity to remedy these 
aforementioned institutional difficulties* the size of 
the Commission being pre-eminent among these (see page 
111 above),
(iii) Unfortunate results of the kind mentioned 
in (i) (9b (ii) above are certainly serious but should 
not prove irremediable to an otherwise healthy Comm­
unity ; the same cannot be said of the problems out­
lined in Chapter X (see page 155 above). That similar 
issues have arisen after both accessions indicates 
that we are not in the realm of "political lunacy" 
but are witnessing a manifestation of an infelicitous 
enlargement method.
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We now proceed to discuss, using where appro­
priate the terminology of Lindberg and Scheingold* 
what is wrong in principle and how far there can be 
a remedy using the numerous legal techniques which 
are available.
According to Lindberg & Scheingold (see Appendix 
B), systems transformation is a function of five 
variables: the existing system; systemic support;
demand; leadership and a general error term. In a 
way,, this is merely stating the obvious but the 
categories are identifiable by function and by an 
examination of the law.
We do not propose to consider the state of each 
of these at any given time for two reasons: enlarge­
ment is too dynamic a process to make this worthwhile* 
and as Lindberg & Scheingold themselves confess* there 
is nx> quantitative element in their model: It tells
us what to look for but not how much of it we need.
We have seen deficiencies in both accessions: 
Decision making at Community level has slowed down 
every stage of the operation; Norway failed to ratify 
after a popular referendum; the processing of demand 
is at its clearest in the negotiating phase and the 
failure of the first U.K. application is an example of 
a failure to process demand; leadership has been in­
adequate since the Commission failed to take an init­
iative in the first application in I9 6 I and wasr re­
placed by the member states who have been unable to 
lead effectively. The first U.K. exclusion is also 
evidence of the general error term.
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We can take* at least* the following proposi­
tion from Lindberg and Scheingold; an increase in 
any of the four major variables should make enlarge­
ment easier.
Having already given indications in the thesis 
of areas where law can improve those variables* we 
intend now to look at those changes in the law of 
accession which would most impressively increase the 
quantative levels of these variables.
The Association with a view to membership could 
be used in a more extensive way. Freezing* (in the 
case of Greece) we submit* prevented the value of 
this device from being fully appreciated. The exten­
sive use of law which it makes improves a number of 
the variables: an Association Council both provides
additional leadership resources, and because of the 
activity in national life* increases systemic-support♦
The most striking effect is the way in which it 
processes demand. Our view is that it ought to be used 
as an "ante-chajnber" both consolidating past progress 
and forming a framework for future developments. This 
would be a valuable use of law and entirely in keeping 
with the incremental nature of the Communities them­
selves. In this way we would pre-empt many of the 
accession problems as a degree of political and 
economic integration would, by the time that an 
application under E.E.C. Art. 237 was made, have been 
achieved. Apart from making accession easier for the 
applicant state* such an approach puts less stress on 
the Communities themselves.
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Failing such a step, or even in addition, a 
fresh approach to Art. 237 E.E.C. would be beneficial. 
We are of the view that it is extremely unlikely that 
this will be done. The procedure following upon the 
Article (see page 59 above) is now almost as much 
Community Law as the Article itself. This is part­
icularly so because the Commission’s call to 
allow more than mere mechanical adjustment, was 
ignored (see page 72 above).
This does not increase any of the variables 
but it is a negative contribution from the legal 
system. It is an example of the characteristic effect 
of law operating in an unhelpful way. Obvious and 
perhaps uncontentious matters pass unresolved, only 
because it is felt that it is not legally permissable 
to change them without amendment. Certainly the 
reluctance to invoke the Art. 23^ E.E.C. procedure 
is understandable; it must appear to be something of 
a Pandora's box, all sorts of hard won Community 
compromises being re-argued again.
There is we suggest, a middle way, and it is 
for the Court of Justice to be given a jurisdiction 
to advise whether the Treaties can be amended in a 
proposed fashion under the "necessitated" part of 
Art. 237 E.E.C.. A similar power exists under Art,
228 E.E.C.. Such a power might have to be conferred 
in an amending treaty but this need not be the case. 
Just as the supreme Court of the United States refused 
to isÈue an advisory opinion when George Washington 
submitted 29 questions to it on the effect of inter­
national law, it would*(.we submit, be open to the
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Court of Justice to choose to isaue such opinions.
In any event the existence of Art, 177 E.E.C, would
make such an action appear to be unobjectionable in
principle. In this way the flexibility which some
feel Art 237 E.E.C. was always supposed to have
could be restored* at no loss to the acquis communautaire.
Our third and final improvement would be a call 
for goal definition in enlargement. This admittedly 
is a wide and general remedy* but by putting accession 
fully into its position in the overall sweep of 
Community activity accession would he made easier* 
assuming an appropriate goal is selected.
This is in fact a call for a scientific re­
appraisal of the enlargement method which we have 
seen has grown in an ad hoc fashion. The develop­
ment of the acquis communautaire doctrine reflects 
this pragmatic growth. Simply put* the acquis 
communautaire doctrine was developed as a bulwark 
against retrenchment; once established* a minimal 
position could be taken, whereby it would be possible 
to disregard the quality of the enlargement method, 
knowing that the respect for the doctrine would pro­
tect existing achievements and that the momentum of 
accession would bring about a satisfactory outcome*
While the Community system could have been, 
expected to cope with such stress once, the danger 
we see is that acquis communautaire is being accepted 
as a sufficient bulwark. This it is not in real terms 
as we saw in section B of Part 11. In settling for 
acceptance of the acquis communautaire as a criterion
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a goal has been selected which is too myopic.
The conclusive evidence of misdirected! goal 
definition is the repeated problem of re-negotiation 
(chapter X.). The Communities have to think beyond 
bringing the applicant into the Community; they must 
insist upon keeping the new member state in.
The re-negotiation problem could be dealt with 
in two ways but first there has to be a recognition 
that it is a serious issue which requires to be 
dealt with.
Firstly* there is the mainly political solution 
(which would require the support of a legal mechanism) 
of dealing with demand properly. At present the call 
in the preamble in the Treaty of Rome is answered by 
state governments and not the peoples of Europe.
Both the Greek and the U.K. re-negotiation claims 
came after elections deposing the negotiating govern­
ments. Based on the experience we have described of 
accession, we feel that there is a case that can be 
stated for having the Communities insist upon a re­
ferendum being held before dealing with an application 
under Art. 237 E.E.C,. It has been established that 
référendums stifle political activity quite effectively. 
Both Norway and the U.K. have abided by the outcomes 
of their respective référendums. As it seems that 
they do play a significant part ini accession, should 
they not be turned to advantage?
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We acknowledge that there could be difficulties 
in persuading applicants to participate. It could be 
said that by insisting upon popular approval we take 
the risk of losing the influence that national actors 
or elites have in leading the state to application.
We would accept this as a valid criticism of our 
proposal. However* that argument loses its force if 
this proposal is read with our earlier comments con­
cerning association with a view to membership; under 
such an association the incremental integration would 
already have taken place; the national elites would 
already have had the opportunity to influence the 
ultimate response. It would then be a case of putting 
the question of almost certain membership to the 
people. We submit that this approach is more theor­
etically sound and more practical than the method 
presently used. It need not even require treaty 
amendment for its implementation.
Our second solution would require treaty amend­
ment but avoids the political components of the first 
solution. Our aim would be to avoid the argument* 
such as was put forward by the N.E.C. of the Labour 
Party (see page 164 above) circulating and gaining 
support. The Communities should recognise that with­
drawal (and re-negotiation which is tacitly based on 
a threat of withdrawal) can actually happen even if 
pnly de facto. As soon as this is done the Communities 
put themselves in the position of being able to preveict
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withdrawal happening* This would be achieved by 
inserting a provision allowing a new member state to 
withdraw on an application made after seven years 
of signature of the Accession Treaty*
Such a term would make re-negotiation possible 
and it would no longer be a matter to be dealt with 
in the swing of national politics. It would be the 
legal significance of such a rule that would have the 
most valuable results. It would mean that the inter­
national law rules, in the absence of the consent of 
the other parties, would allow the new member state 
to withdraw only in obedience to this rule*(see Art.
5 4 of the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties).
We have suggested seven years because (a) it 
would in most European countries permit a general 
election to take place* and (b) it would allow the 
Community to become the "irreversible fact" Narjes 
spoke of (see page 165 above). We submit that by 
this apparently anti-Community provision* the 
opponents of successful enlargement would be dealt 
a pre-emptive blow. Again if the seven year period 
followed upon say five years of meaningful association* 
it is not much of a risk to take.
There is one criticism of this solution which 
might make the first solution we suggested (referendum) 
more acceptable. It is that Costa v E.N.E.L. (see 
pages 36 and 39 above) saw the Court founding upon, 
inter alia. Art. 240 E.E.C. in supporting the supre­
macy of Community Law. It did this when it referred 
to a Community of unlimited duration* Alteration off 
Art. 240 E.E.C. in the wqy we have suggested would
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undermine this particular premise of the Court's 
decision. Accordingly if it were fellf that alteration 
of Art, 240 E.E.C. would seriously affect the prin­
ciple of supremacy of Community Law then we would 
have to abandon this particular solution. However 
we feel that the Court expressed eo many alternative 
foundations for supremacy that we cannot see that the 
principle of supremacy would be materially affected.
It is hoped that our attempts to isolate a law 
of Accession is thought to be valid. Like Agricul­
tural Law which, "deals with contract generally,the 
particular contracts of sale/hiring and employment, 
delictual liability to and for employees and for 
animals, the law of landownership, leases and small 
holdings compensation and arbitration"]75the law of 
Accession is a synthesis.
The law of Accession is more "a functional sel­
ection of topics which are useful for particular
1 7 *5groups of students and particular professions".
In Community law its significance is a little wider 
than being a convenient handbook for prospective 
applicant states. That a law of accession can be 
isolated tells us more about the Communities. It 
emphasises the importance of the rule of law in the 
Community. From it too we see the continuing inter­
dependence of Community functions and we see how the 
"theoretical" concepts which underly the Community are 
surviving the test of experiment. Spill-over* espec­
ially ,the dynamic aspect or expansive logic, seem
17 7
still to be an active force in the Community in 
Greece's progress from associate to member.
And finally, having isolated a law of Accession 
we obtain the opportunity of looking at its specific 
content and examining it critically. We have 
commented adversely on aspects of .the present access­
ion procedure but it has the benefit of being certain 
and predictable, A radical and scientific approach 
looking at the whole of the Accession process in­
stead of the immediate or politically sensitive 
issues arising at any given time would^we submit^ 
bring forth a more useful law of Accession.
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APPENDIX A
A Narrative Account of the Accession Negotiations 
Between the Hellenic Republic and the 
European Communities
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The negotiating conference opened on July 27th. 
1975^* It had been proceeded by some frantic 
"diplomatic" activity. In early June there was 
anxiety over Karamanlis* trip to Paris. A Turkish 
research vessel Sismik was exploring disputed areas
p
of the Agean . The Greek Prime Minister was no doubt
checking with his most sympathetic community contact
on what action would be appropriate.
Apart from this extra-systemic issue, it was
reported on 12th. July that the E.E.C. member states
had failed to meet their own deadline for agreeing
their negotiating position? Relations with Turkey
could have resulted in deadlock. The British were
opposing any freeing of movement for Turkish workers.
It was eventually decided that negotiations would
4
open by the end of the month and a package deal was 
offered to the Turks on 24th, July. The package of 
trade and aid was given a "cool" welcome^. The 
delegates decided to meet again at ministerial level 
before the end of the year. They did in fact meet 
again on 19th. October 1976. In the Interim, the 
globalisation issue was introduced^ viz, that the terms 
of entry for Greece should be adjusted with those of 
other countries who had made application for member­
ship.
In September* Greece complained to the Security
Council of the U.N. and the International Court of
Justice about the continued progress of the vessel
Sismik 1. At the same time they announced a military
air/sea exercise which took place over the disputed)
7part of the Agean . This precipitated the departure
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of* Soames* the external relations commissioner, to 
Greece^ another sign that the Communities were to take 
the Turkey question very seriously.
Following the practice adopted in first accession* 
ministerial meetings were fixed to take place every 
three months and deputy/ambassador level meetings, 
once a month. In November, Karamanlis set off on what 
was to turn out to be a series of travels round 
European capitals, running in parallel with the 
formal sessions. At the same time* procedural rules 
were settled at Berne for the resolution of the dis-
g
pute with Turkey .
In January 1977, negotiator Kyriazidis was re­
placed by Theoderopolous; this was seen by some as
9
a tactical switch^in an attempt to hasten progress.
Fears of globalisation were driving the Greeks to try
to enter the Communities at the earliest opportunity.
Liberals in the European Parliament began to pressure
for alacrity requesting that negotiations should be
completed by the end of the year^^.
The second deputy level meeting, the first since
the Greek substitution, took place on 31st. January.
The Community made a statement of its position on the
customs union, and the Greeks on External relations*
the budget competition and regional policy. Secondary
legislation discussions began on agriculture^^. This
was hailed in the press as, "The Greeks agree to accept
the E.E.C. agricultural policy". In fact, the Greeks
1 2had specifically exempted dairy products and meat.
The third deputies meeting took place on 28th. 
February. The Communities demanded the acceptance by
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the Greeks of its external relations policy and stated
its position on regional policy and state aids. The
Greeks replied to the Communities' statement at the
1 3second meeting on the customs union , More details 
were discussed at the technical level on seeds, fats, 
cotton, poultry eggs* free moveraeht of capital * economic 
and monetary union and Euratom,
Another resignation from the Greek delegation* 
that of Papaligouras, resulted in the appearance on 
the team of Varfis the deputy governor of the Bank of 
Greece. This was thought to be as a result of the 
influence of the right wing of the New Democracy 
Party. Criticism was made of the haste in negotiation 
technique of Karamanlis, in that the speed might result 
in the best terms being lost or important matters 
being left unresolved. The first fear was not un-
1 hreasonable, the second was less likely.
Prior to the fourth deputy level meeting of 
30th, March, progress was still being mada under the 
association agreement, Greece was granted 116m. 
Sterling until 31st, October 1981. Despite this, 
Strathos for the Greeks suggested this was inadequate* 
noting that only 73*5*». Sterling had been received 
since 1 9 6 2 .^^ The Greeks also ordered a farm census 
in order that they would be able to refute arguments 
that the entry would be too expensive. Previous dis­
cussions had been based on 1971 statistics* which 
were discovered to be extremely inaccurate.
The fourth deputies meeting brought the Comm­
unities' view on the budget and a reply from Athens 
on external relations and Ë.C.S.C.. The secondary
2 0 0
legislation, committee dealt with Social affairs* the 
right of establishment and cereals. It was also 
noted that the Commissions third report had been 
produced. The first was on environmental and con­
sumer protection; others were on taxation and rég­
lé 17ional policy . At this time, it was revealed that
the Greeks were actively preparing for entry by 
providing government fellowships in conjunction with 
private enterprise,, to train lawyers, scientists* 
magistrates and linguists in Community Law and 
language.
The second ministerial meeting of 5th. April 
summarised achievements to date* although the secon­
dary legislation committee began contemplation of
Harmonisation of electrical appliances, motor vehicles 
1 8
and foodstuffs
The Fifth deputies meeting of 4th. May brought
a Community reply on E.C.S.C. and saw the Greeks make
statements on social affairs* free movement of workers
and the social fund. The secondary legislation talks
continued relentlessly on Harmonisation of dangerous
substances, solvents, detergents, textiles* fertiliser*
patents, fruit and floriculture. Natali* the chief
Community negotiator,, made an official visit to 
1 9Greece.
The Community replied to the Greek statement on 
social affairs at the sixth deputies meeting on the 9th. 
of June at which the Greeks made clear their stance 
on free movement of capital and the right of establish­
ment* while the secondary legislation, committee, 
switched from Harmonisation to the budget, the *
2 01
20institutions and staff regulations
However* this may be an optimistic view of
21the progress of negotiations. It was reported that 
at this meeting* the sixth, of the deputies* France 
had demanded a complete revision of Community policy 
concerning wine, fruit and vegtables before effective 
negotiations could take place. This was one month 
after Presidential statements had been made support­
ing entry. It was thought that the french attitude 
was an attempt to appease the farmers of the french 
Midi. However under the headline "Barrier to Greece 
lifted" we discover that the Italians and the French
agreed not to insist on reform and instead to wait for
22a Commission report on the subject .
At the seventh deputies meeting, another dis­
agreement provided an illustration of the negotiating 
principles in practise. As the secondary legislation 
committee discussed tobacco, the Community laid down 
the position to be accepted by Greece in agriculture
and answered the Greek proposals on establishment
2 3and free movement of capital . In these statements
the Community rejected Greek requests for subsidies
because of its transport costs. Neither would the
Community permit an increase in the proportion of
sugar production covered by unconditional price
guarantees nor extend market support to raw cotton
and raisins as it was felt that this would constitute
24a modification of the C.A.P. • Coincidentally, the
next day the negotiations were described as progressing
2 5at a snail's pace ,
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The third ministerial meeting set a new time
table and brought forward the next ministerial
meeting to 17th. Oct,^^, This may have been inspired
by the application of Spain and the hints about
similar Portugese action.
Before the eighth deputies' .meeting of 23rd,
27September Turkey expressed its concern that Greece
might exclude them from the Communities in the
future. The Greeks denied that they had refused to
undertake not to veto the Turks .... The Turks
admitted that they were not in a position to make
28application under Art.237
The eighth deputies' meeting had the Communities
commenting on capital movement and establishing a
procedure for considering the results and problems
of secondary legislation as the committee itself was
considering competition rules. The Greeks made a
29declaration on the institutions
The fourth ministerial meeting saw some progress 
being made and the begining of substantive talks. It 
was agreed that the customs union* Paris Treaty* cap­
ital movement and external relations and industrial 
goods could be shortly resolved. This may not have 
been unconnected with the forthcoming Greek elections
and could have been to assist the New Democracy* pro-
30European Party domestically . The Community and 
Karamanlis were not disappointed; PASOK, the 
leading anti-E.E.C.party* increased their vote from 
13^ to 259  ^which gave them 93 seats as opposed to 13 * 
There was overall 6oÿ support for pro-community parties.
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At the ninth deputy meeting of 11th. Nov. the
Greeks talked more of the E.C.S.C. and Euratom as
did the Comminities, clarifying the position for
sectoral talks and, as did the secondary legislation
31committee, discussing external relations •
Karamanlis was now convinced that the negotiations
32were "developing normally" and proceeded to condemn 
Turkey's conduct. He again made reference to the 
special relationship he was seeking with N.A.T.O,.
At the tenth deputy meeting of 9th. December 
the Community had been concerned with social affairs, 
state aids, regional policy, agriculture and trans­
itional measures; the Greeks with the customs union, 
free movement of industrial goods and the secondary
legislation committee looked again at external 
33relations •
There then followed the fifth Ministerial 
meeting of 19th, December at which a Commission
memorandum on the customs union in industrial goods
34 3 5was discussed . At the end of December it was
suggested that the member states had taken an informal 
decision to admit Greece on almost any terras but 
to resist the Spanish and Portugese applications.
It was thought that progress on the question 
of Mediterranean produce would have to wait the out­
come of the French elections. The Greeks pressed for 
early entry* They said it was to resolve all quest­
ions save the budget and the C.A.P. by the end of 
March. The Commission president sœiid that the situa­
tion was too complex to toe hurried^^é This was suff­
iciently disturbing to result in Karamanlis making
2 0 4
another tour of European capitals.
On this tour he chose* cleverly, to discuss 
tooth the E.E.C. and N.A.T.O. which might have helped 
prevent Commission censure. Turkish generals had been 
appointed to the Izmir command which gave the Greeks 
cause for concern despite a U.S. embargo on arms
O rr
sales to Turkey during the Cyprus crisis . Karamanlis 
proposed in these extra-systemic talks a maximum five
O Û
year transitional period and although receiving no
positive reply he did hear from the U.K. that they would
keep Greek negotiations separate from the Spanish and
39Portugese applications . President Jenkins then made
a statement for the Commission. He did not* as he
could not, commit the Community to signature of a
Treaty by the year end but aaid that talks should be
almost complete by then. He also assured the Hellenic
Republic of a positive approach on the Communities'
part^^. Mr, Karamanlis returned to Greece "satisfied"^^
and again emphasised that the N.A.T.O. talks had not
been connected with the E.E.C. negotiations.
On the 7th. Feb. 1978 the Council announced that
42it had agreed its final negtiating position . France
had tried to have, a commitment made for entry at the
end of 1 9 8 0 but this was not accepted. The U.K.
expressed concern that the Community had been giving
too much attention to the Greek application and
voiced suspicion that France and Italy were considering
43blocking Spain and Portugal's applications .
The eleventh and twelfth deputies' meetings were?
devoted to agreeing details on the customs union and
44free movement of industrial goods
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The thirteenth deputy meeting considered the
free movement of capital and customs union in ind-
45ustrial goods and external relations . The sixth 
ministerial meeting of 3rd. April presumably gave the 
final consensus to conclude talks on the subjects of
captial movement and the customs union in industrial
, 46 goods
The Commission then submitted another Memo which 
was to be a regular feature, Karamanlis now felt able 
to predict that Greece would be a full member in two
4?years
The fourteenth deputy meeting of 12th. May,, the
1 5th. of 12th. June, and the l6 th, of 23rd, July dealt
progressively with the E.C.S.C., the external relations,
in industrial goods common market, free movement of
capital and Euratom. This coincided with the Commis-
48sion's fifth Memo on Euratom .
There then followed the seventh ministerial meet­
ing on the 2 6 th. June discussing Euratom, E.C.S.C. and
49capital movement , The secondary legislation committee
examined statistics* data processing and rules on origin
of goods. The Commission produced Memos on economics
and finance and on agriculture.
50About this time the United Kingdom had suggested 
that the Greeks hold a referendum of entry which was 
rejected by the Greeks quite reasonable, as the British 
themselves had not held a referendum on entry.
Progress was made at the seventeenth deputy meet­
ing of 2 7 th.July. Agriculture* economics and finance, 
fishing* transport* agriculture and trade with non- 
member third states were on the agenda. The Greek
20 ô
system of import and capital payments were talked about. 
The secondary legislation committee looked at rice* 
beef and the Commission submitted memorandums on 
social policy* institutions* state aids and regional 
policy.
It was now understood^^that 1 9 8 I would be the
entry date for the Greeks and that there would be
a two tier transitional period of five years and seven
years and it was hoped that negotiations would end
by December, Before the eighteenth deputy meeting
of 2 9 th. September an interesting problem arose.
There were rumours of a veto of Greek entry by the
French. Whether there was ever any possibility of
this we shall never be able to determine and this
might merely have been an idea put out by the French
to test the water, or even by some other member state
53to see what reaction would ensue. It was said
that the members of the European Parliament would
challenge the use of such a veto. It is difficult to
fathom the import of such a statement. Effectively
the Parliament would have been as impotent as at the
time of de Gaulle.
The eighteenth deputies' meeting itself involved
talks upon textiles and relations with third states*
state aids* regional policy and outstanding problems
in secondary legislation. The secondary legislation
committee began the task of effecting Harmonisation in
the C.A.P. and made a report to the Commission asking
for a Memo to be produced which was in fact done at the*
54-nineteenth deputies' meeting of 2?thi October . At 
this meeting economics and finance* the industrial
2 0 7
customs union, state monopolies and external relations
were the topics. Hops, flax and hemp preoccupied the
secondary legislation committee.
Shortly after this meeting it was heard that
the United Kingdom and the French Republic had taken
a strong line over Council voting -in order to maximisa
5 5their own influence .
The secondary legislation continued in its exam­
ination of agricultural problems and the Commission 
submitted working papers on right of establishment, 
own resources and transport policy^^. It was after 
this meeting that it seemed certain that the Treaty 
would be signed in the following year. Greece did
express some concern as to the timing of the grants 
57and subsidies , These doubts were assuaged by 
Giolatti for the Commission^^. December was indeed* 
as promised, to see the breakthrough in negotiation.
The twelfth deputies' meeting on 1st December 
was unremarkable and again looked like marking time 
until the forthcoming ministerial meeting, (Discus­
sions ranged across finance, the institutions, the
customs union,, state aids, regional policy and V.A.T, 
59 Vtook place ^ )•
It was however the presentation of a package by 
the Community at the ninth ministerial meeting on the 
6th. December which saw the begining of a new phase^? 
Transitional provisions, agriculture and derogation,, 
the troublesome problems were set out. The Greek 
reply came at the twenty-first deputy meeting at which 
on the 1 5th. December ^they requested another min­
isterial meeting.
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It was at this the tenth ministerial meeting 
of 20th. December that these questions were settled.
A special protocol was permitted for cotton and a , 
safeguard provision similar to Art. 35 included.
Priority was to be given to Greek workers in employ­
ment matters until the end of the - transitional period.
A visit by Contogeorgis to the Commission on 
23rd. January helped to clarify the questions yet to 
be resolved^^. The twenty-second deputies' meeting 
of 23rd February allowed consideration of the 
customs union in industrial products* transport* 
movement of capital, .state aids and regional policy.
A procedure was agreed for the drafting of an 
accession treaty. The secondary legislation committee 
looked at external relations* right of establishment 
and social affairs. The Commission sent final 
proposals on Agriculture, the transitional budget 
and fisheries bringing the number of such proposals 
(Memos) to nineteen. This was to be the last Commis­
sion document and the secondary legislation committee 
was not recorded as having been active^^.
The twenty-third deputies' meeting reconsidered 
the customs union* external relations* E.C.S.C.*
Euratom, economics and finance, E.I.B. transport and 
^^agriculture* establishment, tax and regional policy 
and* not surprisingly the eleventh ministerial meeting 
of 3rd. April 1978 was able to state that all questions 
had been agreed.
The Commission began the chore of treaty drafting^^ 
Notwithstanding the conclusion above there was a 
twenty-fourth deputies* meeting on May l4th. to
3 0 9
discuss the E.I.B. and another,, the twenty-fifth and 
final in May on the topic of the Parliament, some 
five days before signature of the Accession Treaty 
on 28th. May.
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REFERENCES TO APPENDIX A
The Bulletin of the European Communities is cited 
herein "B” and the London Times thus "T", Refer­
ences to the Bulletin, unless otherwise stated* are 
to the year/part followed by the paragraph. The Times 
citations are to the day of the month of the year 
(all 1 9 0 0 's) and then, when available* the page 
number and column.
1.B.7 6 .7/8.1201
2 .T.8 ,July,7 6 ,
3.T.12,July*76.4d.
4.T.1 3 ,July,76.3d.
5 .T.2 7 ,July,7 6 .6d.
6 .T.1 2 ,Aug,7 6 .1 2c.
7 .T.4 ,Sept.76.4a
8 .T. 1 3 ,Nov.7 6 .4a.
9.T.6,Jan,77.5h.
10.T.20*Jan,7 7 .6a,
11.B.7 7 .1-2 .2 .1 .
12.T.1,Feb,7 7 .6g.
1 3 .B.7 7 .2-2 .2 . 1  .
14.T.1,March,77.5g.
15 .T.II,March,77.7a.
1 6 .B.7 7 .3 -2 .2 . 1  .
17 .T.3 I,March,7 7 .5g.
18.B.7 7 .4-2.2.1.
19.B.77.5-2.2,1 .
2 0 .B.7 7 .6 -2 .2 .1 .
21.T,13„Juhe,77.5a.
2 2 .T.2 3 ,June*77,1 la.
2 3 .B.7 7 .7/ 8 .-2 .2 .1 .
24.T.9,July*77.3 1 .
2 5 .T. 2 5 ,.July, .77
2 6 .T.2 6 ,July,77
27/.B.7 7 .9 -2 .2 . 1 .
2 8 .T. 1 5 ,Sept.77
2 9 .B.7 7 .10-2.2.3.
3 0 .T.12,Nov,77.5b.
3 1 .B.7 7 .11-2.2.1.
3 2 .T. 1 5 ,Dec,7 7 ,6a.
3 3 . B , 7 7 . 1 2 - 2 . 2 . 1 ,
3 4 .as above.
35.T. 1 9 ,Dec,77.4c.
3 6 .T.2 0 ,Dec,7 7 .3 1 .
37.T.7,Jan,7 8 .3g.
38.T.2 3 ,Jan,78.8a.
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39.T.26,Jan.78.5a.
40.T.28,Jan.78.4a.
41.B.78.2-2.2.1 .
42.as above.
4 3 .T.2,Feb.78.5a.
44.B.78.2-2.2.1.
4 5 .B.7 8 .3-2.2.1.
46.B.7 8 .4-2.2.1.
4 7 .T.7,April,7 8 .6a.
48.B.7 8 .6-2.2.1.
4 9 « as above.
5 0 .T.1 8 ,June.7 8 .1 6c.
5 1 .B.78.7/8-2.2.2.
5 2 .T.28,July.7 8 .6a.
5 3 .T.2 8 ,Sept.7 8 .5f*
5 4.B.78.10-2.2.1.
55.T.30,Oct.78.la
5 6 .B.7 8 .1 1-2 ,2 .2 .
57.T.7,Nov.7 8 .7c,
58.T.28,Nov.78.9f. 
59.8 .78.12-2 .2 .2 .
6 0 .as above.
6 1 .as above.
6 2 .B.7 9 .1-2 .2 .1 .
6 3 .B.7 9 .2 -2 .2 .2 .
64.as above.
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A P P E N D I X  B .
Lindberg & Scheingold : Some Terminology 
and concepts.
It is unfair to try to summarise a complicated 
and well argued theory and that is not our aim. In 
this appendix we repeat some of the definitions given 
by the authors for their terminology.
"Once an undertaking like the European Community 
is launched* the complex set of agreements that it 
implies....may be fulfilled* retracted* or extended to 
areas where only tentative commitments existed* or to 
altogether new policy areas. These notions of fulfilled, 
retracted and extended obligations will constitute for 
us contrasting patterns of decision making outcomes.
They are linked directly to system change because 
what they identify are the effects of decisions taken 
by the community system on the system itself".
"....system change (operationalised ... as changes 
in the functional scope and institutional capacities 
of the community) can be predicted (explained) accor­
ding to the following equations;
where d:-a change in; S;-the existing political system; 
f:-is a function of ; Su.;-systemic support; D;-demand; 
L ;-leadership; E;-general error term.
Their systemic support is of two kinds "identitive", 
links between community citizens and "systemic", being 
links to the community itself. "Support does establish 
important parameters for the decision making process".
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Demand is considered to be an essential factor for 
continued growth and is analytically divided into two 
parts that of the subject demanding and the content of 
the demand.
Leadership is seen in terms of processing demand. Lead­
ership is vested in the supra-national institutions 
and the member states.
The following terms are also used.
"Forward Linkage" describes a sequence whereby com­
mitment to participate in joint decision making has 
intitiated a process that has led to a marked increase 
in scope of the system or its institutional capacities. 
In terms of the growth of the system this model yeilds 
potentially high benefits but at considerable risk of 
failure.
"Output failure" refers to a situation in which such 
a commitment was accepted but where the system was 
unable to produce an acceptable set of policies and 
rules and where the capacity and scope of the system 
were not enhanced. In fact scope and authority oould 
both be decreased since the failure is one that might 
be generalised as due to a lack of will or leadership 
to go on with integration as such.
"Equilibrium" occurs when an area of activity is rout- 
inized or institutionalized. Rules are established 
and recognized,,and there is little need for new inter­
governmental bargaining. Nor is there any increase im 
scope or im institutional capacity^although the orig­
inal commitment may involve important joint tasks in 
both regards. In terms of growth, the gains are veiy 
modest, but so are the risks.
21 4
"Spill baek" refers to a situation; in which there is 
a withdrawal from a set of specific obligations* Rules 
are no longer regularly enforced or obeyed. The scope 
of Community action and its institutional capacities 
decreases   .....  "
-oOo-
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A P P E N D I X  C.
ENLARGEMENT CHRONOLOGY
1951 - 1981
April 1951  
Dec. 1 9 5 4  
Feb. 1 95 7  
March 1957 
Feb. 1 95 9  
Nov. 1 95 9  
July 1961  
August 1961  
Augus t 1961
October 19^1 
March 1962 
April 1 9 6 2  
Jan. 1 9 6 3
Treaty establishing the E.C.S.C. 
signed in Paris.
Association agreement between the 
U.K. and the E.C.S.C. concluded.
The U.K. proposes establishment of 
a European free trade area.
Treaties of Rome signed, setting up 
the E.E.C, and Euratom.
Co-operation agreement between the 
U.K. and Euratom signed.
European Free Trade Association 
convention signed in Stockholm. 
Signature of the Athens Association 
Agreement.
Irish Republic applies for membership 
of the Communities.
The U.K. and Denmark request nego­
tiations aiming at membership of the 
E.E.C..
The U.K. and the E.E.C. commence 
negotiations.
The U.K. applies for membership of 
E.C.S.C. and Euratom*
Norway requests negotiations for 
membership of the E.E.C.•
British negotiations with European 
Communities broken off following
2 1 6
Appendix Ct An Enlargement Chronology
April 1 9 6 7  
May 1 9 6 7
Sept. 1 9 6 7  
July 196 9
Oct, 1 9 6 9  
Dec. 1 9 6 9
Dec. 1 9 6 9  
June 1 9 7 0
August 1 9 7 0  
Oct. 1971
Jan. 1 9 7 2
press conference at which General 
de Gaulle expressed opposition to 
British entry.
Colonels Coup in Greece.
The U.K., Irish Republic, Norway 
and Denmark submit formal applic­
ations for membership,
European Commission publishes opinion 
on enlargement•
Following resignation of de Gaulle 
in April 19^9» M . Pompidou, newly 
elected French President, indicates 
that he has no opposition in prin­
ciple to U.K. entry.
Commission publishes second opinion. 
Summit conference of Heads of state 
or Government agrees on future deve­
lopment and enlargement of the 
Community,
End of Community's transition period. 
Opening of negotiations with Brit­
ain, Irish Republic,, Denmark and 
Norway.
Association with Spain concluded. 
Parliament (u.K.) votes overwhelm­
ingly in favour of entry.
Negotiations concluded with all 
applicants. The Treaty of Accession 
is signed in Brussels.
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May 1 9 7 2
July 1 9 7 2
Sept. 1 9 7 2
Oct. 1 9 7 2
Oct. 1 9 7 2
Jan. 1 9 7 3  
March 1974
April 19 7 4
June 1 9 7 4
Dec. 1 9 7 4
June 1975
A referendum in the Irish Republic 
approves entry.
Association agreements between 
Portugal and E.E.C. and E.C.S.C. 
concluded.
A referendum in Norway gives a result 
against entry,
A referendum in Denmark approves 
entry.
A summit conference of the Heads 
of State of the nine in Paris set 
guidelines for the future develop­
ment of the Community.
Community of Nine States effective. 
Labour Government assumes office 
in U.K. pledged to renegotiate the 
terms of membership and to consult 
the British people.
The U.K. informs the other Community 
members of its general renegotia- 
tion objections.
The U.K. presents the Council of 
Ministers with its detailed renego­
tiation aims.
A meeting of the Heads of Government 
makes progress on Britain's demands 
and agrees a regional development 
fund.
Greek application submitted.
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June 1 9 7 5
Feb. 1 9 7 6  
July 1 9 7 6  
July 1 9 7 6  
March 1977 
Nov, 1 9 7 8
Feb . 1 9 7 9  
April 1 9 7 9  
May 1 9 7 9  
J an. 1981
U.K. referendum: vote to stay in 
Communities by 2 to 1 majority. 
Council accepts Greek application. 
Negotiations opened with Greece,
Spain applies for membership.
Portugal applies for membership. 
Commission opinion on Spanish member­
ship .
Negotiations with Spain begin. 
Negotiations with Greece concluded. 
Athens Accession Treaty signed,
Athens Treaty takes effect.
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A P P E N D I X  D .
TREATY ARTICLES
Art,237 E.E.C.
Any European State may apply to become a member of the 
Community. It shall address its application to the 
Council, which shall act unanimously after obtaining 
the opinion of the Commission,
The conditions of admission and the adjustments to this 
Treaty necessitated thereby shall be the subject of an 
agreement between the Member States and the applicant 
State, This agreement shall be submitted for ratific­
ation by all the Contracting States in accordance with 
their respective constitutional requirements.
Art . 2 3 8 E.E.C.
The Community may conclude with a third State,, a union 
of States or an international organisation agreements 
establishing an association involving reciprocal rights 
and obligations, common action and special procedures.
These agreements shall be concluded by the Council, 
acting unanimously after consulting the Assembly.
Where such agreements call for amendments to this Treaty,, 
these amendments shall first be adopted in accordance 
with the procedure laid down in Article 2 3 6 ,
Art . 2 3 6 E.E.C,
The Government of any Member State or the Commission 
may submit to the Council proposals for amendment of 
this Treaty.
If the Council, after consulting the Assembly and, 
where appropriate, the Commission, delivers an opinion 
in favour of calling a conference of representatives 
of the Governments of the Member States, the conference 
shall be convened by the President of the Council for
2 20
the purpose of determining by common accord the 
amendments to be made to this Treaty.
The amendments shall enter into force after being 
ratified by all the Member States in accordance with 
their respective constitutional requirements.
Art.131 E.E.C.
The Member States agree to associate with the Community 
the non-European countries and territories which have 
special relations with Belgium, Prance* Italy* the 
Netherlands (and the United Kingdom).
These countries and territories (hereinafter called 
"countries and territories) are listed in Annex IV 
to this Treaty.
The purpose of association shall be to promote the 
economic and social development of the countries and 
territories and to establish close relations between 
them and the Community as a whole.
In accordance with the principles set out in the 
Preamble to this Treaty* association shall serve 
primarily to further the interests and prosperity of 
the inhabitants of these countries and territories 
in order to lead them to the economic* social and 
cultural development to which they aspire.
Art.9 BRUSSELS.
In order to facilitate the adjustment of the new 
Member States to the rules in force within the
2 21
Communities, the application of the original Treaties 
and acts adopted by the institutions shall* as a 
transitional measure, be subject to the derogations 
provided for in this Act.
2, Subject to the dates* time limits and special 
provisions provided for in this Act, the application 
of the transitional measures shall terminate at the 
end of 1977.
Art.9 Athens.
The application of the original Treaties and acts 
adopted by the institutions shall, as a transitional 
measure, be subject to the derogations provided for 
in this Act,
2. Subject to special provisions in this Act laying 
down different dates or shorter or longer time 
limits, the application of the transitional measures 
shall terminate at the end of 1985.
Art.60 BRUSSELS.
2. In respect of products not covered, on the date of 
accession, by a common organisation of the market, the 
provisions of Title 1 concerning the progressive 
abolition of charges having equivalent effect to customs 
duties and of quantitative restrictions and measures 
having equivalent effect shall not apply to those 
charges* restrictions and measures if they form part 
of a national market organisation of the date of 
accession.
This provision shall apply only to the extent necessary 
to ensure the maintenance of the national organisat­
ion until the common organisation of the market for 
these products is implemented.
2 2 2
Art.62 VIENNA.
Fundamental change of circumstances,
1. A fundamental change of circumstances which has 
occurred with regard to those existing at the time 
of the conclusion of a treaty* and which was not 
foreseen by the parties* may not be invoked as a 
ground for terminating or withdrawing from the 
treaty unless:
(a) the existence of those circumstances con­
stituted an essential basis of the consent 
of the parties to be bound by the treaty; 
and
(b) the effect of the change is radically to 
transform the extent of obligations still 
to be performed under the treaty.
2. A fundamental change of circumstances may not be 
invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing 
from a treaty:
(a) if the treaty establishes a boundary; or
(b) if the fundamental change is the result of 
a breach by the party invoking it either of 
an obligation under the treaty or of any 
other international obligation owed to any 
other party to the treaty.
3. If, under the foregoing paragraphs* a party may 
invoke a fundamental change of circumstances as a 
ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty 
it may also invoke the change as a ground for sus­
pending the operation of the treaty.
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A P P E N D I X  E .
THE GLOBAL MEDITERRANEAN POLICY ; WORKING HYPOTHESIS, 
(from MEDITERRANEAN EUROPE & THE COMMON MARKET, 
BAKLANOFF page 230)
(1) Geographical area : the policy will apply to those
coastal Mediterranean countries (including Portugal), 
plus Jordan, that apply for it.
(2) Throughout that area, a free-trade area in indus­
trial products, qualified by exceptions for sensitive 
products, should be gradually established.
(3) Some reciprocity should exist between the E.E.C. 
and the partner countries, but this need not necess­
arily take the form of reverse preferences.
(4) A 'considerable' (but numerically undefined) per­
centage of agricultural goods should be covered, these 
concessions to be periodically reviewed. Safeguard 
clauses would apply. These concessions would not be 
uniform but would take account of variations from 
country to country.
(5 ) All agreements would include a 'co-operation' 
section but financial aid would be excluded for Spain* 
Portugal, Israel and Yugoslavia.
(6) The global agreements should enter into force if 
possible at the beginning of 1974.
oOo
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